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The series of events which began with the Arab oil
embargo in 1973 and recently culminated in the Iranian
Revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the Iran-
Iraq Conflict have underscored the vulnerability of Western
oil supplies from the Persian Gulf region. This research
analyzes the potential role of France and West Germany as
U.S. allies in relation to the problem of ensuring the
security of the Persian Gulf while maintaining the credi-
bility of deterrence in Europe. Included in this analysis
are assessments of French and West German dependence on
Persian Gulf oil supplies and an evaluation of each country's
capability and intention to contribute to the security of
the region. The conclusion reached is that neither country
in the near-term has a viable alternative to political and
military efforts to protect their energy security. Moreover,
each country possesses unique capabilities to complement
U.S. efforts in this area, but the policy of France conforms
more to American policy than that of the traditionally
staunch supporter of U.S. policies, West Germany.
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The series of events which began with the Arab oil
embargo in 197 3 and recently culminated in the Iranian revolu-
tion, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the Iran-Iraq
conflict have underscored the vulnerability of Western oil
supplies from the Persian Gulf Region. These events served
notice that extra-European events could pose threats to
Western security of equal or possibly greater significance
than the Soviet threat in central Europe. When the 197 3
crisis occurred, the West European governments found that
they were heavily dependent on Middle Eastern and Persian
Gulf oil at a time when they had just completed a gradual
but continuous withdrawal of military influence from these
regions.
The ensuing search for oil security by the Western
industrial powers after 1973 consisted of a two-fold attempt
to decrease dependence on Persian Gulf sources while increas-
ing economic and military interdependence between themselves
and the oil-producing states via increased industrial
cooperation and arms transfer arrangements. The Iranian
revolution highlighted the pitfalls of the latter strategy
and its corollary, the belief that security and stability in
the Persian Gulf area could be assured solely by the creation
and maintenance of a regional Western-leaning military power

such as Iran. The Iran-Iraq conflict (and the resulting loss
of a large share of Middle East oil production) revealed that
the major industrial countries had failed to significantly
reduce their energy dependence on the major oil producers by
1980. Finally, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan solidified
the notion that these previous strategies to ensure the flow
of Western oil supplies could not, except in the long term,
replace individual or multilateral Western efforts to become
capable of direct political and/or military intervention to
protect their interests in the Persian Gulf.
Since the end of World War II, the security interests of
the United States and those of Europe have been intimately
related and have been institutionalized through the creation
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) . This
reality, plus the fact that most of the Western European
states are highly industrialized, energy-consuming nations
like the U.S., creates a joint interest in the continued
safe flow of energy from the Persian Gulf. Of particular
importance to American security interests are the two most
powerful continental allies, France and the Federal
Republic of Germany (FRG) . Because of the centrality of
these two countries to American security, this research will
focus on the importance of Persian Gulf energy supplies to
France and West Germany, analyze the role which they see
themselves assuming in jointly securing the safe flow of
10

energy from this area, and point out areas of continuity and
discontinuity with American perceptions.
Naturally, the problem of ensuring adequate access to
energy sources is not one unique to France, West Germany, or
the United States, nor even to NATO countries alone. Other
Western-oriented industrial countries such as Japan,
Australia, and New Zealand are to varying degrees concerned
with the problem and are potential contributors to the
solution. In addition, other members of NATO are affected by
the problem directly and indirectly. While not all NATO
countries are directly affected by dependence on Persian Gulf
energy, all are subjected to the reality that the protection
of energy supplies from this region is not a task that can be
viewed in isolation. This task is intimately related to the
primary function of NATO—the defense of West Europe and
North America. In an era of limited defense resources and
economic stringency, the deployment of defense assets has
become almost a zero-sum endeavor. Almost any asset ear-
marked by Western powers for Persian Gulf contingencies
becomes an asset which is no longer available for Europe.
Therefore, all NATO nations have an interest in the effi-
cient protection of Persian Gulf energy flow.
This analysis of France and West Germany as American
partners in the protection of energy supplies will be
organized into four major sections. The first section will
concentrate on the effects of the 1973 oil embargo on these
11

two countries and their ensuing efforts to reduce depend-
ency on energy imports from the Persian Gulf region. A
summary of their progress from 1973 to 1980, when the
second oil shock after the Iran-Iraq conflict occurred, will
show that neither country to a significant degree improved
its energy security. Neither country in the near future will
therefore be able to rely on alternative sources of energy
or conservation as a substitute for political and military
effort to protect their energy security.
The second section will focus on the role of France in
the protection of Western oil supplies. Due to the nature
of France's foreign policy and global interests, this
analysis will briefly examine France's capabilities and
intentions vis a vis the defense of Europe before turning to
a more comprehensive analysis of her overseas policy and
capabilities, especially as they relate to naval matters and
the protection of sea lanes of communication. France,
despite espousing an adamantly independent policy, will find
her interests and policies increasingly paralleling those of
the United States, owing to her resource constraints.
The third section will examine the role of West Germany
in the protection of Western oil supplies. Because of the
overwhelming regional nature of West Germany's defense
interest, the examination of her military capabilities and
potential contribution will center on the European theater.
Despite a declaratory policy of complete solidarity with
12

American policies, it appears that the Federal Republic is
increasingly assuming a stance more independent of American
policies
.
The final section will identify similarities and
differences that characterize the policies which France and
West Germany have pursued in relation to the threats to
their security that have arisen since 1973 in the Persian
Gulf area. When these policies are in turn compared to
American perceptions and policies, a somewhat surprising
conclusion is reached. The "independent" policy of France
conforms more to American policy than that of the tradition-
ally staunch supporter of U.S. policies, West Germany.
13

II. FRANCE, WEST GERMANY, AND THE ENERGY CRISIS
One of the most difficult and dangerous problems facing
the Western industrial nations today is their dependence on
external sources of energy, primarily from the Middle East.
The independence and security of West Germany and France,
our major European continental partners in NATO, are of
primary importance to the security of the United States.
Therefore, it is important for the U.S. to understand the
degree of energy dependence of these countries on the
Middle East suppliers and their prospects for the future.
It is often accepted as dogma that a sudden cut-off of
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries' (OPEC)
supplies, over which Western countries have little or no
control, would bring immediate catastrophe and set off
major political shock waves, particularly in West Germany
and France. In this paper, I will analyze the validity of
this hypothesis by comparing the energy policies and
problems of West Germany and France. This comparison will
include the following topics:
(1) the background of West German and French energy
policies from World War II to the "first shock wave" in
1973.
(2) the 1973 Arab oil embargo.
14

(3) the events from the 1973 oil embargo until the
"second shock wave" in 1979.
(4) the "second shock wave" in 1979.
(5) future prospects and new approaches.
A. POLICY FROM WORLD WAR II TO 197 3
In a broad sense the energy policies of France and West
Germany pursued a similar course which was typical of
Europe as a whole from the end of World War II until the
Arab oil embargo of 1973. Both were included in the
fundamental shift that took place in Europe ' s energy
position after the Second World War, in which the coal-
mining industry shrank drastically, and Europe lost its
self-sufficiency in energy that it had previously enjoyed.
European governments felt increasingly free to rest their
economies on cheap and seemingly safe supplies of Middle
Eastern and North African oil. In West Germany and France
the annual growth in demand for oil during the years 19 60-
1972 was 12.6 percent and 14.1 percent, respectively.
[Ref. 1: p. 6]
The different set of rules that governed the petroleum
and coal markets were an outgrowth of the European
Community's organization which from its inception treated
coal and oil as separate commodities. The treaty that
instituted the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in
1951 placed the policy for coal with that organization.
Atomic energy policy was left primarily in the hands of the
15

individual states with, some power granted to Euratom, and
other energy sources were entrusted in 19 59 to the European
Economic Community (EEC) . No provision was made for a
common energy policy, and those of the various Community
institutions were extremely diverse. For example, the ECSC
imposed special rules for the disclosure of price and
commercial practices that had no parallel with respect to
other energy sources in the EEC. For this reason, as well
as others, production and marketing were much less flexible
for coal than for petroleum. [Ref. 3: p. .43]
Fearful of the return to the monopolistic practices of
the pre-war period, the ECSC maintained a rigid control over
the coal market. In addition to enforcing market disclosures
and non-discrimination in sales to customers, it limited the
use of restrictive agreements or mergers among enterprises.
As a result prices in the various countries were held down
artificially without regard for production costs of the
various coal deposits and the competitive situations in the
various regional markets for alternative fuels.
On the other hand, no rules existed for limiting the
entry of the multinational oil companies into the European
market. These already enjoyed various advantages over the
coal industry, including a greater operating flexibility
because of size and international structure, as well as the
numerous advantages that petroleum as a source of energy
compared to coal enjoyed such as availability as energy for
16

for the rapidly growing automobile market. As a result an
oligopolistic battle developed between the major oil
companies on one side and the nationalized or cartelized
coal companies on the other in which the oil companies held
the advantage. Variable costs in the coal industry were
based mainly on wages, accounting for about 60 percent of
the total, and tending to rise. Variable costs in the oil
industry were mainly royalties and benefit taxes in the
1960s constituting about 15 percent of the consumer price in
Western Europe. Average fixed capital costs for oil tended
to decrease during this period with such factors as the
increase of tanker capacity. The result was that the price
of oil calculated on a caloric basis, was about equal to
that of coal in 1955-1957 and fell to about 70 percent of
the price of coal in 1971. Thus coal gave way to oil, its
share in the overall energy market falling from 61.2 percent
in 1960 to 22.2 percent in 1972. [Ref. 2: p. 7]
In spite of the protectionist measures taken in favor of
coal, the high coal labor costs and the more efficient and
flexible oil company policies spelled the demise of the
European coal industry by 197 3. From time to time, particu-
larly in the mid-fifties, some European governments expressed
concern over the possibility of an international energy
shortage and the risks posed by an excessive reliance on
foreign energy sources. Nevertheless, steps to reactivate
coal production never materialized. From the early 1950s
17

the policies of European governments toward the energy
market were based, at least in part, on the conviction that
the cost of energy represented an important variable in the
costs of industrial production and low-cost energy was
considered vital in determining the position European
industry would have in the international market. European
governments deluded themselves with the notion that economic
interdependence with the producer states would somehow pro-
tect them from serious supply difficulties. Thus when the
1973 crisis occurred the European governments found that
they were heavily dependent on Middle Eastern oil at a time
when they had just completed a gradual but continuous with-
drawal of military influence from the region.
In this situation of general energy dependence, each
European nation responded according to its philosophy,
institutions, and interests including the approach to the
regulation of materials. In this context the approach to
the energy situation differed markedly in France and West
Germany; the French relying on government planning and
interventionist policies and the Germans relying on market
conditions. The contrast may be summed up in the priorities
which West Germans and Frenchmen have brought to bear on oil
industry problems and many other economic problems in the
past: the German idea of conforming to the market and the
French idea of directing the industry according to the
national interest. In addition when the great conversion to
18

oil began in the 1950s, Germany and France found themselves
in different positions regarding access to oil abroad.
Long before the massive conversion to oil, France sought
to emulate America and Britain in acquiring crude oil con-
cessions abroad for national companies. The French enjoyed
initial success through the acquisition of Germany's share
of Mesopotamian concessions as booty following World War I
and in 192 4 the Compagnie Francaise des Petroles (CFP) was
founded on the French government's initiative for the
purpose of exploiting and processing this oil.
[Ref. 4: p. 19] This French success was tempered by their
failure to achieve entry into what became , after World War
II, the most important oil area in the world—Saudi Arabia.
When, in 1946-47, Socal and Texaco proceeded to organize
ARAMCO (Arabian American Company) by taking Exxon and Mobil
into their Arabian venture, CFP pressed for admittance to
the partnership, but the American companies refused to admit
the French. The French have never forgiven the Americans
for keeping them out of Saudi Arabia, and ARAMCO 's success
with Arabian oil in the years that followed—not the least
in the French and European markets—only increased their
resentment. It also accentuated the French animosity to the
role of the U.S. major ceil companies in the French oil
market. [Ref. 4: p. 20]
However, early on the French had established a policy to
promote a French petroleum industry at the expense of the
19

international oil companies. The legal basis of this
policy was a set of laws that came into effect on January
10, 1925, April 4, 1926, and March 30, 1928, respectively.
These laws established a state monopoly for hydrocarbon
imports which the government then delegated to public and
private companies. Foreign and French companies obtained
their import licenses on conditions that usually included a
commitment to a specific volume of refinery capacity in
France and a high level of stockpiling. [Ref. 5: p. 99]
In 19 55 the French petroleum policy was crowned with
success in Algeria (prior to its independence in 1962) where
oil was struck. In 1960, the state corporation, Union
Generale des Petroles (UGP) , was formed in order to refine
and sell the crude produced by French companies in the
Algerian Sahara. Because the Algerian Sahara was still
French territory and because the major international
companies were only marginally represented there, the UGP
was able to enter the French market successfully as a new-
comer. It became a rival to the previously mentioned CFP
which by then was a semi-public corporation with state
financial participation of 35 percent. [Ref. 5: p. 99]
In 1963 the French government reorganized the petroleum
market. The new import regime, the government-owned
Enterprises de Recherches et d'activites Petrolieres
(ERAP) , came into effect in 19 65 and favored the French
companies, the UPG in particular, at the expense of the
20

multinationals. This new regime was specifically designed
to give the CPF the task of defending the national interests
among the club of international companies and of allowing
ERAP (later ELF-ERAP) to act as agent for French policy in
negotiations and relations with producer countries.
Thus the French, in contrast to a general air of compla-
cency in Europe, were aware of the risks of overdependence
on oil imports and by the early 1960s, although resigned to
the need for oil imports, had taken steps to maximize and
control the proportion that came from French-controlled areas.
Under this policy in 1961, France drew 32 percent of her
crude oil imports from Algeria and 20 percent from Iraq; thus
receiving more than half of her crude oil imports from sources
under French political, or at least French company, control.
French companies then produced 33 million tons of crude oil
in the "franc zone" or elsewhere, which was equivalent to
94 percent of French crude oil imports. [Ref. 4: p. 20]
Unfortunately, by 1973 the loss of political control and
company properties in Algeria had largely erased previous
French success. In that year only 8 percent of French crude
oil imports were still coming from Algeria and another 2
percent from other former franc-zone sources. French-owned
companies still produced a respectable volume of crude world-
wide, but this now only corresponded to 62 percent of French
imports. Even worse the footing of the French companies in
the OPEC countries where 87 percent of their crude originated
21

was no more secure than that of other Western countries.
[Ref. 4: p. 21]
West Germany, as was noted earlier in contrast to
France, was a more consistent follower of the free-
enterprise system and at the beginning of the 1950s had no
extraterritorial crude oil base under political or German
company control. But it had a small domestic production
(three million tons in 1955) which at the low consumption
level at the time actually supplied almost one-third of the
country's oil consumption. Coal liquification , which at
the height of World War II had supplied about four million
tons of petroleum products, had dwindled to insignificance
because of wartime bombing and postwar military government
prohibitions
.
West Germany's hard and soft coal deposits are the
largest in Europe, but for many years Germany had no energy
policy other than to protect coal against oil using a
heavy discriminatory tax on oil and taxation of imported
coal. Nevertheless, the share of coal in primary energy
consumption fell from 75 percent in 1960 to 31 percent in
1973 while the share of oil rose during the same period
from 21 to 56 percent. [Ref. 2: p. 51] Meanwhile, Germany
remained for a long time the only large European state with
no direct interest in the oil business. The U.S. and
Anglo-Dutch major oil companies controlled the bulk of
refineries and of the distribution network. Germany had
22

to rely on crude oil imports from sources outside German
political jurisdiction and outside German company control.
As can be seen from the preceding discussion what in
the early 1960s still looked like a decisive difference
between France, with a large independent crude oil base,
and Germany, without one, became in the early 1970s more of
a similarity between two oil have-nots, with their remaining
difference being the French oil companies 1 size and inter-
national integration and involvement.
Energy consumption patterns in France and Germany
evolved similarly during the time of the great conversion to
oil. In 1925 energy still meant reliance on coal in both
countries. In 1950 it meant oil to 20 percent consumption
in France, but to only 4 percent in West Germany. By 1965
oil's share was approaching 50 percent in both countries;
in 197 3 it had reached 72 percent in France and 5 8 percent
in Germany. [Ref. 4: p. 31]
Crude oil imports followed a similar pattern with
consumption in the two countries. Both France and Germany,
that is the refining companies operating within their
borders, drew almost exclusively on Middle Eastern and
African sources for the expansion of their crude oil
imports at that time. France was dependent upon Iraq and
Algeria until the debacle there, and thereafter by 1973
relied upon Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, other Persian Gulf
sources, and Nigeria. Germany by 1973 was dependent mostly
23

on Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, and Algeria. In 1973 the Arab
countries of the Persian Gulf loomed much larger in French
than in German imports of crude oil (64 percent versus 37
percent) ; those of North Africa much larger in German than
in French imports (36 and 13 percent, respectively). While
all other countries together from Iran to the U.S.S.R.
supplied roughly comparable shares of French and German
imports (24 and 28 percent, resepctively) . [Ref. 4: p. 34]
As these figures portray, on the eve of the 1973 Arab oil
embargo, both West Germany and France were in a tremendously
vulnerable position.
B. THE 197 3 ARAB OIL EMBARGO
The petroleum crisis beginning in October, 1973,
actually had two phases: the first, a reduction in oil
production; the second, an increase in prices. The first
phase, between October 1973 and February 1974, was associa-
ted mainly with scarcity and the second, beginning in March
1974, reflected the continuing problem of rising prices.
As an outgrowth of the 197 3 Arab-Israeli War between
October and November 1973, Arab countries comprising the
Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC)
decided to ban the exportation of petroleum to the United
States and the Netherlands and in the process to reduce
the production of petroleum by 25 percent. Although the
prime political target of the embargo was the United States,
it quickly became evident that Europe and Japan were the
24

most vulnerable, for the embargo on the United States could
generate an energy deficit on the American market of no more
than 1.5 percent. [Ref. 3: p. 93] By contrast the reduced
production plus the embargo on the Netherlands implied a
possible reduction of 12 percent of the energy supply of
Europe. Additionally, any shortage in the United States
primarily affected transportation, while in Europe the
entire industrial sector was threatened.
In October 197 3 France and Germany found themselves
facing similar challenges which may be categorized as
follows:
(1) How to assure oil supplies to their economies in
the face of oil production cuts by the Arab rulers.
(2) How to deal with a differentiated embargo that
deisgnated some countries as friendly, some as hostile, and
others as neutral.
(3) How much to rely on national, European, or
Atlantic approaches to meet the crisis.
(4) How to operate and perhaps modify national energy
policies and domestic market organizations in the new
environment.
The challenges to and approaches taken by France and
Germany were somewhat different. The French, because of
their attitude toward the Middle East conflict and U.S.
foreign policy, were designated by the Arabs as a friendly
state and were exempt from supply restrictions. The
25

Germans under the Brandt-Scheel government were more
neutral toward the Middle East conflict and more sympa-
thetic to U.S. foreign policy. As a result the Germans
were not subject to an outright embargo, but were sub-
jected to restriction.
The French government, relishing the favored treatment,
insisted that all oil companies supplying France implement
the Arab policy fully and refused to jeopardize it by acts
of economic solidarity with the boycotted Netherlands or
political solidarity with the United States. Rather, by
diplomatic initiatives in the Middle East, the French
hastened to express their desire for a demise of the major
international oil companies and for a more conspicuous
French place in the world oil structure and world politics.
The West German government on the other hand decried
the injustice of being made a target of oil supply restric-
tions. Appealing to European and Atlantic solidarity, it
offered as little offense as possible to the Arabs and
looked hopefully to the major oil companies for safeguarding
its oil supplies. Thus, it can be seen that the French
authorities received the Arab challenge by talking and
acting as fellow beneficiaries and stimulators of an oil
revolution, while the Germans objected to it and hoped to see
it reduced to a process of peaceful adaptation.
In the short run the direct impact of the supply
restriction on the French and German economies was both
26

different and similar in various respects. In both
countries the Arab oil supply restrictions interrupted the
past trend of rising net oil imports and domestic oil con-
sumption. Consumption likewise began to fall from the
preceding year's levels. These effects appeared most
distinctly in Germany. During the embargo time—which in
terms of supply effects on importers and consumers may be
equated roughly with the first half of 1974—Germany's net
oil imports from all sources ran 11 percent and its oil
consumption 14 percent below the year before. For France
the figures were 3 and 5 percent, respectively. [Ref. 4:
p. 70] Since the Arab supply curtailments affected about the
same proportion (roughly three-quarters) of both countries'
oil sources, it is evident that their impact on France was
distinctly less.
This effect was mitigated somewhat by the role that the
major oil companies played during the embargo. The
companies as a group passed on some of the supply curtail-
ment to France and mitigated that which was to hit Germany.
While both France and Germany felt the need to address
themselves directly to the oil-producing countries, France
was readier to do so. Since the producer governments
appeared at last to have gained some control over the
international oil companies, the French were ready to
assert that safe supplies for France and Europe could be
assured only by a policy of cooperation with these
27

governments, in preference to other international
endeavors.
This view inspired France's pro-Arab and anti-American
policy during the Middle East war and its diplomatic after-
math, and France's sponsorship of a dialogue between the
Arab countries and the EC states. As a result, France
(with British help) temorarily made progress in winning its
European partners over to a reluctant, basically negative
attitude to the U.S. government's invitation to demonstrate
some consumer solidarity on such occasions as the
Washington conference in February 1974. While the Germans
and others welcomed the U.S. invitation, they also joined in
a declaration of the EC's Council of Ministers that rejected
the American proposal to establish an international task
force of senior officials in order to formulate a consumer
action program. In the aftermath of failed U.S. initiatives
for consumer solidarity both France and Germany turned to
bilateral dealings with the Arab states.
France took the lead in the European rush to the Middle
Eastern oil fields. The French government and its two
principle companies initiated negotiations in Saudi Arabia
in an attempt to bypass the ARAMCO partners who in 197 3 had
furnished 30 million tons of Saudi oil to France. In early
January 19 74 ELF and CFP contracted with Petromin ( a state-
owned Saudi oil company) for the delivery of 27.5 million




French arms and industrial exports were negotiated
simultaneously. The French then sought a larger government-
to-government agreement with Saudi Arabia covering 8 00
million tons over twenty years or 40 million tons annually,
but were unsuccessful in this attempt. The Saudis appeared
more eager to be seen, presumably by Americans, in negotia-
tions with the French than to promise them deliveries, and
the French were becoming more cautious about prices.
French initiatives in other Middle Eastern countries
were even less fruitful in producing preferential long-term
bilateral oil agreements, but were nevertheless fruitful in
producing French export commitments. In 1974, after
Giscard d'Estaing became president, the French emphasis
switched to Iran. An agreement that envisaged large French
inputs into Iran's industrialization, gas liquification
,
petrochemical, steel, and transport equipment plants,
tankers, and naval vessels, and the supply of five large
nuclear power plants together with quantities of enriched
uranium was concluded. The Iranians did not commit them-
selves to supplying specific amounts of oil to France, but
vowed to reward the French industrial efforts with
supplementary petroleum supplies as far as available.
In addition Iran in June 1974, placed a down payment of
$1 billion to the Banque de France on future French exports,
followed by an Iranian loan of another $1 billion to the
French-Italian-Belgian-Spanish uranium enrichment project
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of EURODIF. By passing on to Iran 10 percent of the 53
percent share it held, the French commission obtained the
wherewithal for the plant construction, while Iran assured
itself of future deliveries of enriched uranium and access
to coveted nuclear technology. [Ref. 4: p. 73]
The German approach to the producer countries during
the embargo crisis began where the French had ended, in
Iran. The Germans sought to form an industrial consortium
to pursue projects in Iran with a view to developing the
flow of crude oil and gas to Germany. The Iranian side,
however, turned away from oil export projects and showed a
strong desire to enlist German industry in the building of
a new large refinery at Bushir on the Persian Gulf, and in
a petrochemical development that would utilize oil as a raw
material rather than exporting it as a fuel. An agreement
was reached to build an oil refinery at Bushir with a 25
million-ton capacity, on behalf of the Iranian National Oil
Company (NIOC) and a consortium of five German oil firms
with both NIOC and GOC (the German consortium) to share
future output equally. Other large projects included the
establishment of a petrochemical works, a steel mill, and a
diesel engine factory.
In conjunction with these deals a triangular, Federal
German Republic-U.S .S .R-Iran, deal under which Iranian gas
would be piped into the U.S.S.R., and Soviet gas, additional
to that contracted for under previous Soviet-German "pipe
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for gas deals" would be piped to West Germany was
concluded. [Ref. 4: p. 76]
While the gas project promised to supply Germany with a
future energy supply, the yield of the oil project was less
predictable. Not only did the Iranians avoid commitments to
supply crude oil to German refineries, they limited the
export availability of the new refinery's output by demand-
ing a pricing system that would make its products more
expensive than the norm. Thus it remained uncertain what
contribution the German involvement in Iran's industrial
development would eventually make to the security of
German oil supplies.
The Germans also found their way to Saudi Arabia. By
November 1974, the German government, realizing the need for
a major German oil company, had forced the merger of VEBA
and Gelsenberg, two companies in which there was public
ownership. Accordingly, Germany acquired a relatively
large government-owned oil firm with a significant share of
the German market. [Ref. 3: p. 97] A large delegation
representing this consortium was successful in making a
deal with the Saudis providing for a steel mill, a truck
assembly plant, and a cement factory in exchange for a
crude oil supply commitment for VEBA (12 million tons over
the next three years) . The price was reported to be more
favorable than that which the French had earlier paid.
[Ref. 4: p. 77]
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In sum, starting out from rather different positions
with regard to the principle oil producers, France and
Germany were proceeding by the end of 1974 on similar
tracks. In government-sponsored bilateral deals with
Middle Eastern countries, they were both promising copious
deliveries of industrial goods in return for limited and
somewhat tenuous promises of direct access to oil and gas
supplies, none of which were embargo proof.
The economic impact of the cut-back in Arab oil imports
followed a different path in West Germany and France, but
tended to terminate at roughly the same point. Consistent
with their respective economic traditions, the French
government fixed prices and the Germans avoided doing so
but encouraged price restraint on the part of domestic
refiners. The great initial price increases for petroleum
product imports that resulted from German price liberal-
ization gradually dropped back, while France's fixed prices
moved up step-by-step through 19 74.
These efforts to cope both economically and politically
with the reduced volume of oil were further complicated by
the increase in price which rose from $3,011 per barrel of
Saudi marker crude in October 1973 to $11,651 per barrel
by December 1973. [Ref. 3: p. 283]
As a result of the sudden change in the global energy
situation in 1973, both France and West Germany were
faced with serious immediate challenges. The manner in
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which these challenges were met produced serious strains
in relations between Europe as a whole and the United
States. Friction was initially created by the refusal of
NATO members (except Portugal and briefly, Germany) to
allow the U.S. to use their territories to resupply Israel
during the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war out of fear of
retaliatory cutoffs of oil supplies. The opposition of
some nations, especially France, to follow the U.S. lead to
present a united oil-consumer negotiating position in the
wake of the OPEC price rise did nothing to improve the
situation. Other points of contention were the rush by
some nations, including France and Germany, to seek bi-
lateral deals with the Arab oil producers and the commence-
ment in June 197 5 of a Euro-Arab dialogue without the
participation of the U.S.
In summary it can be seen that the 197 3 Arab oil
embargo brought about major changes in both French and
German foreign policies toward the Arab nations and the
United States, as well as a change in domestic energy
policies. In their efforts to relate to the newly powerful
producer countries, France and Germany embarked upon some-
what different paths, which in the end seemed to converge.
France began pursuing bilateral oil-for-exports deals,
chiefly with Arab countries, and ended up with bilateral
economic cooperation agreements with the Arabs and others
where little was accomplished to improve French oil
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security. Germany became more active as a national factor
in the international oil and gas business than it had ever
been before. Nevertheless, the initial efforts of Germany
with Iran and Saudi Arabia yielded little in the way of
additional oil supplies. With regard to gas, Germany
increased its reliance on supplies from the Soviet Union in
the framework of a tripartite agreement with that country
and Iran. The result of all these manoeverings immediately
following the Arab oil embargo was an increased strain on
trans-Atlantic relations and very little improvement in
either ' s energy security.
C. AFTER THE FIRST SHOCK WAVE, 1974-1978
1. Economic Strains
With the supply disruption of the embargo over and
oil flowing freely again (but at extravagant prices) the
French and Germans faced the problem of finding their
bearings in a drastically changed world. Each not only had
to deal with the economic strains caused by the price of
oil imports, but also with the international relations
problems initiated by the oil revolution.
On the economic side both countries were faced with
difficult choices due to the variable inflationary and
recessionist strains imposed upon their economies. These
strains were not solely due to the oil crisis, but high oil
prices and supply disturbances certainly contributed to
them. The governments of both Germany and France faced
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two basic problems since the 197 3 oil revolution. First,
they had to invest in energy substitution and in energy
conservation in order to reduce their external dependence.
Second, they had to invest in selected export industries in
order to restore the equilibrium of their trade balance in
the long term by satisfying the import needs of the oil
producing countries. These new investments are inflationary
because they are financed by monetary expansion and not from
savings. Additionally, higher oil prices require indivi-
duals in the consuming country to divert a portion of their
spending power that was previously allotted to other goods
and services. This in turn has created the choice for
governments to either allow the consumption of those goods
and services to fall, which creates unemployment, or to
artificially increase purchasing power in the form of
higher nominal wages, thus leading to cost inflation. In
other words, the government can either accept a lower
economic growth rate with the potential for increased
unemployment or push for continues growth with cost
inflation.
It is not within the scope of this paper to delve
deeply into the economic history of France and Germany
during the period for 1973-1979. However, several statis-
tics are useful in gaining a feeling for the effect that
high oil import prices have contributed to the economies of
these two countries. Both countries followed the trend
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among industrial countries concerning annual growth of
gross national product (GNP) . West Germany in the period
from 1971-1973 experienced a growth of GNP of 3.9. This was
in contrast to the 1961-1965 average of 5.1 and the 1966-
19 70 average of 4.7. West Germany's GNP further deterior-
ated into virtual stagnation during the global recession of
1974-1975 registering GNP growth of 0.5 and -2.1 for these
years. As part of a world-wide recession recovery in 1976
Germany produced a growth of 5.6 followed by a 2.8 figure in
1977. This figure improved to 3 . 5 and 4 . 3 in 1978 and 1979
respectively. [Ref. 6: p. 128]
In France the trend was somewhat different. The pre-
embargo periods of 1961-1965 and 1965-1970, yielded annual
growth of 5.3 each period followed by a 5.6 figure for
1971-197 3 and 3.2 a year later. The bottom was reached in
1975 with a 0.2 growth followed by a recovery of 4.9 in 1976.
In 1977, France's GNP dipped to 2.8 and was followed by
figures of 3.3 and 3.0 in 1978 and 1979, respectively.
[Ref. 6: p. 123]
As these figures indicate, France entered the post-
oil revolution of 1973 period sustaining higher rates of
growth than West Germany. France was able to continue this
trend through the 1974-1975 global recession but by 1978-
1979, West Germany had moved ahead. During this period from
1969-1978, the unemployment rate in France and West Germany
grew at an average annual rate of 14.7 and 21.0, respectively,
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[Ref. 7: p. 37] In France unemployment reached around 6%
percent by 1979 [Ref. 8: p. 78] and in West Germany the
figure was close to 5 percent. [Ref. 9: p. 48] These
unemployment figures would not engender a great deal of
sympathy in the U.S., but in both France and West Germany,
there is alarm at the rate of increase of these numbers.
When one considers that during the 1958-1968 period unemploy-
ment rose by an annual average rate of 8.8 percent in France
and fell at an 8.4 percent rate in West Germany, the alarm
is understandable. [Ref. 7: p. 37]
These figures on unemployment and growth of GNP
provide a general indication of the direction that France
and West Germany's economies moved in during the 1973-1979
period. The price of oil, albeit an important factor in
these economic trends was not the only one, bat nevertheless
the price and availability of oil imports remained high on
government leaders' priorities because of national security
reasons. For this reason both France and West Germany took
important steps in the post embargo period to limit their
dependence on Arab oil.
2 . Efforts to Deal With the Energy Crisis
Beginning in 1974, both France and West Germany began
programs to reduce their energy dependence on oil imports
through a variety of methods to both decrease the demand for
external oil and increase the availability of domestic energy
sources. The demand-side measures included the use of price
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controls and conservation while the supply-side measures
included the search for new oil and gas reserves, expanded
production of known hydrocarbon reserves, and more rapid
development of alternative energy sources—especially
nuclear power.
a. Demand Side Measures
In the fall of 1973 the German government
published its first general energy program, (see table 1.).
It predicted that German primary energy consumption for
19 85 would be 61 percent higher than in 197 3 (an annual GNP
growth rate of 4 percent) to which oil would contribute 54
percent or about the same percentage as in 197 3. The
contribution of bitumous coals was expected to shrink from
22 percent to 8 percent with natural gas increasing greatly
from 10 to 15 percent. Nuclear power was to increase from
1 percent in 1973 to 15 precent in 1985.
One year later German predictions looked
quite different, (see table 1.) The rise in energy con-
sumption was scaled down to 46 percent above the 197 3
figure and oil's contribution was reduced 10 percent.
Coal's contribution was increased greatly and gas was
augmented further. The expectations for nuclear energy
remained the same.
The French outlook for the future went through
several evolutions and finally emerged in final form in
1975, (see table 2.) It resembled the German evolution
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somewhat in that earlier predictions for oil were drasti-
cally scaled back, from 6 3 percent to 40 percent and the
total expected increase in energy consumption from
1973-1985 was dropped from the original 61 percent to as
little as 36 percent. As with Germany, the expectations for
coal and gas were revised upward, but in France the role
assigned to nuclear power was greatly increased. Together
with other primary electricity sources (hydropower chiefly)
,
nculear energy was expected to contribute 30 percent of
total French energy by 1985.
Both France and West Germany pursued a variety
of methods to meet the previously mentioned goals; among
them were the demand-side measures, or those designed
to reduce domestic consumption of energy. France was one
of the first industrialized nations to take energy conserva-
tion seriously. The Agence pour les Economies d'Energie
(Energy Conservation Agency) was established in November
1974, and from the beginning aimed at reducing the long-
term growth of energy demand. Among the many measures
introduced since 1973, are the following : a special tax on
the excess consumption of fuel oil, demonstrations and
subsidies for new techniques, energy conservation awareness
campaigns, interest rebates on loans for energy savings
investment, temperature restriction for buildings (20 °C)
with fines for offenders, and rules on thermal insulation
and ventilation. In general France prices energy products
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at levels which would correspond to the world market price,
and gasoline is heavily taxed. These measures also aided
France's effort to reduce consumption. From 1973-1975,
France was able to reduce consumption of primary energy by
8.5 percent. [Ref. 10:p..l81J However, the period from
1973-1976, only showed a reduction of 3.1 percent. This
would indicate that most of the savings were a result of the
slow-down in GNP growth, rather than energy conservation
measures.
In Germany until 1977, the government was
reluctant to intervene in specific end-use sectors, but
tended to rely exclusively on the price mechanism of the
market. The increasing difficulties encountered in imple-
menting Germany ' s nuclear program changed this view somewhat.
In March 1977, the government issued a statement on energy
targets that increased the role of energy conservation and
set targets for energy consumption. From 1960 to 1973
energy demand grew at about the same rate as GNP, but the
government now expects this to change; from 1977 to 1985
they expect energy demand growth to be 90 percent of GNP
growth. [Ref. 10: p. 182]
Germany, like France, has mandated energy
conservation measures such as public awareness campaigns,
financial incentives for conservation, grants and subsidies
for more efficient energy use, and progressive vehicle tax
by weight. But like most European countries, Germany has
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avoided a speed limit. The results in Germany have been
similar to France; 1973-1975 produced a decrease in energy
consumption of 8.4 percent and the period 1973-1976 showed
a 2.0 percent decrease—again indicating that slower
economic growth has had more impact than conservation
measures.
b. Supply-Side Measures
One of the distinctive features of German
energy policy since the 1973 crisis has been the stepped-
up effort by the Federal Republic government to implement
the 1973 Energy Program objective of creating a strong
German mineral oil group which can join in international
cooperation especially with the oil-producing coutries as
an equal partner. As previously mentioned, this was
accomplished by the merger of Veba and Glesenberg to form
a joint company. The rationale for this venture was to
create a German national oil company to broaden the
country's crude oil base.
As the largest consumer of oil in Europe,
Germany has a particular interest in joining the world-
wide search for oil. The chosen instrument for the FRG in
this field is called Deminex, which has been carrying out
test drilling in the British North Sea, Nigeria, North
Africa, the Caribbean, Peru, Canada, and the Middle East.
The results of these efforts by 1979 were
less than encouraging. Referring to table 3., it can be
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seen that by 1979 German crude oil production was less than
2 percent of primary energy consumption. Additionally, it
can be seen that crude oil consumption comprised 52 percent
of Germany's total energy consumption. Recalling the 19 75
government projection for 1985, which envisioned a 44 per-
cent share of oil in Germany's total consumption and that
in 1973 oil's share was 55 percent, it can be seen that not
much progress had been made by 1979 in reducing the propor-
tion of crude oil in Germany's total energy consumption.
France had no sizeable reserves of fossil
fuels, and its production of oil is negligible (about 1
percent of total energy consumption by 1979) . Referring to
table 3., it can be seen that in 1979 crude oil consumption
in France comprised about 61 percent of the total primary
energy consumption. Comparing this to the 19 7 5 target for
1985 of 40 percent it can be seen that France has a long
way to go in reaching its 1985 target. In addition, France
actually imports close to 70 percent of the oil that it
uses both for domestic consumption and for the re-export of
refined petroleum products.
Ever since 1973, when the importance of
Germany's coal reserves became strikingly apparent, the
Federal government sought to apply an optimum policy
toward Germany's coal reserves. The extent to which Germany
leaned on her coal stocks at the height of the 197 3 crisis
can be seen in the decline on coal stocks from 19 million
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tons in September 1973 to slightly below 5 million tons a
year later. [Ref. 11: p. 76] West Germany has significant
coal reserves; however, the balance between the need to
maintain a coal industry at home and the costs of maintain-
ing such a structure are a problem. Although the EEC
provides subsidies for member nations coal, the price of
European coal is between $45 and $90 per ton as compared to
the world market price of $30 or less per ton. [Ref. 12:
p. 41] Therefore, German coal, principally due to unfavor-
able geological conditions is hard pressed to compete with
American and Polish coal. Nevertheless, German domestic
production of coal in 1979 comprised about 30 percent of
total primary energy consumption. This compares to the 21
percent figure of both bituminous and lignite projected in
the 1974 forecast for 1985. If West Germany has an ace in
the hole in the energy situation, it is the ample reserves
of coal. As was mentioned, it is not as economical as other
nation's coal, but is is nevertheless available.
France's coal is deep, expensive, and
scarce. In 1979, France's production of domestic coal
accounted for only 6 percent of its total primary energy
consumption. This compares with the 1974 projection for
1985 of 13 percent (domestic and imported). Therefore,
France is forced to import coal and has created a state-
owned coal board, Charbonnages de France (CdF) into the
mining equivalent of an international oil company, to buy
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mines abroad and secure complete control of coal imports.
CdF prospects for coal around the world in joint ventures
with big French industrial groups and has taken a stake in
mines in West Virginia and Australia and expects to start
prospecting in Canada, Columbia, Algeria, and China. The
ultimate aim is not only to supply the French market with
"French-owned" coal, whatever its source, but to carve out
a position as a supplier on the rapidly growing world
market.
After mineral oil and hard coal, natural
gas is the third largest source of primary energy in
Germany. The German natural gas market until 19 79 had been
met about equally by foreign and domestic sources. Among
the most politically significant developments since 1973
in Germany's natural gas market has been the addition of
the Soviet Union to the Netherlands as one of the two major
foreign suppliers, followed by Norwegian natural gas in
1976. By 1979 Germany was importing 16 percent of its
natural gas requirements from the Soviet Union, 3 5 percent
was produced domestically, 37 percent came from Holland,
and 12 percent from the Norwegian North Sea. [Ref. 13:
p. 6] Comparing the natural gas share, domestic andimported,
of around 16 percent in Germany's total energy consumption
for 1979 to the projected figures for 1985 of 18 percent
the Germans seem to be on track in this area, although it
is difficult to see how dependence on the Soviet Union is
any more advantageous than other sources.
44

France's position with respect to natural
gas is similar to oil; domestic production is almost negli-
gible accounting for some 3 percent of total energy con-
sumption. The 1975 projection for 1985 envisioned natural
gas as comprising 16 percent of France's total energy needs,
therefore France has pursued an active import policy
including a number of import contracts with Algeria, the
Netherlands, the Soviet Union, and Norway.
After 197 3 many European countries turned
their eyes to the nuclear option with much the same
results—vastly overambitious plans were continually scaled
back, and Germany was no exception. The German government's
1974 projection for 1985 envisaged a 15 percent nuclear
energy component of total energy consumption. By 1979,
nuclear energy was contributing only 4 percent of the
domestic primary energy consumption. The difference between
nuclear hopes and reality is related to slower economic
growth and to anti-nuclear protests.
By mid-1977, there were eight nuclear plants
in the German market whose construction was being blocked
by legal protests and in November 1977, the ruling Social
Democrat Party bowed to anti-nuclear forces and decided not
to build more nuclear stations until coal-fired stations
fueled by indigenous coal supplies could no longer be
maintained. [Ref. 1: p. 129] The government has an equally
tough problem with the storage of atomic wastes where the
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subterranean salt dome structures of Lower Saxony presently
constitute the only advisable long-term storage location,
but the constituents of the area are opposed to its use.
Nevertheless the West German Chancellor,
Helmut Schmidt, and the minister of economics, Count
Lambsdorf f , are powerful advocates of nuclear energy and
argue that the future of Germany's nuclear program, which
already has been cut back, depends upon solving the problem
of atomic waste storage. Therefore the plans for reproces-
sing plants are doubly important because they also reduce
German dependence on imported uranium. But regardless of
how the present nuclear debate is resolved, the German
program is well behind projected goals.
France has had a rapidly growina nuclear
energy program, the most ambitious in Europe. In 1973,
nuclear energy accounted for almost 2 percent of total
primary energy consumption and for 8 percent of electrical
production. Forecasts for 1985 envisaged nuclear energy
to 23.7 percent of total primary energy consumption and to
72 percent of electricity production. [Ref. 2: p. 58] By
1979, nuclear energy was contributing only 4.5 percent of
France's primary energy consumption.
Unlike West Germany ,. France continued to
emphasize nuclear power rather than freeze it due to
environmentalist pressure. The major industrial group
engaged in France's first nuclear ventures was a company
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called Framatone which was controlled by a Belgium group to
51 percent and by Westinghouse with a 45 percent share.
Following negotiations in 1975 sponsored by the French
government, the Commisariat a 1 ' Energie Atomique (CEA)
purchased 30 percent of Framatone from Westinghouse which
will remain a junior partner until 1982. [Ref. 2: p. 59]
In the field of advanced reactors, CEA has
devoted most of its research and development activities to
breeder reactors. CEA has also been active in providing
resources and technology for all phases of reactor fuel
cycles and has already built a vast industrial complex
covering prospecting, mining, enrichment, production of
fuel elements, and reprocessing. Prospecting and production
of uranium ore have been launched not only in metropolitan
France but also in two French-speaking African states, Niger
and Gabon. The companies under CEA's supervision control
about 15 percent of the natural uranium world market. In
addition CEA also promoted Eurodif, a large uranium enrich-
ment plant which began operation in 1978. The publicly
owned Eurodif had as its original partners France, through
CEA, with 52.8 percent, Belgium and Spain with 11 percent
each, and Italy with 25.2 percent. In 1973 Iran became a
partner with 10 percent share. The objective of Eurodif
was to make West Europe independent of U.S. enriched
uranium deliveries, which were soon to become in short
supply because of enlarged U.S. nuclear programs.
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In summary, nuclear power has immense future
potential both in France and Germany and progress was
made during the 197 3-19 79 period to advance the share of
nuclear energy in the total French and German markets.
France and Germany have even pooled their resources in the
research field of advanced reactors. Nevertheless, due to
a general anti-nuclear feeling in Europe and especially in
Germany, progress has slowed, especially nuclear plant
construction.
France has exhibited widespread interest in
alternative sources of energy ranging from tidal power,
solar power, geothermal power, to biomass power and hydro-
electric power. Like most industrialized countries, in
France hydroelectric power potential is almost exploited
at its maximum potential, whereas the technology for
exploiting geothermal power still remains to be developed.
By 1979, however, France relied on hydroelectric power for
some 8 percent of total primary energy consumption.
Solar energy is another prospect for France,
especially in the Southern regions with Mediterranean
weather, but here again the technologies that would allow
more widespread use are not commerically available at
economic prices.
Only about 20 places in the world have the
right combination of tidal range and geography to make a
tidal power scheme at all practicable and only two
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full-scale modern tidal power plants have been built, one
in France and the other in the Soviet Union, but the capital
costs of tidal power are still considerably higher than
conventional hydroelectric power.
France has been the most aggressive European
country in pursuing biomass potential for energy, having
launched a government-backed alternative fuels program.
The goal is to substitute biomass and synthetically-
derived methanol for 25 percent (some optimists say 50
percent) of gasoline usage and reduce oil imports to about
70 million tons a year by 1990, [Ref. 14: p. 18] a
figure which represents about half of what France imports
today.
In short, France has pursued a government
directed effort to develop other sources of energy but the
rewards appear to be far off in the future.
Germany, like France, has exhibited interest
in alternative fuels, but unlike France does not have
the potential for extensive tidal or solar power. In
19 79 Germany relied on hydroelectric power for less than
2 percent of total primary energy requirements but this
figure represents a large proportion of the potential in
this area.
Germany is somewhat behind France in the
exploitation of biomass potential, but has developed the
use of a fuel mixture containing 6 percent methanol. In
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addition, Germany has been in the forefront of efforts to
produce oil from coal through coal liquification and
gasification. Of the five most promising processes for
coal gasification only one, the West German, Lurgi process,
has been commercialized and then only in Europe, but like
most alternative fuels, the development of coal gasification
entails numerous engineering problems and substantial costs
and doesn't promise to be a near term solution for Germany's
energy problem.
3 . International Cooperation After 1973
As was previously discussed in the immediate after-
math of the Arab oil embargo in 1973, many countries,
including France and Germany, tried to secure their supplies
of Middle Eastern crude by direct government-to-government
deals or by politically distancing themselves from the
United States and the Israeli cause. However, it slowly
became clear that the advantages of such deals were
relatively small compared to the disadvantages. By 1977,
this particular strategy had become measured. The emphasis
moved away from direct intergovernment deals for oil
toward more general forms of cooperation with the oil-
producing world. It was during this phase that the EC
brushed aside U.S. opposition and opened a formal dialogue
with the Arab world, (the "Euro-Arab dialogue")
.
However, parallel to this second phase a third,
more defensive strategy developed among the Organization
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for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) nations.
This particular strand of energy policy was built around
the International Energy Agency (IEA) , which sprang from a
United States initiative and was created in 1974. It is now
part of the OECD and counts among its members all the OECD
nations except France. The IEA's initial goal was to help
the OECD world avoid (in any future disruption of oil
supplies) the muddle and panic of 1973. To this end the IEA
members set goals for the increase of their stockpiles (90
day reserve by 1979) and created an emergency allocation
scheme, which is triggered automatically if a 7 percent
shortage of world supplies is created.
The emergency allocation scheme presented a problem
since the French had opted out of the IEA, feeling that it
was too concerned with confronting the oil producers and
subject to U.S. dominance. The French instead pushed for
a scheme run by the EC in Brussels. After a certain amount
of intra-European haggling in late 1977, the EC produced
its own scheme which was designed to be compatible with the
IEA's version, but went a step further by including fuels
other than oil in its calculations.
In spite of these gains, intra-European and EC-U.S.
rivalries continued to plague OECD efforts for consumer
cooperation during the 1970s. In Europe the original
opposition of France to the cooperation of oil-consuming
countries under U.S. leadership, France's preference that
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other European countries (especially Germany) align or,
"harmonize" their energy policies with France, and the high
priority that France placed on political and economic co-
operation with Arab countries tended to limit European co-
operation. Germany, especially having been more consumer/
cooperation minded than France and more concerned about the
performance of the Common Market as a free trade area for
petroleum products, did not move in the direction where
France stood.
Another cause of friction within Europe was the
degree of exploitation of the promising North Sea reserves
of oil and gas. For example, Norway cannot consume all the
oil that can be produced from its sectors of the North Sea,
but an unresolved debate within Norway is whether to develop
these reserves at the maximum feasible rate or develop the
resources more slowly. Great Britain has also been singled
out for criticism by EC members for its alleged me-first
policies.
EC-U.S. cooperation has also been following a rocky
path mostly concerning import targets and long-terms
strategies for oil savings. The U.S., through the IEA,
consistently pushed for plans entailing specific import
targets by state. The EC preferred to maintain an overall
European target of reducing dependence on foreign oil from
63 percent to 50 percent of total energy use by 1985.
[Ref. 15: p- 43] Additionally, Europe continued to single
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out the U.S. as irresponsible on import policy and con-
servation. The U.S. pointed out that European progress
toward their 1985 goal was attributable more to increased
North Sea production than self-sacrifice.
4 . Summary of French and German Progress From
1973-1979
In France total primary energy consumption rose by
4.7 percent from 197 3 to 1979 while domestic primary energy
production rose about 12.2 percent. During this period
crude oil consumption remained relatively constant and
crude oil consumption as a percentage of total primary
energy consumption fell from 65.7 percent in 1973 to 61.2
percent in 1979, leaving quite a way to go to meet earlier
goals of 40 percent by 1985.
The change in volume of France's crude oil imports
was almost negligible from 1973-1979, having increased
from 2,709 thousand barrels per day to 2,762 thousand
barrels per day. However, the pattern of France's major
suppliers changed somewhat. The percentage from Arab OPEC
fell from 76.3 percent in 1973 to 70.8 percent in 1979.
Supplies from OPEC as a whole fell from 96.7 percent in
1973 to 85.5 percent in 1979. Neither of these figures
would be a cause for optimism.
There were some large changes in France ' s supply
relationships. A drop in Algerian imports from 8.2 percent
of France's total to 3.7 percent was matched by an increas-
ed dependence on Iraqi oil from 13.8 to 17.7 percent of
53

total imports. Similarly, the share supplied by Kuwait
dropped from 11.5 percent to 3.5 percent while Saudi
Arabia's share climbed to an impressive 32.3 percent of
France's total imports of oil. During 1979 Iran and Iraq
together accounted for 22.7 percent of France's total oil
imports.
In Germany total primary energy consumption rose
2.8 percent from 1973-1979 while primary energy production
fell 1 percent. Crude oil consumption remained relatively
constant dropping from 2.985 thousand barrels per day in
1973 to 2,901 thousand barrels per day in 1979. Crude oil
consumption as a percentage of total energy consumption
dropped from 55.4 percent in 1973 to 52.3 percent in 1979
which puts Germany in a slightly better position than France
conerning earlier projections of a 44 percent goal. However,
Germany's crude oil imports rose 35.6 percent during the
period from 2,192 to 2,292 thousand barrels per day.
The pattern of West German imports shifted signifi-
cantly from 19 73. Dependence on Arab OPEC oil dropped from
71.9 percent in 1973 to 40.6 percent in 1979. Dependence
on OPEC as a whole dropped from 9 7.1 percent to 5 9.5 percent.
The largest inputs to this change resulted from a fall in
Algeria's share of German oil imports from 12.2 percent to
6.6 percent, Saudi Arabia's share decrease from 22.8 per-
cent to 12 percent and Libya's drop from 2 3.6 percent to
12 percent. However, the Soviet Union's share of West
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German oil imports rose to 6 percent by 19 79 and Iran and
Iraq together contributed 9.3 percent to Germany's total in
1979.
D. THE SECOND SHOCK WAVE, 1979-1980
Until the end of 1978, the prospect of a new energy
crisis occurring in the next decade appeared to be receding.
Studies of world energy supply and demand had painted a more
optimistic picture than those that had emerged immediately
after the 19 7 3 crisis. Energy consumption had grown at a
much slower pace than what was thought possible several years
earlier and new sources of crude oil, in the North Sea,
Alaska, and Mexico, had temporarily eased reliance on OPEC.
It was generally predicted that fuel prices would remain
almost constant in real terms for the next several years.
That picture was changed by the upheaval in Iran and an
associated hardening of attitudes by other members of OPEC.
For a time Iran's petroleum industry was virtually shut
down and the world's oil supply system was robbed of some
5.5 million barrels a day. [Ref. 16: p. 154] That short-
fall, amounting to over 10 percent of non-communist world
oil consumption, was greater than the combined production
of the North Sea, Mexico, and Alaska, the non-OPEC producing





The impact of the events in Iran would have been much
more pronounced in the industrialized world had not two
events helped alleviate the short-term effects of the oil
shortfall. First, global oil stocks were at a record level,
In addition to the seasonal buildup that occurs in the
fourth quarter of the year, the international oil companies
had made additional purchases in anticipation of another
price rise being levied at the December 1978 OPEC meeting.
Second, as the magnitude of the crisis became apparent,
Saudi Arabia allowed the ARAMCO consortium to raise produc-
tion to 10.5 million barrels per day (MMBD) which was two
MMBD above Saudi Arabia's self-imposed average annual pro-
duction ceiling of 8.5 MMBD. [Ref. 17: p. 28] Saudi efforts
to balance global oil supply/demand were aided by Kuwait,
Venezuela, and Nigeria, all of which raised production.
The geopolitical situation affecting access to oil
became more desperate during the summer and fall of 1979.
The deteriorating political situation in Iran, the November
seizure of the American embassy in Teheran, and the
December Soviet intervention in Afghanistan led to an even
greater escalation in the price of oil. By the end of 1979
most OPEC crude prices were near $25-$30/barrel . When
premiums and other production "incentive" differentials
were added to the official OPEC base prices, the real price
of many OPEC crudes hovered between $30-$32 per barrel with
spot prices near $40/ barrel. [Ref. 17: p. 37] As OPEC
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prices escalated, most non-OPEC producers raised their
prices in tandem.
The war between Iraq and Iran that began on September
22, 1980, was the third event that comprised the second
shock wave, resulting in widespread destruction of both
countries oil installations and stoppage of their crude and
refined exports. On the eve of the war, Iran's output was
already drastically curtailed, but Iraq had been a major
Western, particularly European, supplier.
These three events, the political instability in Iran,
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the Iran-Iraq war
portended a situation similar to the first shock wave in
1973, but this time there were some major differences for
the West in general and Europe in particular. First, by
late 1978 the international petroleum market was very
different than it had been prior to the 19 7 3 OPEC oil em-
bargo. Until the eve of the 19 7 3 embargo, United States
oil import dependence had been held at reasonable levels,
implying that the U.S. would not be a major claimant on
world oil in a supply emergency. After 1973, however, sky-
rocketing demand in the U.S. and the continued decline of
domestic U.S. production raised U.S. oil-import dependence
from 23 percent in 1973 to almost 50 percent by the end of
1978. [Ref. 17: p. 28] During this period, as was previously
discussed, France and Germany had made little progress to-
ward decreasing their oil import dependence. As a result
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by 19 78, Europe and the U.S. (not to mention Japan) were in
much greater competition for world oil supplies. But where-
as France and Germany were dependent on Arab. OPEC for 70
percent and 40 percent of their imports, respectively, the
United States only received 30 percent of its oil imports
from the reigon. This difference in dependence held open
the possibility that the U.S. would not adopt politico-
military policies in the region compatible to French and
German vital interests.
A second fundamental difference from 197 3 was that the
major international oil companies who had helped mitigate
the 1973 effects on Germany, had witnessed an erosion of
their guaranteed access to Middle Eastern oil supplies.
Whereas in 1969, the major oil companies had a near strangle-
hold on the international oil business, by 1979 these same
companies extracted only about 4 5 percent of OPEC crude.
This declining control of crude oil by the majors raised
serious questions of whether the industry advisory board in
the International Energy Agency (IEA) would have sufficient
flexibility to allocate crude oil supplies in the event of
a major supply emergency and the activation of the IEA oil-
sharing mechanism.
A third difference from 1973 is the uncertainty con-
cerning Soviet interests and designs in the Middle East
especially after the invasion of Afghanistan. Should the
Soviets seek to exert themselves as a major claimant on
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Middle Eastern oil in the near future, the political,
military, and economic ramifications would be ominous,
especially for Europe.
Finally, as has become apparent by 1979, the global
petroleum market no longer seems to be determined by econom-
ic factors alone. The industrialized world can no longer
afford to disregard the vital interests of the major oil
producers. The attitude of the OPEC countries remains
crucial to the supply and demand balance. In this regard
Saudi Arabia is particularly important; it is uncertain how
long the Saudis will continue to increase production to
alleviate global shortfalls particularly when this is not
in their economic interest.
The effects of the second shock wave were different for
France and Germany. France, in terms of sheer volume,
suffered the greatest loss among the consumers. Since 1973,
France had continued to increase dependence on Iraq for
imports^ reaching 560,000 MMBD at the time of the Iran-Iraq
war which was equivalent to 24 percent of France's oil
consumption. [Ref. 18: p. 40] Germany being less dependent
on Iran and Iraq remained more optimistic because of large
stockpiles which had previously been built up, but the loss
of Iranian supplies made it impossible to build stocks for
the approaching winter season. Both countries benefited
from the temporary glut in the global market which existed
during that timeframe, but each had to face renewed
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economic strains resulting from the price increases. As
in the aftermath of the 1973 crisis, both countries joined
the rest of the industrialized world in renewed efforts to
strengthen their security. Two of these efforts, the new
search for consumer cooperation epitomized by the Tokyo
Summit and efforts to further diversify energy supplies
(characterized by the negotiations for Soviet gas) will be
discussed below.
1. The Tokyo Summit
The second shock wave of 1979/80 produced renewed
incentives for Europeans and Americais alike to add impetus
to the international consumer programs that had produced
few results since 1973. Thus within the EEC and IEA new
programs were pushed and previous ones reevaluated.
Within the EEC, two formal commitments on energy-
saving had previously been made: to reduce dependence on
imports from 57 percent in 1978 to 50 percent by 1985 and
to keep oil imports in 1985 to the level of 1978. These
declarations were used by the EC as a means to pressure
the U.S to take actions to cut U.S. imports by the end of
1978. [Ref. 15: p. 43] Before this deadline arrived,
however, the Iranian crisis arose to add considerable
urgency to the oil import problem and inadvertently took
the Americans off the hook. By late February 1979, IEA
officials began to talk of plans to lower import use
on an emergency basis. In March the IEA members agreed
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that during 1979, they wourld cut total energy demand roungly
5 percent per nation. This hurriedly conceived plan soon
turned out to be unworkable. Members supplied lists of
crash conservation measures to the IEA, but countries like
Japan and Germany clearly were not prepared to carry out
programs that would seriously threaten economic growth.
Nevertheless most countries eventually showed
import reductions of 3 to 5 percent and the United States
cut oil use a dramatic 8 percent during 1979. [Ref. 15:
p. 43] During March 1979 , tne EC had also revised its energy
targets to conform to the IEA pledges. But by late June,
at a summit in Strasbourg, the increasingly pessimistic
situation had forced the EC to stiffen their targets by
promising that each year between 1980 and 1985, community
oil imports would not exceed the 1978 level. France had
pushed for country-by-country goals, but the other EC
members were not ready for this step.
A. week later the seven nation Tokyo Summit was
held with the participants including the United States,
Japan, Canada, and EC members Great Britain, West Germany,
France and Italy. Under intense pressure from France and
the U.S., the "Big Seven" agreed to accept country-by-
country import targets for 198 5 and it was understood that
based on this foundation the other IEA and EC countries
would do likewise. However the actual targets accepted by.
each of the Big Seven caused problems; each wanted to use a
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base year that best suited its own interests. The U.S.
used 1977 when its imports were highest, the EC used 1978.
In September 19 79, the EC sought to parcel out
portions of their global import ceiling to each member
country and a fight immediately developed over treatment of
North Sea oil. Britain maintained that other EC countries
should treat this as an import, but the rest led by Germany
argued that North Sea oil should not be part of the quotas
and the British gave in.
Thus, in contrast to post-19 7 3 events, some
progress has been made by the industrial countries to limit
imports but serious difficulties still remain in the arena
of cooperation. For example, the IEA emergency sharing
plan has never been used and the results of its implementa-
tion are uncertain. U.S. officials calculate that under
the IEA plan the U.S. would have to give up about 300,000
barrels per day of imports which would be allocated to
other IEA members. This on top of losses from disruptions
of normal U.S. supply could cause a serious supply
situation in the U.S.
In addition, immediately after the Tokyo Summit
in June, the Strategy Committee of OPEC met in London with
top EC representatives to discuss the Europeans' long-term
demand for oil and the Arabs' views on its availability,
thus reviving memories of the Euro-Arab dialogue after 1973
and giving rise to U.S. speculations of a new special oil
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bargain between the EC and OPEC. Urged on by France and
Kuwait, the EC and six of the oil producers on the Persian
Gulf proceeded to conduct negotiations to establish a special
relationship that envisaged long term guaranteed oil supplies
for Europe and access to Europe's markets, technology, and
possible military assistance for the Arabs. OPEC ' s president
later stated publicly that the talks, "should not be limited
to energy problems alone, but should include political and
economic areas of common interest." [Ref. 19: p. 19]
Both Arabs and Europeans believe there is much
to be gained economically and politically from lessening
their dependence on the U.S. and its oil companies. The
Europeans have long argued that the industrialized
countries ' economic problems
,
particularly inflation and the
turmoil in foreign exchange and financial markets, are
largely rooted in the lack of an effective U.S. energy
policy. The dollar's decline, which severely cut into OPEC
income, combined with alleged U.S. oil gluttony, has been
blamed for the 60 percent run up in oil prices in Europe
that fueled inflation and contributed to recession. Another
strong bargaining chip for Europe is that under the
European Monetary System (EMS), dominated by the German mark,
more and more European currencies have become attractive




In short, the second shock wave was instrumental in
forcing Euro-American cooperation on the important issue of
import restraint but also had an unsavory effect for the
U.S. as well—the bilateral deals that characterized the
European search for oil security after 1963 were replaced
by a more formidible united EC approach in 1979.
2. The Yamal Gas Deal
As in the post-1973 crisis era, the French and
Germans after 19 79 attempted to further diversify their
source of their energy imports, but this time the proposed
plans included the controversial issue of greater depend-
ence on the Soviet Union as a natural gas supplier through
the Yamal pipeline deal. The Western European nations, led
by the Federal Republic of Germany, have completed negotia-
tions to import extensive new gas supplies from the Yamal
Peninsula in Western Siberia. The proposed project will
develop frontier Yamal fields and build a pipeline to bring
40 BCM (billion cubic meters) of gas per year to Western
Europe before the end of the century. At least 12 BCM per
year will go to Germany and eight to France; the rest will
be available to Italy, Holland, Spain, Austria, Belgium,
and Sweden. The cost of the project to Western Europe,
mainly for construction of up to 3,600 miles of pipeline
will be between $10 and $15 billion. Financing will be
undertaken by the Western European countries involved and
Japan at low, subsidized rates. [Ref. 20: p. 209]
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The project will bring the Soviet share of Germany's
gas imports to almost 30 percent and the share of Soviet gas
in Germany's overall needs to about 5 percent. For France,
this will more than double current French gas imports from
the Soviets to 25 percent of France's natural gas supplies,
and raise French dependence on Soviet gas to 4 percent of
its total energy needs. [Ref. 21: p. 40]
West Germany, because of its leading role in the
pipeline arrangements, is the crucial customer and con-
structor. In addition to needed gas supplies German
companies are the prime contractors for most of the pipe and
construction contracts and German banks are in the forefront
of the financing.
Prior to completion of the deal, the U.S. warned
Germany, France, and other potential European buyers of the
gas that such purchase would make Western Europe, particu-
larly the FRG, dangerously dependent on Soviet supplies.
Since natural gas is used in key German industries, like
steel and chemical, and is not readily replaceable when
supplies are curtailed, the supply contract will be strate-
gically and politically significant. The U.S. also
pointed out that the Soviets curtailed supplies to Western
Europe 2 percent during the winter of 19 80 when their
sources in Iran were cut off. [Ref. 22: p. 20] Washington
also objected to the sale because it would give the Soviets
much needed hard currency to buy Western technology.
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According to Klaus Liesen, German Ruhrgas chairman, the
basic price was set in marks and payments for the gas will
be only in marks. [Ref. 23: p. 31]
The Europeans in general and West Germany in particu-
lar deny that the Yamal deal will place them in a position
of dependence on the Soviet Union. The West Germans claim
that it is only a diversification of resources and that
Germany could make up for any shortage caused by a Soviet
cutback with supplies from its own gas fields and with gas
supplied under contract from the Netherlands and Norway.
It is difficult to predict whether the deal will fulfill
West Europe's expectations or prove to be a disaster, but
either way it is a significant outcome of European efforts
to get OPEC off their backs.
E. SUMMARY AND PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE
As has been discussed, the roots of French and West
German energy dependence on Persian Gulf oil began with the
decline of the indigenous European coal industry and the
conversion to cheaper, more accessible oil after World War
II. The French and Germans although starting from different
energy positions, ended up almost equally vulnerable when the
Arab embargo began in 1973. Due to basic foreign policy
differences, each reacted differently with respect to the
Arab suppliers and the United States, although eventually
both felt compelled to negotiate bilateral deals with
Persian Gulf states in an effort to improve supply security.
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Neither significantly improved their import supply security
due to the failure to conclude long-term guaranteed supply
deals.
In addition to bilateral deals, both countries tried to
restructure their energy situations through conservation
measures, diversification of suppliers, increased develop-
ment of alternative fuels, and long-term energy plans
envisioning a rearrangement of the proportion that various
energy sources would contribute to the total.
When the second shock wave of oil supply restrictions
and price hikes hit in 1979, neither France nor West Germany
had significantly altered their position since 1973,
although West Germany had reduced its oil dependence on the
Arab suppliers. This situation was due in large part to
the failure to make progress on earlier, somewhat grandoise,
projections on nuclear power production and the slow pace
of research and development of various other alternative
fuels which had yet to become economically feasible. In
addition, efforts to increase cooperation between consumer
countries had largely been a failure, due in part to
France's policy of intransigence toward the United States.
The second shock wave, like the first, stimulated
renewed efforts for international consumer cooperation with
a modicum of success. However, the pattern of bilateral
Euro-Arab deals shifted to a united European-Arab dialogue.
Additionally, France and Germany entered into deals
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destined to increase their dependence on the Soviet Union
as a supplier, apparently operating on a theory that had
previously been disapproved with the Arab suppliers—that
increased economic interdependence will somehow protect
consumers from supply curtailment. In addition, the second
shock, wave revealed some stark realities about the present
global energy situation; that the U.S. is fast becoming a
major rival with Europe and Japan for Persian Gulf oil,
that the Soviet Union may in the near future join this
rivalry, and that the global petroleum market no longer is
driven by economic factors alone—the vital interests of
the Persian Gulf and other major producers have to be
considered.
The future for France and West Germany within the
global energy competition seems unclear. Part of this is
attributable to the wide variance among analysts who fore-
cast global energy supplies. Much of the variance can be
accounted for because of the following factors:
CD varying projections of world and national GNP
rates.
(2) different assumptions about energy demand
inelasticities




(4) varying assumptions about the impact of govern-
mental and environmental policies on the timing of energy-
resource development.
(5) differences over the rapidity of technological
innovation leading to enhanced exploitation of alternative
energy.
(6) the attitude of the major oil producers toward
continued high rates of production.
It seems clear that the answer to France and Germany's
energy problems for the near term Cwithin the next decade)
is not various alternative sources such as biomass, solar
energy, geothermal, tidal power, etc. unless spectacular
oil price increases and/or technological breakthroughs
occur. Nuclear energy may produce a mid-term answer al-
though currently construction in France is being cut back
by the Mitterrand government and construction in Germany
has been frozen.
Both countries will primarily be dependent on coal, gas,
and oil for the foreseeable future. In this respect West
Germany has an advantage with its expensive but ample coal
reserves. iMuch could also depend on the exploitation of
U.S. coal reserves. In the area of oil and natural gas,
the North Sea reserves provide an important future alterna-
tive for Europe. The Norwegian block in the North Sea
contains large reserves of gas, but its exploitation will
be difficult and expensive and is complicated by Norway's
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policy of economic and environmental conservation. In
addition. North Sea oil exploitation has consistently lagged
behind expectations due in large part to British protection-
ist policies. In short, the many alternatives available
to France and Germany are each difficult and promise to
produce only small amounts of new energy, but in combination
their energy security benefits could be significant in the
long term. The only alternative other than political and
military efforts is to wait complacently for the next shock
wave, which like the first two, promises to have the effect
of increasing the distance between U.S. policies on one
hand, and those of France and West Germany on the other.
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III. FRANCE AND THE SECURITY OF THE PERSIAN GULF
In the two years since the invasion of Afghanistan it
has become apparent that there is still a great deal of
disagreement among the NATO allies on how to best protect
the flow of Persian Gulf oil without compromising the defense
of Western Europe. However, there is a general consensus
that the formal boundaries of NATO's area of responsibility
(which stop at the Eastern border of Turkey and at the
Tropic of Cancer) should not be extended and that any mili-
tary measures necessary should be planned and conducted
outside the realm of the Atlantic Alliance on a bilateral or
multilateral basis. In conjunction with this reasoning two
basic methods in which the European allies can aid the
United States in contribution to the continued security of
Persian Gulf resources have evolved— first, direct contribu-
tion of combat and/or support assets earmarked for Persian
Gulf contingencies or secondly, by replacing American combat
forces presently committed to Europe, thus freeing them for
use in the Gulf region.
It is within this context that the role of France
becomes important. Although no longer a member of NATO's
integrated military structure, France is one of the few West
European nations with the capability to militarily influence
a situation both in the Persian Gulf and in Europe. For
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this reason it is important to resolve some of the ambiguity
surrounding the role of France in the dual problem of pro-
tecting Gulf oil supplies without compromising the defense
of Europe.
Unfortunately forecasting French policy is a difficult
task in that its main characteristic seems to be that it is
predictable only in its unpredictability. Due to the
Gaullist legacy of complete independence in foreign policy
and heavy reliance on proportional deterrence in the defense
sphere, it is somewhat uncertain how France would react to a
Soviet military initiative either in Europe or elsewhere.
Nevertheless, the limits of this uncertaintly may be
changing. The Middle East war of 1973 and the resultant oil
crisis it perpetuated, coupled with the mounting tensions in
the Horn of Africa where French forces are engaged in main-
taining the security of her former territory of the AFARS
and ISSAS (Djibouti), as well as continuing local conflicts
in Chad, along the borders of the former Spanish Sahara, and
in Zaire, dramatize the fact that France's nuclear deterrent
cannot safeguard all of her interests or sustain her commit-
ments in many regions of the world outside of Europe. These
increasingly demanding commitments may eventually force
France to modify her independent stance vis a vis NATO and
the United States. This may become the trend in French
policies for as France is repeatedly forced to employ scarce
military resources outside the framework of her proportional
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deterrence strategy her dependence on allies will increase,
and her autonomy of decision will decrease. This dilemma
was succinctly expressed in a warning from Gaullist General
Pierre Gallois when he stated that, "in attempting to do
too much, France will fail to do what is essential,"
(maintain the Gaullist legacy of an independent foreign
policy). [Ref 24: p. 75]
In developing this hypothesis it is necessary to
analyze French capability to influence situations in Europe
and the Persian Gulf, and to make an assessment as to French
intentions in these areas.
A. FRENCH CAPABILITIES IN EUROPE AND THE PERSIAN GULF
For purposes of this discussion French capabilities to
influence situations in Europe and the Persian Gulf will be
categorized as military and political-economic. Although
this analysis of French capabilities is arbitrarily divided
into the sub-categories of Europe and Persian Gulf, it
should be understood that many of the military assets
attributed to Europe could readily be employed elsewhere
depending upon the choice of the French leadership.
Additionally, political and economic assets and liabilities
tend to cut across regional divisions. Therefore this
discussion will provide a brief overview of the most
important military capabilities available to France in
general and their applicability to the European theater.
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This will be followed by a more detailed analysis of
France's intervention capabilities and politico-economic
strengths in the Persian Gulf area.
1. Europe
France recognizes that in the present global situa-
tion there exist two superpowers and a cluster of middle
powers in addition to the third and fourth world, and it is
the expressed determination of France to stand at the head
of these middle powers. Consequently, she maintains a
military force structure commensurate with this goal. In
order to maintain this force structure France from 1971-1978
maintained a growth in defense expenditures of 3.17 percent
in real terms, a figure in excess of NATO's present goal of
3 percent. This was accomplished during the period of
detente when most Western countries failed to attain the
1977 NATO guideline and the United States reflected a growth
of -2.69 percent in real terms. [Ref 25: p. 78] France
continued to increase defense spending reflecting percent-
ages of 3.25 and 3.26 in 1978 and 1979, respectively, and
her goal by 1982 is 3.65 percent. [Ref. 26: p. .599]
A heavy proportion of this defense spending (45.5
percent, 1965-1970 and 36.9 percent, 1970-1975) has been
used for the development and maintenance of the cornerstone
of France's defense—the nuclear deterrent force. [Ref. 27:
p. 79] As a result France is recognized as having the third
leading independent nuclear force in the world behind the
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United States and the Soviet Union. The centerpiece of
France's strategic nuclear force is the ballistic submarine
fleet presently consisting of five strategic submarines and
a sixth under construction. These submarines carry 16
strategic missiles each and all but the oldest eventually
will be upgraded with the new M-4 SLBM with multiple war-
heads and increased range. [Ref. 28: p. 11] These strategic
nuclear submarines will be complemented by nuclear attack
submarines in the future, although at present only one is in
the fleet and the ultimate number to be built is in question
The second leg of the French nuclear arsenal is the
land-based intermediate range ballistic missile system
based at the Albion plateau. This arsenal consists of two
groups of nine S-2 strategic missiles, capable of carrying a
150 KT warhead over a distance of 500 to 1,875 nautical
miles, which will be upgraded by the S-3 missile with more
effective penetration capability and higher megaton power.
However, plans to install nine additional IRBMs were
dropped in the 1977-82 program-law. [Ref. 26: p. 588]
The Air Force component of the strategic nuclear
forces is also to be upgraded. The air leg of France's
strategic triad has depended on the Mirage IV aircraft
capable of carrying nuclear bombs of 70 XT yield with a
combat radius of 850 nautical miles without refueling or
some 4,300 nautical miles refueled twice. [Ref. 27: p.. 79]
Future plans include intensification of research on a
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medium-range air-to-surface missile providing reduced
vulnerability for the aircraft during the strike mission.
France also has the capability to deliver tactical
nuclear weapons in the European theater using five air
force squadrons equipped with the AN-52 tactical nuclear
bomb of 10 to 15 KTs , and the Pluton ground-to-ground
missiles with a range of 120 Km. [Ref. 27: p. .19] Initially,
as provided in the 1977-1982 program, six regiments were
eventually to be equipped with the Pluton missile, however
in the 1977 budget a final decision to abandon long-term
plans for a sixth regiment of Pluton missiles was made.
[Ref. 16: p. 588] In the near future the AN-52 will be
replaced by the medium-range ASM in the tactical air force
and in the Navy Super Etendard Squadrons which also presently
carry the AN-52. Finally, with an eye to preparing for the
more distant future, France is currently engaged in the
development of the enhanced radiation bomb.
Although there is a great deal of controversy
surrounding the merits of France's nuclear arsenal both
within and outside of France, its proponents maintain that
her independent nuclear force does indeed contribute to the
defense of Europe and provides an additional deterrent from
the U.S. nuclear guarantee. The main thrust of their
argument is that the French capability creates multiple
decision centers and additional uncertainty in the mind of
a potential aggressor thus adding to the nuclear deterrent
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in Europe. The French point to the provision in the
Ottawa Declaration of June 1974, in which the value of the
French (and British) nuclear deterrent force was officially
recognized by her NATO partners. Naturally, if deterrence
should fail and nuclear weapons come into use, French
nuclear capabilities, which will quadruple by 1982 from a
total of 22,000 KT in 1976 [Ref. 26: p.. 585], will be
welcomed by her NATO allies. Finally, the French develop-
ment of enhanced radiation weapons (ERW) could help deflect
some of the political pressure from the United States ERW
program and thus contribute to the eventual deployment of a
valuable NATO anti-tank weapon.
The conventional forces of France, in view of man-
power resources involved, put her in second place in Europe
after Germany, but in front of the United Kingdom. Total
army-airforce manpower stands about at 4 30,000 men not
including approximately 30,000 gendarmes. Of this total
330,000 men belong to the army and 100,00 serve in the air-
force. The army is comprised of eight armoured divisions,
three of which are stationed in the Federal Republic of
Germany. These are complemented by six infantry divisions
and an Alpine division as well as two external intervention
units including one parachute division and one "marine"
infantry division. The airforce consists of some 4 50 Mirage
III, IV, F-l, Jaguar and Alpha jets, plus 100 transports,
mostly Transalls, some of which are configured to carry the
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aforementioned tactical nuclear payloads. [Ref. 29: p. 3]
To support the manpower needs of these services France still
relies on conscription.
France maintains the finest navy of any continental
West European power, and it is one of three navies in the
world, in addition to the United States and Soviet navies,
which is able to claim a truly world-wide deployment status.
Apart from the submarines that form the strategic nuclear
force, the existing fleet consists of approximately 130
combat ships and 18 logistical support ships. The largest
warships in the French fleet are the two aircraft carriers,
Foch and Clemenceau, which are intended to remain on active
duty until the late 1990s. These carriers usually include
an aircraft complement of 30 strike aircraft and 12 heli-
copters for submarine chasing or search and rescue operations.
In accordance with a command given by President Giscard
d'Estaing, the two carriers were transferred from the Atlantic
to the Mediterranean underscoring the keen interest felt by
Paris for the Mediterranean area. In addition to the Foch
and Clemenceau, France maintains a 10,000 ton training
carrier, the Jeanne d'Arc, which primarily serves as a
training vessel for naval cadets, but it has been outfitted
as an operational control ship with a capacity for carrying
helicopters and 700 marines. [Ref. 30: p. 105] These craft,
primarily Foch and Clemenceau, can be used to support inter-
vention abroad, support amphibious operations in the face of
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serious opposition, or secure sea control in limited areas,
given their relatively short-range aircraft.
France differs from other European states in her
continued interest in naval intervention abroad and her
fleet, in addition to the carriers, reflects the desire to
maintain this capability. An entire class of frigates was
designed as dual-purpose ASW/amphibious assault ships
capable among other things of carrying a commando force of
80 men. France possesses two dock landing ships with
permanent and temporary helicopter decks, five tank landing
ships, and a variety of lesser craft, but none is fast
enough to keep up with the combatants. However, French
warships can generally carry considerable numbers of
commandos; what they lack is the ability to transport heavy
equipment such as tanks.
For sea lane protection and sea control the French
navy maintains several cruisers, 5 large guided missile
destroyers, 11 conventional destroyers, 19 frigates, 22
conventional submarines, and 4 7 minesweepers, in addition to
numerous small combat ships. [Ref. 30: p. 106]
Future improvements as detailed in the naval
program revealed in November 1979, envisage a fleet of 112
new warships and 21 supply ships over the next two decades.
The combat fleet was to consist of 3 nuclear powered
carriers, plus 1 helicopter carrier; 18 anti-submarine
corvettes (compared to 13 at present) ; 9 anti-aircraft
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corvettes (currently 7); 18 AVISOS, 10 high speed patrol
boats, 40 minesweepers, and 14 attack submarines, 10 of
which will be nuclear powered (in place of 22 diesel
powered boats). [Ref. 24: p. 72] The nuclear powered heli-
copter carrier designated PH-75 is intended to compensate
for the lack of a heavy transport component to the inter-
vention forces.
It should be borne in mind that the above mentioned
goals are part of a long-term plan the entire fulfillment
of which is probably doubtful. Nevertheless, the French
navy is a European force that has to be reckoned with by the
Soviets especially in the Mediterranean where the French
government has indicated the primacy of defending France's
interests by relocating and stationing her two most
formidible surface vessels.
Finally, in addition to the valuable nuclear and
conventional assets which France could bring to bear in
Europe, her geo-strategic weight must not be forgotten.
France ' s withdrawal from the integrated military structure
of NATO had a major impact on the logistic systems and plans
of NATO forces. Since the withdrawal of NATO forces from
French territory, NATO lines of communication (LOCS) are
more vulnerable as they run close to and parallel the NATO/
Warsaw Treaty Organization boundary. This factor plus the
additional strategic defensive space provided by France
increases the military contribution that France could provide
in the event of a major crisis in Europe.
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This brief summary of military capabilities serves
to highlight the fact that France can indeed provide a
major contribution to the protection of Western interests
in the Persian Gulf area indirectly by relieving her allies,
primarily the United States, of some of the burden of the
defense of Europe. Without going into detail, in addition
to direct military involvement on the continent, these
measures could include, but need not be limited to:
augmentation of the U.S. sixth fleet in the Mediterranean
thus releasing U.S. ships for duty in the Indian Ocean;
earmarking civil aviation assets for troop transport from
North America to Europe, thus releasing U.S. assets for
duty elsewhere; or providing landing and logistic support
for U.S. air transport enroute to the Persian Gulf area.
These measures would all be helpful in a period of crisis
in the Persian Gulf area and could be provided for by low
visibility, bilateral contingency agreements.
2 . The Persian Gulf Area
a. Military Capabilities
Of importance to the Persian Gulf situation is
France's low key but considerable presence in the area,
with approximately 5000 troops stationed in Djibouti
supported by air transport and helicopters. This is backed
up by a powerful European-based Force d ' intervention which
is designed to protect French foreign interests and can be
drawn from an air portable motorized division of Marines

or two-brigade parachute division airlifted in the Air
Transport Command's force of over 100 C-160 Transall and
Noratlas aircraft. [Bef. 30: p.. 32]
France continues to keep a significant
naval presence in the Western Indian Ocean to guard oil
routes. French sea lane control in the area was predicated
on using bases at Djibouti and at Diego Suarez in the
Malagasy Republic for their ships. However, in 1974, a new
government in Malagasy told France to remove all of its
forces by 1975. To replace Diego Suarez as a base in the
South Indian Ocean, the French have moved their naval forces
to Reunion where they have a modern air base, a communica-
tion center, a well equipped port, and 3,200 troops
including 1,200 paratroopers. They are also present on
Mayotte Island in the Comoros group (where they are well
located to exert control over the Mozambique Channel) with
its good deep water bay and some naval facilities. [Ref. 31:
pp. 30-41]
Djibouti, strategically located at the
entrance to the Red Sea, received its independence from
France in June 1977. Within hours the new nation had signed
a defense pact permitting the French troops, warships, and
aircraft based there to remain. [Ref. 31: p. 36] Djibouti
continues as the nerve center and principle base for French
military and naval presence in the Indian Ocean, which
normally consists of 12-13 units depending on the circum-
stances. The regular French Indian Ocean force includes
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a command ship (La Charente—a converted tanker) , a
destroyer, 4 frigates, 5 patrol, and 3 support ships.
Periodic reinforcement in times of acute crisis could in-
clude one of the two French aircraft carriers. Addition-
ally, the French deploy maritime patrol aircraft to the
area, but in the absence of the carriers lack any permanent
tactical air capability. [Ref. 25: p. 55] At present, this
French presence does not constitute an overwhelming force,
but prior to 1978, France had more naval ship-days of
deployment on a yearly basis in the Indian Ocean than either
the U.S. or U.S.S.R. [Ref. 31: p. 36]
The French have not been reticent to augment
these permanently stationed forces in times of crises. A
show of naval strength offshore of Djibouti in 19 77 when she
was granted independence evidently provided notice of French
interests in that state and contributed to Djibouti's
neighbors' hands-off policy. The most recent example of
these diplomatic signals was the deployment of the Geroges
Leygues , the French fleet's best equipped anti-submarine
vessel, to augment the Indian Ocean force in February 1980
after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. According to
naval experts this was part of an effort at that time to
stress the importance that France attaches to its naval
presence in the Indian Ocean. The Georges Leygues joined
elements of the rest of the French fleet in cruising the
water of the Persian Gulf, Straits of Hormuz , and
Mozambique Channel. [Ref. 32]
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The importance of France's military and naval
presence in the Indian Ocean area, however limited it may-
be at any given time, goes beyond the mere presence of
firepower in the region. The fact that it is a non-U. S.
presence demonstrates allied concern for European interest
in the area and lessens and perhaps makes more acceptable
the political impact of the presence of U.S. forces in
littoral states; and naval presence, the least obtrusive
of any combat presence, is the most tolerable form politi-
cally for our regional allies such as Saudi Arabai or Oman.
The ideal situation, of course is to establish
joint Western cooperation which displays explicit recogni-
tion that NATO Western interests are direct enough to risk
combat in the Persian Gulf. This signal would be intended
for the Soviet Union as well as regional states. Presently,
there is no agreed-upon joint plan within NATO to react to
any emergency that might interrupt the flow of oil from the
Persian Gulf. However, in recent years there has been some
interest shown among certain of the West-oriented countries
toward scheduling joint naval exercises in the Indian Ocean
and toward at least talking about coordinating naval contin-
gency plans in this area. In 1974, ships and planes from
all the CENTO countries participated in the largest naval
exercises at that time ever held in the Indian Ocean. In
the meantime CENTO has been terminated but France , Great
Britain, and Australia continue to hold join naval exercises
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with U.S. naval forces in the Indian Ocean. [Ref. 31: p. 38]
In the area of contingency planning French officials have
acknowledged that French and American military chiefs in the
Persian Gulf area "talk to each other" but imply that this
is much better than some formal institutional arrangements
that would only attract attention and hostility in the area.
[Ref. 33: p. 4]
b. Politico Economic
European nations- have emphasized their
contention that long-term stability in the Persian Gulf
region will depend more on poltical and economic factors
rather than the almost exclusive reliance on deployment of
military power, and France has been no exception to this
rule. In many respects France's independent foreign policy
and aspirations for greater global European influence have
been large inhibitors of Franco-American cooperation. Never-
theless , some of France's policies which are at odds with
U.S. views provide a diversity in Western policy that could
have potential advantages. Indeed the French often point
out that one of the strengths of the Western Alliance is its
diversity.
Of great importance in this respect is the
different stance that the European nations have taken from
the United States concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict and
efforts to promote a peaceful settlement of this issue.
While Americans maintain that the European policy and
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France's policy in particular is nothing more than a mani-
festation of their energy dependency on the Arab states, the
French policy nevertheless has allowed France to develop
certain relationships with the Arabs, including some of the
more radical ones, that would be impossible for the United
States. France's recognition of the Palestinians right to a
homeland may be a factor which would gain them greater room
for manuever in the Arab world in a future crisis. This in
turn could provide capabilities for France to defend common
Western interests—capabilities that would be denied to the
United States because of perceived anti-Arab policies.
In addition, largely as a result of her oil
dependency, France maintains economic and arms transfer
relationships with Middle Eastern and Persian Gulf states.
Although it is a moot point concerning the degree that these
relationships provide France with influence or leverage,
it is a factor in France's capabilities in the area. France
continues to act as one of the largest suppliers of arms to
the region, especially in such areas as advanced aircraft
and missiles and is a major equipment supplier of the Saudi
Arabian navy. France has recently sold aircraft to Egypt,
Jordan, Lebanon, and Libya and missiles to Iraq and Syria.
[Ref. 34: p. 59] Also France has sold 24 Mirage F-l aircraft
to Iraq and 6 Alpha-jet aircraft to Qatar, [Ref. 35: p. 5]
as well as entered into a military cooperation agreement




According to the Kuwaiti newspaper , Al
Seyassa , during a visit to the Persian Gulf states in March
1979, President Giscard d'Estaing had talks with the region's
leaders involved in the Gulf cooperation council (a frame-
work for economic, political, and security collaboration
among Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Qatar, Oman, and Bahrain)
concerning setting up a joint arms industry. The aim was to
build French weapons, Crotale missiles and Mirage III air-
craft. Evidently the venture would be along similar lines
as the now defunct Arab Organization for Industrialization
(AOI) . [Ref. 37: p. 4] The AOI was created in April 1975,
providing for French technological assistance to help
establish an Arab arms industry run by four countries:
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE. The project fell
apart as a result of Egypt's participation in the Camp
David peace process. [Ref. 38: p. 151]
Another report in a French magazine Le
Point , revealed that French military experts were reportedly
involved in the relief of the Grand Mosque Siege in Saudi
Arabia in November 1979. According to this source five
French military specialists arrived in Mecca on November 2 3
at the "top secret request of Saudi King Khalid to President
Giscard d'Estaing," and took charge of coordinating and even
directing the Saudi soldiers who lifted the two week siege.
The report was denied by the French Defense Minister
Yvon Bourges at the time, but he stated that a military
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mission for technical assistance under the command of a
French general had for several years a permanent link to
Saudi forces but excluded any intervention in war opera-
tion or the maintenance of order. [Ref. 39]
These last two examples of French behavior
serve to reinforce the fact that France is deeply involved
in the Middle East and Persian Gulf area not only mili-
tarily, but politically and economically as well. This
involvement is not always in conformance with U.S. policy
and at times even works against American designs; however,
French policy does provide alternatives which may be
helpful to the West in a future crisis,
c. France in Africa
It is useful to examine French policy in
Africa for several reasons. Although it is somewhat of
a digression from the topic of French capabilities to
influence situations in the Persian Gulf area, an examina-
tion of French involvement in Africa not only points out
some areas such as Djibouti which may be militarily useful
in a Gulf contingency, but also highlights France's
capability and determination to intervene in areas where
she perceives herself to have a vital national interest.
Africa is a region where France's independent
policy seems to have had the greatest success to date
and French involvement there is based on various interests,
Economically, Africa is rich in raw materials including
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uranium deposits in Gabon and Niger that are necessary for
France's nuclear energy program. Politically, France is
concerned that Africa could fall under control of the
Soviet Union or such pro-Soviet states as Libya or Angola.
Overall, there is a framework of ties between France and
many African states formed by geography and history and
strengthened by the nature of their economies. Some
260,000 French citizens work in Africa, mostly in North and
West Africa and the sealanes around Africa are essential
for the transportation of the major part of France's energy
imports.
France presently has agreements with
Senegal, Ivory Coast, Gabon, and Djibouti which provide for
the presence on their territories of certain permanent
military facilities, and the use of a number of other ports
or airport facilities. [Ref. 40: p. 318] In addition,
France has military agreements and the right to station
troops or advisors in 25 African countries. There are
22,000 French civil servants—called cooperants—working in
African schools and government offices under technical
agreements and France now maintains some 7,800 French
combat soldiers in Africa, a number which increases to
14,200 when military advisers are included. [Ref. 41: p. 1]
France has enforced stability in Africa.
with a history of armed intervention. French troops have
quelled a military uprising in Niger which supplies France
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with uranium and restored a friendly government to power
in Gabon. They have put down guerilla movements in
Cameroon and Mauritania (1977 and 1979) and crushed tribal
feuding in the Congo. They have twice parachuted into
Zaire's Shaba Province where France buys cobalt, to
protect French interests against Angolan and Katanganese
forces. [Ref. 41: p. 1] Most recently, French troops
participated in the September 1979 Operation Barracuda to
overthrow the corrupt Emperor Bokassa I in the Central
African Republic and supplied logistic support to Tunisia
against Libyan threats. [Ref. 42: p. 3]
It must be remembered
_ that most of these
operations were carried out unilaterally and at a time
when the rest of the Western allies were loath to conduct
such intervention in Africa. Former President Giscard
d'Estaing, leery of seeing France drawn into a proxy war
for the interests of the West, campaigned long and as it
turned out unsuccessfully to get the Carter administration
and the rest of the West to support French efforts in
Africa.
3 . Constraints on French Capabilities
The fact that France is a European power and must
first ensure the defense of Metropolitan France limits
France's capabilities to influence events in the Indian
Ocean, Middle East, or Persian Gulf. France still deploys
some 34,000 troops in the Federal Republic of Germany
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and France's military forces are primarily designed and
oriented toward a potential East-West confrontation in
Europe.
France's independent foreign policy has also placed
limits on her capabilities. The need to maintain a cred-
ible independent nuclear deterrent has come at the expense
of conventional military capabilities. Although as pre-
scribed by the progam law, 1977-1982, in order to support
a greater conventional effort, nuclear weapons will
receive a declining proportion of the total defense effort
from 16.8 percent in 1977 to 15.7 percent in 1982. [Ref.
26: p. 585], the restoration of desirable conventional
capabilities will be a long-term process. Additionally,
because of economic constraints, the original goal of
allocating 20 percent of the national budget to defense
was lowered in mid-1977 to 18.8 percent* but nevertheless
exacerbates the conventional military capability problem.
Concerning the army, one observer characterized
the situation as follows : "Although the army is strong in
numbers, its program of re-equipment must be speeded up,
since this has only progressed at a slow rate as a
result of competition with the deterrent force and the
large share devoted to the latter in defense budgets.
Furthermore, account will have to be taken of the morale
*This change is partly explained by changes in the
structure of the national budget.
91

element, which seems to be the weak link in a not very
satisfactory army-nation context." [Ref. 27: p. 84]
Right now the French navy is an impressive force
but it is beginning to suffer the ravages of obsolescence
and faces a continuing reduction in ships and tonnage
until the mid-1980s to the 1990s in spite of a gradual
increase in the Navy's share of the budget. Most of the
French fleet was constructed prior to the early 1960s, the
funds in the intervening period having been diverted to
the more sophisticated and expensive nuclear programs. As
a result, the increasing sophistication of French warships
(such as nuclear attack submarines) will probably come at
a cost either in numbers or in manpower.
In summary, the future of the French military
appears to be one of intense competition between the
various branches for scarce defense budget resources.
Large portions of France ' s conventional stockpile were
acquired prior to the 1960s and will have to be replaced
before the 1990s. More sophisticated nuclear delivery
systems will be necessary in order to preserve the credi-
bility of the French nuclear deterrent. This will entail
financing programs for improved MIRVs, cruise missiles,
and air and land mobile IRBMs. Added to these are the
costs of interventionary operations in Africa and else-
where, and increasing manpower costs. [Ref. 26: p. 606]
In the absence of an even greater defense burden for the
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French people, these conditions will result in a deteriora-
tion of France's capabilties in Europe, overseas, or both.
4 . French Naval Policy Outside of Europe *
This final segment in the analysis of French
capabilities to influence situations in Europe and in the
Persian Gulf area is presented in an effort to explain how
the French in their own view intend to circumvent the
contradictions inherent in their independent foreign
policy and their apparent lack of military, especially
naval, assets to independently carry out such a policy.
French naval policy in many ways is similar to
French defense policy; in particular views on strategic
nuclear deterrence and defense of Metropolitan France are
the logical extensions of her national deterrent policy.
However, in the area of defense policy outside of Europe,
French naval writings go much further than those of the
other services of the ministry. Naval strategists have
defined an additional threat, "indirect strategy," that
that they feel France faces overseas and they have
adopted French deterrence theory in an effort to respond
to it.
Indirect strategy as originally described by the
noted French strategist, General Andre Beaufre, is one of
*This section is a brief summary of a thorough dis-
cussion of French naval strategy in Robert, Ref. 43.
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two components of total strategy, the other being direct
strategy. Whereas direct strategy is the achievement of a
decision (or deterrence) by primarily military means,
indirect strategy is one which seeks to obtain a result by
methods other than military victory. French strategists
believe that the more complete nuclear deterrence becomes,
the more prevalent the threat o f opponents using indirect
strategy will become; in fact the strategists are convinced
that indirect strategy will become the dominant form of
action in today's world.
Indirect strategy can be of two basic varieties:
the piecemeal approach or prolonged conflict. In the
former type, adversaries will attempt to nibble away at
France's weak points by limited military actions separated
by periods of negotiation. The latter type will be
characterized by a long conflict combined with a psycho-
logical offensive designed to wear down France's will to
resist.
With the increased activism of the Soviet navy,
the development of strong regional states, and especially
the events surrounding the shock of the 197 3 oil crisis,
indirect strategy has become a paramount concern and has
attracted wide attention in France. Discounting accident,
disruption of the East-West military balance, or the
spread of conflicts that start outside of Europe, the
French expect indirect strategy to be a more likely
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occurrence than the application of direct strategy in
Europe. Of the two forms of indirect strategy, the French
navy is more concerned with the piecemeal approach which is
most likely to be exercised at sea. Within this piecemeal
threat are a number of possibilities ranging from conflicts
over territorial waters or economic zones at sea or dis-
agreements over the imposition of environmental regulations
which could be used as a pretext to interfere with commerce,
to covert military actions at sea.
The French fear the threat of indirect strategy
because it can endanger vital French interests without
triggering France's strategic deterrent. For example an
attack on several merchants would not justify a nuclear
response or be credible if France threatened it; however,
several carefully selected attacks of this nature could
raise merchant insurance rates so high as to threaten
France's imports of oil or other necessities.
There is a wide range of external interests that
France is bound to protect including: sealanes vital to her
commercial exchanges and her supplies of raw material
(petroleum, uranium, etc.); fishing areas; areas earmarked
for scientific, technical, and military experiments (e.g.,
the experimental nuclear center in the Pacific, and the
French West Indies Aerospace Center) ; actual overseas
interests (e.g. , French Overseas Departments and Territories)
;
and responsibilities to defend and maintain law and order
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in certain African nations bound to France by various
bilateral agreements. One concerned observer described
the situation as follows, "France could be brought to her
knees in three months or less if her overseas connections
were cut, even if her land frontiers were never crossed."
[Ref. 43: p. 296]
France realized that in a world with two super-
powers and a number of strong regional powers, she does
not have the ability to respond to all threats with brute
strength. Instead France has applied her version of
deterrence theory to naval doctrine in an effort to
develop a defensive strategy "for the weak against the
strong." Since France cannot afford to buy extensive
conventional forces or to fight a long conventional war
she has rejected flexible response as an option. Instead,
France has tried to develop an equivalent to flexible
response which instead of countering each threat with an
appropriate amount of force, counters it with an appropri-
ate deterrent.
France plans to respond initially to an aggression
with a coup d 1 arret—a swift, sharp move at a level of
violence appropriate to that used by an aggressor, the
purpose being not necessarily to defeat him militarily but
to show that France has the resolve to defend her interests,
that the aggression has been detected, and that France has
the ability to inflict severe pain on an aggressor.
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Hopefully, this would nip the aggression in the bud
before it gets too big for French forces to handle. But
if the aggressor defies this warning and confirms his
aggressive intent, France would increase the level of
violence until the aggressor realizes that the price to be
paid to reach his objective has become exhorbitant and he
backs down. In short, France would deter her opponents by
showing her readiness to ascend an escalating ladder, the
top rung of which in her case, is a strategic nuclear
force. France's policy is ambiguous on the eventual use
of the strategic nuclear deterrent especially in the third
world, but there are indications of the possible use of
sea-borne tactical nuclear weapons.
B. FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY AND INTENTIONS
In order to analyze French intentions in the event of
a crisis in Europe or overseas in a vital area such as the
Persian Gulf, several factors must be taken into considera-
tion. First and foremost is the concept of a French
independent foreign policy which will be examined in
relation to the way this policy is explained by leading
government figures. Secondly, a description of French
defense policy is essential. Third, a brief look at
France's reaction to and behavior after the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan may provide some clues to future French
behavior. Finally, it is necessary to review the policy
97

of the new socialist government of Francois Mitterand as
it has been enunciated to date.
1. France's Independent Foreign Policy
If France were to align itself with some other
country's policy the French policy would be simple,
but it would cease to exist as such. Seen from the
outside France would become the province of a super-
power. This isn't the lesson we learn from our
history and it's not what the people of France want
either. They want us to be loyal to our alliances,
as indeed we are, and at the same time pursue an
independent policy that respects our solidarities.
[Ref. 44: p. 1]
This statement by President Giscard d'Estaing in
February 19 80 captures the paradox that seems to character-
ize French policy as observed by outsiders. How is it
possible to both pursue an independent course and yet
remain faithful to alliance goals? Since the days of
»
President Charles de Gaulle, French leaders have maintained
that there is no contradiction in this stance and their
aim has been to escape the limitations of a mutual but
unequal dependence within the Atlantic Alliance. Whereas
the senior partner of the alliance, the United States, has
sought to maintain the global status quo, France has been
interested in a gradual transformation of the existing
international order to fulfill a perceived destiny of
national grandeur. Thus during de Gaulle's era French
foreign policy was characterized by a deep-rooted anti-
pathy toward the privileged position of the two superpowers
and hence toward American hegemony in Europe. Former
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President de Gaulle also harbored a suspicion that in a
tight spot the United States would fail to honor its
commitments to European defense. Out of this suspicion
grew the basic tenet of France's policy—that France is
unwilling to allow another state, even an ally, the
exclusive responsibility for decisions controlling her life
and death.
The relaxation of tensions in Europe relative to
the immediate post-war period and the growth of France's
nuclear arsenal were exploited by France to expand her own
diplomatic flexibility. Thus she withdrew from NATO's
integrated military structure and established new contacts
with the Soviet Union and East European states. Such
contacts were designed to lead first to detente and
ultimately to entente and cooperation in Europe in which
France naturally felt she would play a leading role.
The aims of France's international actions as
recently explained by former President Giscard d'Estaing
reflect essentially the same goals: first, to defend
France's interests, especially its security; second, to
try to preserve peace; third, to enable Europe once more
to exercise some influence over world affairs. Recent
evolution in the international system, that is the growth
of third world influence (and probably France's dependence
on third world countries for raw materials and energy) led
President Giscard to emphasize a fourth goal of French
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foreign policy—to help organize a world that takes into
account new realities and rectifies injustices, in other
words a greater recognition of third world interests.
[Ref. 44: p. 3]
In pursuit of the first goal, the protection of
French interests and security, France has relied upon her
nuclear deterrent, her association with the NATO alliance,
and her conventional naval doctrine to counter indirect
strategy as has been previously discussed. Thus
President Giscard has described French policy as "the
action of a country that belongs to an alliance, that
pursues an independent policy, and recognizes ties of
solidarity." [Ref. 44: p. 5]
To achieve the second foreign policy goal of
trying to preserve peace, France has been deeply committed
to the policy of detente; they in fact claim to be the
initiators of this policy under de Gaulle's leadership.
This policy was continued under President Pompidou and
culminated in the signing of a Franco-Soviet Protocol in
October 13, 1970, which states in particular that
;
should situations arise which in the view of both
sides would pose a threat to peace, would end peace,
or would cause international tension, the French and
Soviet governments would immediately enter into con-
tact in order to consult each other on all aspects
of these situations and on steps which could be
taken to face them. [Ref. 45]
The detente process was continued under the Giscard
regime and was highlighted by an accord signed by Giscard
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and Soviet President Brezhnev in June 1977 , in which they
agreed to triple Franco-Soviet trade within four years.
Presently, the Soviet Union is France's tenth largest
customer receiving slightly less than two percent of
France 1 s exports [Ref. 46], but trade is rapidly expanding,
The other aspect of France's detente policy is
relations with Eastern Europe the importance of which
President Giscard d'Estaing described after the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan as follows:
Relations between France and certain European
countries—and I am thinking of Poland, of Romania,
of Hungary, and recently I think of East Germany--
have become transformed, have been accentuated.
They have certainly modified the situation in Europe.
I tell you for the benefit of those who talk so
willingly about giving up detente that this would
plunge some European peoples into despair, those who
are our partners in the quest for detente.
[Ref. 25: p. 23]
France's commitment to the third foreign policy
goal, that of increasing the power and prestige of Europe
has been described by President Giscard in the following
manner,
Until now two major voices have been heard in the
world, the United States and the Soviet Union, and
other countries were only expected to voice their
opinion in relation to those two.... It is important
to show that the European powers have special respon-
sibilities.
. .because they exist as powers, because
they have a major and growing economic and political
capacity .. .and because they have special concerns
about the preservation of peace. [Ref. 47]
Naturally as a leading nuclear and economic power, France
envisions herself as a leader of this resurgent Europe.
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In furtherance of the fourth component of her
foreign policy, the increased recognition of third world
interests and development, France has taken several steps
both within the European community and unilaterally.
Typical of these acts were France's signing of the Lome
Convention facilitating economic relations between Europe
and third world countries and France's declared goal of
increasing the North-South dialogue while raising the
level of French aid to third world countries to 0.7 per-
cent of the gross domestic product, excluding her overseas
departments, which would mean a very considerable increase.
[Ref. 48: p. 7]
These four goals, ensuring the security of France,
maintenance of peace and detente, increasing the inter-
national stature of Europe, and furthering the North-South
dialogue, are the basic elements of France's independent
foreign policy as espoused by her leaders. It is by
achieving these objectives that the French hope to increase
their influence in the world and control their own destiny.
2 . France's Defense Policy
The defense policy of France, like any state, is
one of the most crucial elements that affect her ability
to achieve her foreign policy goals as they were discussed
in the previous section. Additionally, France's defense
policy is important because it offers clues to her intent-




France's defense policy, like her foreign policy,
is enigmatic and frought with ambiguities. For this
reason it is helpful to present a brief review of French
defense policy as it evolved under President Giscard
d'Estaing while focusing on France's intentions for
contributing to European security. Of equal importance
for our purposes is French defense policy in regard to the
security of her oil supply in the Persian Gulf.
a. Relating to Europe
France's defense policy in relation to Europe
entails two basic elements; the contribution of her
independent nuclear deterrent and its relevance to Europe,
and her intentions concerning the use of her conventional
assets in a European conflict. Concerning the latter,
ever since France's withdrawal from NATO's integrated
military structure in 1967, French troops have not been
formally committed to NATO and France does not participate
in formal NATO planning for military contingencies. How-
ever, there has been a degree of joint contingency
planning between French and NATO forces under the umbrella
of the Lemnitzer-Ailleret agreement (between the 1967
French Chief of Staff and the 1967 NATO Commander) pro-
viding for limited coordination between the two forces.
[Ref. 49: p. 20] However, this planning proceeds under a
fundamental caveat: it takes effect only if the French
government makes the national decision to go to war. This
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effort has resulted in the development of some joint
contingency plans and exercises, but it has not resolved
the fundamental difficulty with respect to strategy.
It is within this background of uncertainty
that numerous statements made by President Giscard and his
associates in 1975 and 1976 initiated a debate within
France concerning the role of her strategic forces and
their relevance to Europe, and the relation of these
forces to their conventional counterparts. Giscard'
s
statements seemed to call into question the traditional
strict Gaullist strategy of primary reliance on propor-
tional nuclear deterrence by focusing on greater flexibili-
ty of both military doctrine and assets to meet shifting
exigencies in the European theater and in France's global
interests. His statements implied a shift in emphasis
away from nuclear weapons and in the direction of reinforc-
ing the conventional components. Additionally, he hinted
that these strengthened conventional forces could poten-
tially play a more active role in the wider European
theater and permit France to act in areas beyond Europe to
protect specific commitments and to influence future
events— for example by providing a limited military force
to stabilize the situation in Lebanon, as Giscard had
proposed informally during his trip to the United States
in May 1976. [Ref. 24: p. 64]
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The most controversial initiative was the
reference by General Mery to "enlarged sanctuarization"
which implied that France's deterrent protection might
extend beyond French borders to her neighboring allies.
This called into question portions of the 1972 defense
white paper, which consistent with traditional policy, had
stressed that "proportional deterrence" was purely
national and could ultimately only protect France
("Proportional deterrence" theory holds that France's
threat of nuclear retaliation can deter the Soviet Union
because the damage France could cause by targeting Soviet
cities exceeds what the Soviets would stand to gain in
conquering or destroying France). [Ref. 50: p. 3]
To add fuel to the fire, General Mery made
further amplifications to Giscard's statements, implying
that France would possibly contribute to the forward
battle in Germany because it was difficult to conceive of
a European defense that was completely independent of the
Atlantic Alliance which reiterated Giscard's view that,
It would be illusory indeed to hope that France
might retain anything more than a diminished sover-
eignty if its neighbors came to be occupied by a
hostile power or simply to pass under its control.
The security of the whole of Western Europe is, there-
fore, essential to France.
Indeed, Mery argued that France might use its forces
including Pluton tactical nuclear weapons to intervene
beyond its borders. [Ref. 24: p. 64]
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The critics of Giscard's initiatives cut across
party lines and it is natural that retired General Pierre
Gallois, the most outspoken proponent of strict Gaullist
defense views, was particularly critical. The heart of
Gallois' argument is that,
in the nuclear age France has a specific role to play
as defined by her continental position and the limited
resources at her disposal to defend the security of
that position. If she is attacked, France will have
no other recourse but to retaliate massively against
the aggressor. There is no need to test the opponents
intention: once the frontier is crossed his intentions
are obvious. Neither is it possible for France to
contribute to the battle for Europe with conventional
forces, for to do so would only weaken France without
in any way averting a Western defeat." Gallois has
also objected to, "the refurbishing of the surface
navy without regard to the new mission that it must
fulfill. [Ref. 24: p. 63]
Retired General Lucien Poirier, who devised the
strategic model on which the 1972 white paper was based,
apparently disagrees with Gallois only in that Poirier
thinks tactical nuclear weapons can have legitimate "test"
and "Warning shot" roles. [Ref. 50: p. 14] He has further
argued that,
We therefore face the following problem, how to partici-
pate with our conventional forces alone in the common
forward defense in the not unlikely eventuality that
the NATO defense is pierced locally .. .political and
strategic logic argues against our committing our forces
to fill any breach in the allied defense systems, for to
do so would be to run the risk of seeing our convention-
al forces. . .prematurely wiped out and France unprotected
against any enemy on the threshold of our sacrosanct
space. [Ref. 6: p. 36]
By the eve of the 1973 legislative elections,
President Giscard felt it prudent to backtrack and responded
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to his critics by adopting a declaratory policy which re-
affirmed the primacy of nuclear forces and maintained that
the government's defense policy remained firmly within the
framework set forth by General de Gaulle and Georges
Pompidou. It must also be kept in mind that Giscard had
never cast doubts on France's autonomy of decision or his
faith in proportional deterrence throughout the debate.
The result of the whole debate affair from 1976 was that the
Giscard regime produced no strict change in declaratory
policy but mounting evidence existed that supporters of the
orthodox Gaullist view which gives primacy to the nuclear
forces and the strategy of proportional deterrence were
being challenged on a number of grounds by those who
favored a more ambiguous or flexible strategy. [Ref. 24:
p. 69] Despite these factors France's determination to
maintain autonomy of decision in all aspects of its
security policy still created a permanent degree of un-
certainty concerning possible French actions,
b. Overseas policy
In regard to virtually every international
trouble spot, the French seem to deplore the use of any
rigid framework that may curtail their autonomy of decision
to effect a solution to the problem. This sentiment was
echoed by the Brussels' symposium Panel III (leadership and
organizational problems) meeting in September 1979 to dis-
cuss problems relating to the Atlantic Alliance. This
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panel acknowledged that "France for some years now has
effectively blocked meaningful political consulation in
the North Atlantic Council on problems outside the NATO
area despite France's signature on the Ottawa Declaration
of 1974." The panel pointed out that the North Atlantic
Council operates on a consensus basis, therefore France
like other allies has what amounts to a veto over what is
disucssed. [Ref. 51: p. 1]
On the other hand French policymakers have
argued that France, unlike her allies, had "special
relationships," sometimes historical, oftentimes economic
which require unique diplomatic approaches. They also
argue that a great strength of the Western alliance is the
alliance's diversity and that French initiatives have kept
the alliance from becoming too rigid.
French officials go even further saying that
in confronting new dangers outside the European theater,
"France is more pragmatic than her Anglo-Saxon allies."
They point out that when former U.S. Secretary of State
Edmund Muskie proposed that a joint Western naval force be
deployed in the Persian Gulf in response to the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan, France resisted the idea reasoning
that a multinational show of force would only re-ignite old
anti-colonial feelings in the area and give the Soviets
"a perfect pretext" for increasing their own pressure in
the Gulf. [Ref. 52: p. 4]
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The result was that France deployed its own
naval task force of 15 vessels to the Gulf area. This
plus the units stationed at Djibouti was intended to back
up the French government's declaration that any attempt to
cut off the Straits of Hormuz or other access routes to the
Persian Gulf would be treated as an attack on French
national interests. [Ref. 52: p. 4] Said one official,
We made this declaration about the same time as
President Carter was making a similar declaration;
we have deployed forces to the area, so have the
Americans. Thus, the necessary results are
achieved: what matters are the results, not the
creation of some new multilateral force. Moreover,
in the case of the French deployment it has all been
done without fanfare. [Ref. 52: p. 4]
Later, at the same time as Britain's Prime Minister
Thatcher's declaration in Washington of her government's
willingness to support the American rapid deployment force,
French officials let their view be known that she might have
done better to say less and deploy more actual forces to
the Gulf. [Ref. 52: p. 4]
c. France and the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan
It is interesting to analyze French behavior in
connection with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan because
their behavior provides an indication as to what level of
crisis the French deem it is in their interest to forego to
any extent their independent policy and solidly align them-




It quickly became obvious that the French did
not view the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as "the most
serious threat to world peace since World War 11/" as
President Carter had described this event. As a result, to
many Americans the French reaction and behavior after
Afghanistan were irritatingly familiar. After initial
condemnations, the French refused to participate in a
February 1980 meeting of allied foreign ministers, ignored
American appeals for an Olympic boycott, and refused to
impose economic sanctions on the Soviet Union. Instead
President Valery Giscard d'Estaing traveled to Warsaw in
May 1980, for a private meeting with Soviet President
Brezhnev. The French explained that this behavior was not
because they disagreed with the Carter administration '
s
actions, but because European nations should use tactics
better suited to them. Thus, the French preferred to main-
tain a dialogue with iMoscow while publicly condemning the
Soviet action.
Particularly irritating to Americans was the
French refusal to attend the five nation summit proposed by
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance in February 1980. The reply
from France was typical— "France is not in favor of an
atmosphere of confrontation. It is necessary to endeavor




The French, method of solving the crisis over
Afghanistan was put forth in January 1981, by President
Giscard in which he called for "a conference on ending the
interference in the affairs of Afghanistan." The aim of
this conference was "to bring together all countries who,
whether rightly or wrongly are accused or suspected of
interfering in the internal affairs of Afghanistan."
[Ref. 54: p. 1]
Previously Giscard had endeavored to present a
united European stance on Afghanistan by consultation with
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of the Federal Republic of
Germany with the view of assimilating the French and German
points of view. As a result of this Franco-German summit of
February 5, 1980, a joint communique was issued which
pointed out to the Soviets that, "detente had become more
difficult through the events in Afghanistan and would not
be able to withstand another such blow. In the latter case
the Western alliance would have to take necessary measures
to preserve its own security and protect international
stability. [Ref. 55: p. 6] Although heralded as a tough
stance by the Western press, this statement provided the
dual implications that Afghanistan had neither shattered
the premises of Western detente policy nor rendered necessary




In short, French statements after Afghanistan
said little about the interests of the alliance in the
region outside NATO's traditional boundaries and little or
nothing about the need for NATO jointly to increase its
power to defend its interests in the Persian Gulf region
and nothing in public about facilitating the application
of American military power to help protect French and
other European interests there. The situation in
Afghanistan was one in which the French perceived that
their interests could still be defended without sacrificing
their autonomy of decision. Thus, their behavior was con-
sistent with their stated foreign policy goals. France
avoided actions which tended to polarize states into
superpower blocs and emphasized a European solution to the
crisis. Although the French repeatedly stated that the
Soviet invasion was unacceptable, they refused to repudiate
the detente process. Above all France retained her
autonomy of decision. As if to dispel any doubt about this
latter point, French Foreign Minister Jean Francois-Poncet
in response to criticism concerning the Franco-Soviet
dialogue in May 1980, replied, "France holds talks with
whomever it wants, when it wants (and) .. .does not need
permission from anyone for this." [Ref. 56: p. 204]
d. The Policy of Francois Mitterrand's Government
The socialist victory in France created a
change in leadership personalities, yet the defense
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policies of the new administration seem to be following
the basic guidelines of the concepts established in the
1972 white paper with some shifts in priorities. The
most important changes are the reemphasis on French
strategic deterrent forces and a possible reversal of the
trend under Giscard d'Estaing to move French strategy and
capabilities into closer accord wiht NATO's continental
strategy. Additionally, Francois Mitterand has publicly
called for a change in France's intervention policies,
especially in Africa.
The leadership of Francois Mitterrand was
anticipated with mixed feeling by the Western allies. On
the positive side he had repeatedly criticized President
Giscard d'Estaing for failing to respond more promptly to
Soviet actions in Afghanistan; in particular, he condemned
Giscard for meeting with Soviet Premier Brezhnev in Warsaw
on May 18, 1980, thereby appearing to condone Russian
behavior. His own intention, he declared, was to deal
more firmly with Moscow. The allies also welcomed
Mitterrand's support of NATO's LRTNF program and his view
that peace is linked to the balance of forces in the world
and that the installation of the Soviet SS-20s and
Backfire bombers had broken that balance in Europe. [Ref.
57: p. 41] Also welcomed was his frankness during the
election campaign in which he commented that,
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Falling back on themselves can in the long run invite
France to a sort of neutralism regarding affairs of
the world and in particular affairs of our close
friends. If we refuse all solidarity with them, how
can we expect theirs? [Ref. 35; p. 1]
Nevertheless, some previous commments by Mitterrand
called into question his commitment to the Atlantic
alliance. In addition to castigating Giscard as an
"Atlanticist , " Mitterrand also stated that,
the alliance no longer has any content. A summit is
urgently needed to review the relations which unite
the countries belonging. No one in the West knows
where the Alliance stands, its scope, the reciprocal
obligations it entails, or its degree of automation.
The Alliance is based on fiction: American inter-
vention in Europe in the event of Soviet aggression.
[Ref. 58: p. 1]
Despite this pre-election rhetoric, the government
of Francois Mitterrand has in general neither resolved or
exacerbated the ambiguities with respect to France's
participation in the defense of Europe. However, in
relations with the United States many points of agreement
have been reached on defense matters. In a recent
October 1981 meeting between U.S. Secretary of Defense
Weinberger and French Defense Minister Charles Hernu,
both took a hard line against anti-nuclear and anti-
military elements in Europe as well as agreeing on the
value of the enhanced radiation weapons as a defensive
weapon. In addition, the French quietly agreed to an
unofficial delay of arms shipments to Libya in response
to U.S. requests. In general, Mr. Weinberger found the
French to be far more in tune with the Reagan
114

Administration defense policies than the other NATO
military allies. [Ref. 59: p. 3]
Concerning Europe, the NATO alliance and the
role of France's nuclear and conventional assets, the
Mitterrand government has exhibited great continuity
with the Gaullist past. His commitment to France's
nuclear deterrent was shown by his announcement to
proceed with the construction of a seventh strategic
nuclear submarine. In addition he has retained the basic
French concepts of proportional deterrence, the sanctuary
of France, autonomy of decision-making, the non-
integration of France's military in NATO, TNWs as warning
shots, reticence to take part in the forward battle for
West Germany, and the position of France betwen the two
superpower blocs.
In relation to events outside of Europe,
Mitterrand has assumed a different declaratory policy
from the previous adminstration. The policeman's role
in Africa does not appeal to Mitterrand who in opposi-
tion denounced France under Giscard as, "the Cuba of the
West," for military meddling in Africa. Since his
election he has argued that France's priority in Africa
is, "to attack the profound causes of instability-
economic and social ills." [Ref. 60] His party has
called for renegotiations of France's military agree-
ments with African nations so that French troops won't be
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used to prop up extant regimes as in the past. According
to Mitterrand, French troops will only be used in Africa
to protect French nationals or to resist outside aggres-
sion upon request of the African nations.
Consistent with this policy, 1,400 French troops
remained in their barracks in the Central African Republic
when former President David Dacko was toppled there in a
bloodless coup in September 1981. Though French forces
had unseated Mr. Dacko ' s predecessor, the notorious self-
proclaimed Emperor Jean Bedel Bokassa, and installed Mr.
Dacko two years ago, French officials said the latest
military coup was an internal affair. [Ref. 60]
Along the same lines, the French interventionary
forces (force d ' intervention exterieure) have been renamed
the force d 'assistance rapide. But despite the new decla-
ratory stance, the interventionary forces will be maintain-
ed and improved by the addition of increased Transall
airlift capability, and new External Relations Minister
Claude Cheysson has commented, "If something were to
happen tomorrow and we were called on to meet one of our
obligations, we would do so." [Ref. 61: p. 9]
In relation to France's vital interests in the
Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean region, official sources in the
Mitterrand government have stated that in a serious crisis
France not only envisages military cooperation with U.S.
forces.,, but that this is one of the purposes of France's
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deployment of forces in that region. The French expect
that the United States would be more likely to act to
protect the common interests of the West if other allied
forces are present on the scene. [Ref. 62]
What all this suggests is that General de Gaulle's
basic vision continues to dominate the security outlook
from the Elysee Palace, irrespective of the political
coloration of its habitants
—
particularly the premise that
for France, given her geographic position, her historic
role and commitments, and her political and economic
interests, there really is no alternative to the policy of
independent national deterrence with all its inherent
ambiguities. [Ref. 57: p. 49]
C. SUMMARY AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
Alan Ned Sabrosky has suggested that in the recent
past France has pursued variants of three basic policy
alternatives
:
(1) an independent policy, in which she endeavored
to act as a diplomatically autonomous state;
(2) an Atlantic Alliance policy, which entailed
active participation of the United States in European
affairs; and
(3) a European policy explicitly without U.S. par-
ticipation, at times restricted to Western Europe and at
others extended to Eastern Europe as well, but in all
cases one in which she has tried to present herself as
the leading Continental state.
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Sabrosky concluded that the French government would find
an independent policy the most attractive, but the least
feasible; . an Atlantic Alliance policy the least attractive,
but the most feasible; and a European policy moderately
attractive, but scarcely feasible in the medium term.
Unwilling to choose among these alternatives, the govern-
ment has decided to temporize. [Ref. 63: p. 579]
This statement was made in 1976, but today the
situation remains much the same. The purpose of this
analysis was to investigate the role of France in the
protection of Persian Gulf oil supplies, but this problem
does not exist in isolation, rather it is intimately
related to the role of France in the defense of Europe,
for as vital as the energy from the Persian Gulf is to
France, nothing can be more vital than the security of
the Metropole.
Consistent with Sabrosky's analysis, this discussion
has sought to point out that France will do everything
that is possible to maintain her independent foreign
policy. This had been the lesson of Afghanistan in which
case France did not consider the level of crisis to be
so acute that she would be compelled to relinquish her
independent policy in favor of dutifully subscribing to
American policies.
This is not to say that in a future crisis in which
France perceives that the threat to either her
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territorial security or her overseas economic lifeline
has exceeded her capability to cope with it, she will not
fully cooperate with her Western allies. On the contrary,
recent international developments coupled with domestic
French resource constraints will probably make such co-
operation more necessary in the future.
The increasing pace of technological advances by the
Soviet Union could in the future call into question the
credibility of the French deterrent force. Already the
ability of aging French strike aircraft to penetrate
Soviet air defenses is questionable and the increased
accuracy of Soviet missiles places France's land based
deterrent at risk. The submarine force, will in the
future necessarily be both more sophisticated and
expensive. This factor alone will increase the competi-
tion for defense funding between nuclear and conventional
forces
.
Increased obligations overseas, particularly in the
Persian Gulf and sea lanes around Africa, and limited
naval strength will further weaken the already scarcely
credible French naval doctrine of the "weak against the
strong" to combat indirect threats.
The doctrine of proportional deterrence which is the
mainstay of France's European defense, and the naval
doctrine to combat indirect strategy, which is the
keystone of France's overseas security, could both suffer
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loss of credibility due to increased social economic
constraints. The possiblity is even more likely under
the current Socialist regime which is politically obli-
gated to install more expensive social programs such as
an increase in the minimum wage, increases in pensions,
housing subsidies, and more government jobs.
Already several influential French writers have
admitted that the weakest link in France's overseas
strategy is the defense of the sea lanes and have
repeatedly stated that she cannot do this alone—that she
would need allies. The French seem to believe that any
crisis affecting the sea lanes will affect all of Western
Europe and the U.S. and they expect that the allies would
be there when needed. General Guy Mery has written:
We have thought it reasonable to be in a position to
show it (maritime presence) in two areas simultaneously
at present, for example in the Mediterranean and the
Indian Ocean. It goes without saying that in a major
conflict this naval presence could not in all cases be
carried out by French forces alone. The length of sea
routes would necessarily lead us to cooperate with
others. It is nevertheless important that our partici-
pation be significant and that we be prepared to act
temporarily on our own in situations of acute crisis.
[Ref. 40: p. 325]
Perhaps more subtly Admiral F. R. Lannuzel has added:
It is true that beyond a certain threshold of aggres-
sion the interdependence of maritime trade would be
relied on to an increasing extent and would lead, of
necessity, to France's allies helping out on all sides:
the fact is, therefore, that France's contribution to
tne protection of lines of communication must be shared
with the protection she receives from others , and thus
she runs a great risk in losing one part of her
liberty.... [Ref. 28: p. 12]
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In short, the increasing strains on the credibility of
France's proportional deterrent strategy and her overseas
naval strategy will in the future increasingly force her
to rely upon and cooperate with her allies, no matter how
reluctantly. The only alternatives are an increased
contribution to defense spending which would severely tax
the political will of the nation, or greater deference to
Soviet wishes. The latter case seems less of a possi-
bility because as Giscard has said, "This isn't the lesson
we learn from our history and it's not what the people of
France want either." [Ref. 44: p. 1]
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IV. WEST GERMANY AND THE SECURITY OF THE PERSIAN GULF
The Federal Republic of Germany, like France, has been
profoundly affected by the events of the past decade. The
Arba oil embargo of 1973 and the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan in 1979 served notice that extra-regional
events could pose threats to West German security of equal
or possibly greater significance than the Soviet threat in
central Europe. The recent turmoil in Poland, on the
other hand, serves as a stark reminder of West Germany's
vulnerability in Europe and the central role that the
Federal Republic plays within the Atlantic Alliance in the
defense of Europe.
While a debate centering on "out of area" responsi-
bilities to meet the perceived Soviet threat to the
Persian Gulf area has raged within NATO circles , it has
generally been acknowledged that West Germany's military
role would remain the same as it always has been—the
cornerstone of the Alliance's conventional defense in
Europe. Nevertheless, NATO allies, particularly the
United States, have increased the pressure on the Federal
Republic to assume a greater role, especially in the
economic sphere in Turkey and elsewhere.
Lately, however, the Federal Republic has become
increasingly reticent to continue to fulfill its tradi-
tional role as the alliance resource pool. From the
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beginning of the NATO alliance West Germany was seen as a
source of men, money, and material (as well as territory)
needed to close the gap vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and
later the Warsaw Pact. Particularly within the last two
decades the Federal Republic with its growing economic
strength has supplied the alliance with a power source,
both for the maintenance of day-to-day conventional
military capabilities and for the potential increases
required in crisis or in a changing international
environment.
In the early days of the NATO alliance when the
Federal Republic under the leadership of Konrad Adenauer
made the clear decision in favor of an expanding consumer
economy, participation in West European integration
efforts, and an Atlantic Alliance, West German behavior
became predictable and a "special relationship" developed
between Bonn and Washington. Nevertheless, the West
Germans never entirely gave up the idea of a single
united Germany. Since that time, several factors
(including the increasing economic strength of the FRG,
the advent of strategic nuclear equivalence between the
superpowers, and the evolution of detente and the Federal
Republic ' s Ostopolitik ) have afforded the Federal Republic
a greater degree of independence within the alliance.
These processes (plus the recent intrusion of extra-
European crises) have created a situation where the
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Federal Republic is less willing to accept sacrifices in
behalf of a "special relationship" with the United States
within the Atlantic Alliance. This chapter will examine
the capabilities of the Federal Republic in relation to
protecting Western oil supplies and assess West German
intentions.
A. WEST GERMAN CAPABILITIES IN EUROPE AND THE PERSIAN
GULF
While the FRG could employ political, economic, and
military assets in Europe, she is much less able or
willing to employ military assets overseas in the event of
a serious crisis. Therefore this discussion will provide
a summary of the most important West German capabilities
in Europe, but the analysis of capabilities in the Persian
Gulf area will primarily focus on political and economic
strengths.
1. West German Capabilities in the European Theater
The geographic situation of the Federal Republic
of Germany, highly threatened as she is along the
border of the Warsaw Pact, and our economic power
are the quantities by which our military contribution
to the Alliance is measured. [Ref. 64: p. 24]
This statement in the Defense White Paper, 19 79
,
summarizes the importance of the Federal Republic in the
defense of Western Europe. Due to the German renunciation
of the production of nuclear, biological, and chemical
weapons, on October 23, 1954, the main military contribu-
tion of the Federal Republic to Western European defense
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centers around her geostrategic space, economic power,
and tne strength of her naval, air, and land conventional
forces. The Bundeswehr provides in Central Europe 50
percent of the NATO land forces, 50 percent of the ground-
based air defense resources, 30 percent of the combat air-
craft, and in the Baltic, 70 percent of the naval forces
and 100 percent of the naval air forces. [Ref. 64: p. 24]
The Bundeswehr is conceived as an armed force in
an alliance; therefore, it has different forms of authority
over its formations assigned to NATO in peacetime, in a
crisis, and in the event of war. The air defense forces
are continuously under NATO command and most of the German
active formations are either assigned to NATO or earmarked
for such an assignment during a given phase of the NATO
alert system. Within this structure, the West German
army consists of the Field Army, which is transferred to
NATO command in wartime, and the Territorial Army, which
remains under national command.
On November 6, 1979, as a result of nearly six
years of analysis and experimentation the West Germans
decided to adopt a new army structure , army structure 4
.
Within this structure the Field Army consists of twelve
divisions with 3 6 brigades which are manned at 90 per-
cent in peacetime, corresponding to NATO's highest
readiness category. These forces of the Field Army
comprise 275,000 soldiers in peacetime and can be quickly
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augmented upon mobilization to 440,000 troops in wartime.
[Ref. 65: p. 36] This new structure of 36 brigades meets
an old commitment undertaken within NATO and has as its
primary purpose the strengthening of the conventional
capability of the alliance in response to the growing
threat posed by Soviet armor.
The other element of the German land forces, the
Territorial Army, which comprises territorial commands,
military district commands , and military region and sub-
region commands, will essentially remain unchanged under
army structure 4. However, the manoevre and security
troops—the home defense component—will be reorganized
under the new army structure by the mid-19 80s. The newly
organized Home Defense Brigades will enable the
Territorial Army to conduct combined operations in depth
and reinforce NATO formations employed in forward defense
operations. Additionally, peacetime manning levels of
one of the home defense brigades will be 85 percent of its
wartime strength, two brigades will be manned at a level
of 65 percent, and the remaining two at 52 percent, thus
increasing their capability to execute their mission in
the Rear Combat Zone. Newly organized and better equipped
security troops of the Territorial Army will include 45
motorized infantry battalions organized in 15 home defense
regiments to be employed in area defense, plus 150 home
defense companies and 300 security platoons for vulnerable
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point protection in the rear areas. [Ref. 66: p. 47]
The total manpower of the Territorial Army can be increased
from 65,000 in peacetime to 445,000 in wartime. Thus the
total wartime potential of the German army is close to
950,000 troops which can be quickly mobilized.
[Ref. 65: p. 37]
This impressive manpower total is augmented by
superior equipment which is among the best in the Alliance.
The Field Army possesses some 12,000 tanks, 3,500 pieces
of heavy artillery, 2,400 missiles, and 500 helicopters
including such new designs as the Leopard II main battle
tank and the Milan anti-tank guided missiles system.
[Ref. 67: p. 5] The Field Army is highly mechanized with
seventeen mechanized or "Jager" brigades, sixteen armored
brigades, and three airborne brigades. Under the new
organization increased stress has been laid on improved
anti-tank defense capability in order to preclude a
successful Warsaw Pact surprise attack in the Central
region.
West German officials consider the essential
attribute of their army to be an almost instantaneous
reaction capability and a permanent state of operational
readiness, adding that the quality of the equipment, high
level of training, high proportion of regulars or medium
and long-term volunteers make the West German armed forces
the backbone of European defense.
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The Bundesmarine (West German Navy) has a peace-
time strength of 38,000 men operating 24 submarines, 11
destroyers, 6 frigates, and 6 corvettes, as well as 120
smaller craft. [Ref. 67: p. 5] These vessels are backed
up by 130 combat aircraft of the fleet air arm. The
Bundesmarine serves primarily a regional function within
NATO's naval strategy, originally being set up in 1955
with the intent of operating in coastal waters only. Its
prime mission was the defense of the Baltic approaches.
In the 1960s, the area of operations was extended to the
North Sea and most recently, with the endorsement of her
NATO allies, the FRG extended its naval operations to
include Arctic waters. [Ref. 68: p. 5]
West German naval officials define their primary
tasks as follows:
(1) to degrade the offensive capability of the
Warsaw Pact in the Baltic
(2) to impede the use of Baltic waters by an
aggressor,
(3) to contain enemy forces within the Baltic,
(4) to fend off attacks upon friendly coasts, and
(5) to deny the enemy use of the maritime
connection between the Baltic and the North Sea.
[Ref. 69: p. 5]
These tasks are complicated by the fact that the major
part of the Baltic coast is in the hands of littoral
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states of the Warsaw Pact and neutral Sweden. Additionally,
in the Baltic the Warsaw Pact forces have a five to one
numerical advantage over NATO forces. Thus, the navies of
West Germany and Denmark are confronted with the Soviet
Red Banner Fleet comprising 380 surface ships, 65 sub-
marines, and 260 aircraft; the German Democratic Republic
navy comprising 140 surface ships and the Polish navy with
140 surface ships, 4 submarines, and 90 aircraft.
[Ref. 69: p. 53]
Although the security interests of Denmark, are
intimately associated with those of the Federal Republic
in this area, the Bundesmarine bears the main burden in
the Baltic. To make the best use of its primary advantages
of the narrow straits and the defensive position, the
Bundesmarine has placed primary attention in the armaments
field in the development and construction of conventional
submarines, fast patrol boats, minelayers, and naval
fighter bombers. The 24 conventional submarines of the
205 and 206 classes are difficult to detect, and ideally
suited to take advantage of the shallow waters, islands,
and inlets of the 3altic Straits. The Bundesmarine ' s fast
patrol boats, including the sophisticated 14 8 and 14 3
classes capable of carrying modern long-range missiles,
torpedos, and effective electronic warfare equipment
complement the submarines in the anti-shipping task.
These assets are designed for joint operation with the
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naval fighter-bombers, which are being upgraded by the in-
troduction of the Tornado Multirole Combat Aircraft (MRCA)
.
The Bundesmarine also contributes to the defense of
the North Sea with its ports and debarkation areas for the
reinforcement of NATO. The employment of Bundesmarine
destroyers, frigates, maritime patrol and anti-submarine
aircraft, naval fighter-bombers, and mine countermeasures
forces in this area is not substantial, but the Bundesmarine
releases forces of other allies for duty in the Atlantic or
beyond NATO's treaty area. Additionally, the Bundesmarine
contributes on a rotational basis to the Standing Naval
Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT) , which is a NATO multination-
al force composed of five to nine destroyers or frigate-
type ships. This force is permanently deployed and has as
its basic objectives the improvement of NATO teamwork, the
demonstration of solidarity in the alliance, and the main-
tenance of the capability for rapid deployment to a
threatened area in times of crisis or tension.
The West German air force or Luftwaffe has more
than 100,000 men, mainly regulars. With 24 combat
squadrons, totaling about 500 aircraft, it possesses
reconnaissance and conventional combat capabilities,
[ref, 70: p. 47] Some of its forces have an atomic
delivery capability and are available for nuclear engage-
ment as part of NATO's deterrent strategy (Under the
double key system the nuclear weapons supplied by the
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United States may only be used after approval by the
President). The Luftwaffe's role is more tactical than
strategic in that operational space extends from the
Baltic Straits in the north to the Alps.
The aircraft types used in the air force are
"Phantoms" (RF-4E for reconnaissance, F-4F as fighter and
fighter-bombers) , the FIAT G-91 (ground support) , and the
F-104G "Starfighter. " The "Alpha" jet (a Franco-German
aircraft) and the MRCS "Tornado" (produced jointly by
Germany, the United Kingdom, and Italy) will respectively
replace the FIAT G-91 and the F-104G. As well as combat
aircraft, the Luftwaffe contains air defense units
including twenty-four surface-to-air "Nike-Hercules"
missile batteries and thirty-four "Hawk" batteries,
[ref . 71: p. 4]
]
All the combat elements of the Luftwaffe are ear-
marked for assignment to the responsible NATO commander
in the event of war, and the air defense units are under
NATO's operational control in peacetime. Other combat
forces will come under the operational control of NATO
upon declaration of a certain state of alert, while
certain sub-units are on quick reaction alert under
NATO's operational command in peacetime. The remaining
forces are placed under national command and will fulfill
their mission under this command. [Ref. 71: p. 41]
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This orief summary of the capabilities of the West
German armed forces must be supplemented by the realiza-
tion that the defense of the Federal Republic goes hand-in-
hand with the defense of Europe—with that of all the
member countries of the alliance. The defense capability
of the Federal Republic takes on additional importance as
Atlantic Alliance forces quantitatively erode and Soviet
conventional capability grows. This effect may be
exacerbated if certain American reserve troops presently
earmarked for use in NATO have to be used elsewhere.
In addition to tne armed forces of the Bundeswehr,
the Federal Republic contributes to the defense of Europe
by the maintenance of a growing arms industry. While this
•industry (which was non-existent in 1955) still labors
under both psychological and political constraints due to
the limiting protocols of the Paris Agreements, a vast
reservoir of German technological expertise continually
contributes to its growtn. Since the 1960s, West Germany
has forged for itself a prime position in the field of
conventional weapons, particularly in the construction of
fast patrol boats, armored vehicles (of which the
"Leopard" and the "Harder" are the best-known examples,)
in the electronics field (radars, missiles, etc.) and
finally in a rebirth of the aircraft industry in tne form
of international cooperation with the Alhpa jet and
particularly the MRCA. [Ref. 70: p. 101]
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Of great potential importance is West Germany's
construction of conventional submarines, which have
received increased attention lately for specialized
roles because of their relative cheapness in comparison
with nuclear powered submarines and their manoever-
ability and low probability of detection. Since the
United States has discontinued the construction of con-
ventional submarines, the West German program, which has
the highest export rate of all European submarine
builders, takes on added importance. The Federal
Republic has built 32 submarines for the Bundesmarine and
49 boats for export to eleven countries since 1945.
[Ref. 72: p. 65]
In a related development , the Council of Ministers
of the Western European Union (WEU) lifted the tonnage
limitation of 450 tons standard displacement on West
German submarine construction. [Ref. 72: p. 66]
Additionally, the WEU lifted the tonnage limit on con-
struction of German warships which had been in force
since 1954. This measure came in response to the Bonn
government ' s request in order to stop discrimination
against West German shipyards in the military sphere.
Federal Republic shipyards can now accept orders from
abroad like their competitors and also have a free hand
in technology development. [Ref. 73: p. 5] These
developments, in addition to having a favorable effect
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on the West German economy, may be of potential long-
term importance for Western defense interests. As the
traditional Western maritime powers assume added responsi-
bilities outside of NATO, West Germany may be called upon
to increase its naval role in the Atlantic. A stronger
West German military shipbuilding industry would then be
a welcome asset.
Economically, the Federal Republic has tradition-
ally carried a heavy share of the NATO defense burden,
ranking second behind the United States as the largest
contributor to the aggregate defense effort. Addition-
ally, West Germany has been the only member nation
besides the United States to provide defense assistance
to Turkey and Greece since 1964 and Portugal since 1978.
Consisting of the supply of new and used equipment, the
total value of this assistance by 1979 was DM800 million
for Turkey, DM267 million for Greece, and DM34 million
for Portugal. In addition, Greece and Turkey received,
free of charge, several deliveries of equipment dis-
carded by the Bundeswehr. [Ref. 64: p. 278]
The above measures do not entirely reflect the
scope of West German contributions both militarily and
economically to Western defense in Europe. In addition
to such intangibles as alliance morale and confidence,
the Federal Republic adds its economic weight and
prestige within other forums such as the OECD, EEC, and
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the IMF and contributes to Western military capabili-
ties through participation in many multinational weapons
development programs which increase overall alliance
effectiveness through greater standardization of equip-
ment. Despite these achievements and contributions,
alliance partners (specifically the United States) will
expect more in the future.
Because the general strategy for meeting extra-
regional threats to Western security in areas such as
the Persian Gulf has increasingly translated into
American troops and equipment and European money, West
Germany is expected to contribute by assuming a major
role in filling the gap left by the diversion of
American military and economic assets overseas. The
broad outline of American expectations was reflected in
a communique issued after the April 14, 1980 meeting of
NATO's Defense Planning Committee. [Ref. 74] The
measures delineated generally consisted of an increased
emphasis and urgency to complete plans formulated pre-
viously under NATO's Long Term Defense Programme (LTDP)
.
Among the most important measures proposed was an
increase in munition stocks. The United States has the
largest stocks in the alliance and has urged the European
allies to increase theirs. The communique also stressed
the need for more adequate airlift in the event of a
crisis, including programs to assist the United States in
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an airbridge to the Persian Gulf area. The United States
is planning to include U.S. civil aircraft and believes
that the West Europeans could at least draw up similar
plans. Improvement of European infrastructure was
proposed as well as an increase in the availability of
forces in an emergency. Finally, the communique called
for an increase in defense spending, and West Germany
will be called on to contribute its traditionally large
share.
2 . West German Capability in the Persian Gulf Area
The concept of "division of labor" between the
NATO allies in response to the problems posed by events
in the Persian Gulf area has taken on a politico-
economic as well as a military meaning. It is primarily
within the political and economic spheres that the
Federal Republic has proposed to contribute to the
Western effort, both on the southern flank of NATO and
outside the boundaries of NATO. It is within this frame-
work that the Federal Republic has proposed to provide
more economic and military aid to Turkey, to provide
economic aid to help stabilize Pakistan, to embark on a
plan of political and economic cooperation with the
Persian Gulf states within the framework of the
European Economic Community, and as was previously dis-
cussed, to relieve her allies of some of the military
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and financial burden in Europe if they become involved
militarily in areas of conflict ourside of Europe.
a. West German Efforts in Turkey
Of all the NATO allies West Germany is con-
sidered to have the best relations with Turkey. This
relationship has increased in significance since the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Iranian Revolution,
and the Iran-Iraq War. Turkey is important to Western
interests not only for its strategic position, which is
vital for the defense of the upper Persian Gulf, but
because of its membership in NATO.
From a geographic standpoint, Turkish air
bases are well placed strategically. For example, with
the F-111F, strike missions could be carried out to
cover the important sources of a potential Soviet attack
on the upper Persian Gulf proceeding from the
Transcaucasus and Transcaspian regions in the Soviet
Union. These same aircraft could reach all important
destinations in the upper Persian Gulf, and F-15s with
conformal tanks could perform intercept as well as strike
missions that far. For most Western aircraft with
shorter combat radii, Turkey might offer the only bases
from which the origins of a Soviet attack could be
reached. [Ref. 75: p. 66] Moreover, while it might take
many hundreds of millions of dollars to bring bases in
Oman, Somalia, and Kenya up to NATO standards, Turkish
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bases are basically up to NATO standards now, and several
also have the advantage of association with NATO air
defense ground environment stations. (NADGE)
.
The strategic geography of Turkey and the
precedent for use of joint mobile forces in NATO, such as
the ACE mobile force, and STANAVFORLANT , might make it
possible to exercise land-based aircraft of European NATO
countries in Turkey on a frequent basis and to do so
without going outside the formal treaty boundaries during
the exercises. Even the West Germans, who feel especially
constrained politically on the movement of military
forces outside the FRG, have frequently in the past used
Konya range in eastern Turkey for pilot training because
of the lack of airspace for training pilots above their
own territory. [Ref. 75: p. 75] The presence of a multi-
national European-U.S . air contingent within range of the
Persian Gulf could be a valuable political asset for
demonstrating alliance solidarity and determination in
the event of a potential crisis in the Gulf area and
might serve as a deterrent to Soviet aggression. Such a
contingent could be quickly moved to eastern Turkey as a
diplomatic signal without the difficulties inherent in a
similar move outside of NATO's formal area.
In addition to her geostratical position,
Turkey is important because her own armed forces could
contribute to the defense of NATO interests in the Gulf
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region rather than merely supplying facilities for the use
of others. Also, there are significant indications that
the Turks would be in the forefront of a broader interpre-
tation of NATO's concerns today. The Turks allowed the
use of Incirlik in connection with the Jordanian crisis in
September 1970; and a number of influential Turks have made
clear their understanding that, like other NATO countries,
they would be critically affected by Soviet aggression in
the Persian Gulf because oil from the Gulf is as essential
for Turkey as it is for the rest of NATO. Turkey is more
affected than any other NATO country in that such agges-
sion would involve its immediate neighbors.
The attitude of Turkish officials was
displayed in a mid-August 1980 report in Tercuman of an
"important change in Turkish foreign policy determined
jointly by the General Staff and Foreign Ministry."
[Ref. 75: p. 65] The report stated that the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan could be considered as marking
the beginning of a tendency to move down to the oil
regions. Adding, however, that no one at the moment knows
the next Soviet step, the Foreign Ministry officials
stated that it is out of the question that the United
States can use Turkey as a springboard for an attack in
the Middle East. However, if the Soviet Union attempts to
move down to the Persian Gulf, this would prejudice
Turkey's interests. Turkey would then act jointly with
139

its allies because, having occupied the Gulf, the Soviet
Union would certainly threaten Turkey's oil supplies.
The report added that, according to the authorities,
technical work has begun in view of such a probability.
As the preceding report and other indications
imply, it is unlikely that Turkey would wish to involve
itself bilaterally with the United States alone in
military action in the Gulf area, but a Turkish response
is much more likely under an alliance cover involving
other West European nations.
Turkey has therefore become a key state in the
NATO alliance not only because of her previous importance
for defense of the eastern Mediterranean, but because of
the potential danger to Western interests in the Persian
Gulf. Unfortunately, Turkey is one of NATO's poorest
countries. The inflation rate has exceeded 100 percent,
and one of every four Turks is jobless. The Cyprus war
was expensive; and even in peacetime, Turkey's 4 8 5,000
troops constitute a major expense for a poor country.
For these reasons and as a result of the United States
arms embargo since 1974, the Turkish armed forces are
obsolescent and in extremely poor repair. For Turkey this
situation has been worsened oy the ever-increasing price
of raw materials. Nearly the entire export profits of the
Turkish economy are presently spent to finance the import
of crude oil and other energy sources. [Ref. 76: p. 19]
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West Germany has long granted defense assis-
tance to Turkey, a policy which has its roots in a
recommendation of NATO's Council of Ministers in March
1962. This assistance has been granted within the frame-
work of Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty in which
the allies have pledged themselves to mutual assistance.
In the context of ten agreements from 1964 to 1979,
Turkey received from the Federal Republic defense assis-
tance, material supplies, and services to the value of
DM800 million. [Ref. 76: p. 19]
The Turkish military is capable of absorbing
a great deal of military assistance, but the economy
needs a boost as well. At a meeting in Guadeloupe on
January 7, 1979, the Federal Republic accepted the task
of coordinating economic aid via the OECD to Turkey.
Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Bonn has made
this task one of the centerpieces of her efforts to
contribute to the strengthening of Western defenses in
the Middle East and Persian Gulf area. Bonn therefore
pledged to give Turkey further aid from its development
budget as well as aid for military expenditures in
addition to the supply of military equipment (mainly
anti-tank equipment and ammunition) and food supplies.
Most of these stocks will come from Bundeswehr supplies,
wnich will provide 3 percent new material and 20 percent
used material. The Bonn Ministry of Defense estimates
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the value of this aid between DM3 8 and DM56 million.
[Ref. 77: p. 3]
As an initial measure the Federal Republic
made provisions for the immediate transfer of 60 Leopard-
I tanks to Turkey, to be supplemented by armored personnel
carriers, trucks and trailers, machine guns, anti-tank
systems, cobra missiles, and more ammunition. The
Bundesmarine will contribute small craft, tugboats, and
fuel transporters. Bonn was quick to point out that the
total measures envisaged in the arms sector would
necessitate an increase in the defense budget of some DM1
billion, [Ref. 78: p. Jl] and that the total package of
aid to Turkey would likely amount to several billion DM
and would be at the expense of planned tax relief in 1980
and 1981. [Ref. 77: p. 2]
In addition to these measures, Bonn has been
active in a diplomatic effort to encourage the participa-
tion of the Gulf oil shieks in the Turkish financial
rescue operation. In line with these activities the
Federal Republic's financial minister, Hans Matthoefer
first met with his Saudi Arabian opposite number in
Febraury 1980 to probe this possibility. The appeal was
not only for money, but also for cheap oil. [Ref. 79: p. 6]
As this discussion has pointed out, the
Federal Republic has assumed a major role in the West's
attempt to rejuventate and stabilize Turkey after the
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Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This is a task for which
West Germany is particularly well suited because of
Germany's historic friendship with Turkey since the time
of the Ottoman Empire and West Germany's position as
Turkey's most important trading partner.
b. West German Efforts in Pakistan
The Federal Republic pledged to play a leading
role in providing economic aid to Pakistan but refused to
take part in arms deliveries. West Germany hs promoted
the view that India has a crucial role to play in sur-
mounting the Afghanistan crisis and stabilizing the
Middle East. Bonn, therefore, has reiterated its intention
of doing nothing in the Middle East that might lead to an
aggravation of the situation, especially anything that
might exacerbate Indo-Pakistan differences.
Nevertheless, since Bonn first embarked on
development aid, Pakistan has received DM 1.9 billion in
capital aid or aid promised, DM 150m in technical assis-
tance, and nearly DM 54 million in food aid. 3onn has
also provided some DM26 million in aid to Afghan refugees
in Pakistan. In spite of Bonn's refusal to lend direct
military assistance to Pakistan, the Federal Republic
drew up plans to foot the bill fot four Airbus aircraft
for Pakistan which were ordered in the FRG prior to the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The funds thus released
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will be used by Pakistan for different purposes, meaning
defense purposes. [Ref. 30: p. 1]
c. Cooperation With Persian Gulf States
The Federal Republic of Germany shares the
general West European view that long-term stability in the
Persian Gulf region will depend more on political and
economic factors than on the deployment of military power.
Moreover, Bonn has consistently sought to portray her
participation in Middle East and Gulf diplomacy as part of
an overall European effort. This policy has been pursued
in an attempt to shield the Federal Republic from being
singled out for conducting anti-Israeli or anti-American
policies.
Nevertheless, the West Germans have been
active in cultivating greater political and economic
cooperation with the Gulf states and in the Middle East.
In Iraq and other Islamic states where significant
American presence is impossible because of American
association with Israel and the former Shah of Iran,
Foreign Minister Genscher, Franz Joseph Strauss, and
Chancellor Schmidt, among others, have been trying to
establish personal links with Arab leaders such as
Saddam Hussein of Iraq as well as participating in the
much-criticized meetings between FDP member, Jurgen
Mollemann, SPD leader Willy Brandt, and PLO leader
Yaser Arafat. [Ref. 81: p. 1]
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Foreign Minister Genscher has repeatedly
visited Arab capitals in the Gulf region in an effort to
further political and economic cooperation between the
EEC and the Arab states, including Iraq. West Germany has
strong ties with Iraq—itself emerging as a majority
military power in the Middle East—based on ties formed
when Germany built the Berlin-Baghdad Railway around the
turn of the century. Bonn officials now believe they have
good contacts in Iraq and potential influence in that
state. [Ref. 82: p. 69]
The efforts to cultivate relations in the Gulf
have been especially apparent in Saudi Arabia. Part of
this motivation is the fact that Saudi Arabia is the
Federal Republic's main oil source and also its main
creditor. The Saudis have expressed interest in weapons
and arms from West Germany, especially the Leopard tank,
and have hinted that the basis for business between the
two countries may disappear unless this business includes
arms sales. For Saudi Arabia, weapons from Europe are a
symbol of independence from U.S. supply; and even though
Bonn has so far resisted Saudi pressure to alter its
restrictive arms transfer policy, it would not be
surprising to see the West Germans sell the Leopard tank
to the Saudis in the future. [Ref. 83: p. 1]
Most West German arms transfers which provide
potential influence in the Gulf region travel by much less
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conspicuous routes through the export of plants and
licenses, foreign assembly arrangements, and multinational
projects. An example of these procedures is the Italian
main battle tank called the Lion, which is a copy of the
German Leopard and the Marder APC, both of which are
eagerly sought by Arab countries. Other multinational
projects such as the Milan, HOT, and Roland missiles, and
the Alpha jet and Tornado (MRCA) offer the same possi-
bilities for potential sales to Arab countries despite
West Germany's restrictive arms sale policy.
[Ref. 84: p. 251]
The final source of potential West German
influence in the Gulf area and the Middle East is the
position the Federal Republic has taken in the Arab-
Israeli conflict. Here again the Federal Republic has
identified itself with the European Community position,
which advocates a homeland for the Palestinian people.
West Germany historically has shown a great deal of
deference to the Israeli position and to U.S. policy.
However, Bonn officials have clearly stated their criti-
cisms of Israel's policy of establishing settlements on
the West Bank. Early in his Chancellorship, Helmut
Schmidt stated that he did not attach greater importance
to Israel's right to exist than to the legitimate
rights of the Palestinian peoples. [Ref. 35: p. 1] West
Germany's increasingly pro-Arab stance has put Bonn's
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relations with Israel under strain and lias created the
impression that her policies are motivated primarily by
oil interests, but nevertheless these same policies may
provide the West much-needed political leverage in this
area.
d. West German Military Capabilities in the
Persian Gulf Area
The idea of Bundeswehr troops engaging in a
military conflict in the Persian Gulf area or of West
German warships forming part of an international fnrce
to patrol Western oil routes is not very realistic for
several reasons. First, West German armed forces are
basically equipped and oriented toward a conflict in
Europe where NATO assets are already scarcely adequate.
Second, and perhaps more constraining, is the political
legacy of German militarism remaining from World War I
and World War II. Even though few nations, except for
those in tne Western camp, vigorously protest the
presence of East German troops outside of the GDR, it
still remains almost impossible for West Germans to
contemplate a more active military role abroad.
Despite this pervasive feeling in West
Germany, several writers after the events in Afghanistan
questioned whether it was not possible to at least lend
the United States a symbolic hand. Noting that by
Article 87a of tne Basic Law (the 1949 Federal Constitution
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the Bundeswehr may only be deployed abroad on active
service for immediate defense purposes, Hans Schueler
pointed out that by Article 24 of the same document, the
Federal government is entitled to join a system of collec-
tive security to keep the peace (the constitutional
provision empowering the government to join NATO.)
Article 11 of the 19 7 4 Ottawa Declaration states that the
common interests of NATO countries may be affected by
events in other parts of the world. Based on these
interpretations, Schueler concluded that there is no
reason to assume that it is unconstitutional for the
Federal Republic to join an international naval peace-
keeping force in the Gulf region in times of crisis, nor
is there any reason to behave as though the Federal
Republic has its hands tied by NATO. [Ref. 86: p. 2]
Although this is not a widely shared view in
West Germany, in April 1980, three months after the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan, the 3undesmarine sent a flotilla
(two destroyers and supply ships) to the Indian Ocean.
These vessels made port visits and took part in joint
exercises with American vessels. [Ref. 87: p. 3] West
German officials quickly pointed out that this naval
visit to the Indian Ocean was planned prior to the events
in Afghanistan and should not be construed as a move
toward a more expansionist policy. In spite of these
official disclaimers, this wider recognition of mutual
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interests in the area by a major European power is a
positive development.
3 . Constraints on West German Capabilities
The Federal Republic faces several important
constraints on her ability to influence situations within
the international arena. Some are uniquely related to
her historical experiences of defeat in two world wars,
while others, primarily those of an economic nature, are
common to most Western industrial states. In general,
West Germany faces economic and manpower problems which
could potentially inhibit her ability to apply leverage
either in Europe or overseas. In Europe, the existence
of East Germany as a hostage to the Soviet Union and the
related policy of Ostopolitik place severe limits on
Bonn's political flexibility. The recent growth of
neutralist and pacifist segments within the West German
population further inhibits government flexibility. In
the Persian Gulf region, West Germany's traditional
relationship with Israel and her energy dependency on the
Arab states force Bonn to steer a middle course between
pro-Western policies which may run counter to Arab
interests and pro-Arab policies which suggest an
impression of endangering Israel's security.
In many respects West Germany is a prisoner of
past economic successes, West Germans are used to an
annual increase in real national income and current
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governments are held to an accounting which they cannot
avert by making comparisons with the economic performance
of their neighbors. Seen from abroad, the Federal
Republic's high living standards and low inflation rate
probably look as enviable as ever, but on closer inspec-
tion this image has become somewhat tarnished. The
German mark still ranks next to the U.S. dollar as the
most important currency in world trade, West German
inflation and unemployment remain relatively low (4-5
percent per year and 3-4 percent, respectively), and the
West Germans enjoy one of the highest per capita annual
incomes; and yet there are clouds on the horizon.
[Ref. 38: p. 195]
The Federal Republic is facing an economic
growth slowdown, increased unemployment, and high balance
of payments deficits. From 1978 to 1980, West Germany's
balance of payments current account swung from a DM 17.5
billion surplus to a DM 28 billion deficit. [Ref. 39:
p. 21 [ Because West Germany is remarkably vulnerable to
world trade conditions, there are severe limits on what
Bonn can do about these terms of trade or the price of
oil, the chief factors in this plunge. Naturally, these
economic problems have had an impact on defense spending.
The senior partners in West Germany's ruling
coalition, the Social Democrats, espouse a reformist
policy in which social programs enjoy the highest priority,
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The SPD is thus reluctant to sacrifice social gains for
increased defense spending. The Christian Democratic
opposition is more inclined to do so, though such a shift
in emphasis would be somewhat controversial in their
ranks as well. As a result, the 1979 Defense White Paper
projected that defense spending in the medium-term
financial plan for 1980-1983 would fall well below the 3
percent increase in real terms sought within NATO's Long
Term Defense Programme, and the figures projected for
1980-1983 meant that the defense budget as a whole would
take the smallest portion of any federal budget over the
past two decades. [Ref. 64: p. 276] Among other measures,
the decrease in defense spending has forced cutbacks in
pilot training flights and stretches or curtailments in
programs such as the Tornado and the Roland II.
i
This cutback in West German defense spending
rates is exacerbated by the Federal Republic's low birth-
rate, one of the lowest in the world. In 19 77, the
Bundeswehr took in some 2 32,000 conscripts against an
annual requirement of roughly 250,000. By the end of the
19 8 0s, under the same system the number will be down to
less than 200,000 and the projection for 1997 is 133,000.
[Ref. 90: p. 5] These figures and the level of defense
spending illuminate problems concerning West Germany's
preferred role within a Western "division of labor."
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The Federal Republic, in addition to economic
constraints, faces difficult political problems which
limit her room for manoever. In Europe, the results of
two world wars have created a lingering distrust of the
Federal Republic among her NATO allies, as well as dis-
trust and fear among her Warsaw Pact opponents. For this
reason Bonn faces the perpetual dilemma that most of her
actions designed to ameliorate tensions with the East,
such as the policy of Ostopolitik , create apprehensions
among her NATO allies. On the other hand, acts of
solidarity with her NATO allies quickly elicit threats
and vituperation from the Soviet Union and the East
European communist bloc. This dilemma is compounded by
several other realities of the post-war European situation,
First, the Soviet Union by virtue of her control of East
Germany, has great leverage over West German policy.
Second, the Federal Republic's European NATO allies,
although content to see West Germany help NATO constitute
a military counterweight to Soviet power, are extremely
reluctant to allow the Federal Republic to dominate
Western Europe, either militarily, economically, or
politically. This is especially true of France. This
complex situation often impels Bonn to walk a political





Ironically, this same complex situation has
contributed to the current situation of fear among
Americans and West Germany's European allies of a new
West German trend toward drift, neutralism, and new, left-
wing nationalism. Public protest against the current Long
Range Theater Nuclear Force (LRTNF) modernization, the
neutron bomb controversy, and new outbreaks of terrorism
have created questions among Bonn allies as to her
reliability in the future. This recent trend toward
neutralism, either real or perceived, undermines West
Germany's political stock in the United States and among
her European allies, such as France.
Political dilemmas also characterize West German
policy in the Middle East and Persian Gulf area. The
feeling still exists in the Federal Republic that en-
suring the survival of Israel is both a necessity and a
historic obligation. This notion is counterbalanced by
a realization that West Germany is critically dependent
for energy on Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, which
marches in the front ranks of the anti-Israeli Arab
coalition. These factors force Bonn to perform a balancing
act in the Middle East. This often results in adamant
public statements by Bonn politicians stressing their
commitment to Israel concurrent with pro-Arab policies
cloaked within European Community policies.
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B. WEST GERMAN POLICY AND INTENTIONS
Unlike the case of France, there is little ambiguity
concerning West German reaction should hostilities break
out in Europe. As the most valuable Soviet objective in
Western Europe, the Federal Republic would most likely be
the prime objective of aggression, in which case immediate
armed reaction by the Federal Republic would not only be a
fulfillment of alliance pledges, but a necessity for
national survival. Additionally, West German armed
forces are essentially integrated under NATO command.
Therefore, considerations of West German intentions con-
cerning the protection of Western oil supplies center
around the question of her contribution to short and long-
term improvements to Europe's defense and her support of
extra-regional deployment of assets by her allies. A
discussion of this question must be prefaced by an examina-
tion of West German foreign policy—in particular, the
notion that West Germany is expanding her global role and
assuming a greater independence of decision-making within
the Western alliance. An examination of the Federal
Republic's reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,
in order to provide some indications of probable West




1. West German Foreign Policy
A West German journalist recently expressed the
view that "the French withdrawal from NATO, British
economic weakness, and the weakness of U.S. leadership
meant that Bonn has virtually been an equal partner of the
U.S.A. since the mid-70s." [Ref. 91: p. 2] Although the
latter portion of this statement may be an exaggeration,
the Federal Republic has come to play a much more impor-
tant role not just within the alliance, but on the world
stage in general. For our purposes it is important to
examine the roots of this changing foreign policy and the
probability of West German acceptance of U.S. views on how
to best protect Western interests in Europe and in the
Persian Gulf region.
The presence of the Federal Republic has been more
fully felt in international organizations, in the
councils of the Atlantic Alliance, in the Third World, and
in the East, but this new assertiveness has been incre-
mental and generally limited to the political and economic
spheres. Typical of West Germany's new recognition, as
not merely a follower but a leader, was the January 1979
summit at Guadeloupe where for the first time the "Big
Three" of the United States, Great Britain, and France,
was enlarged to include the West Germans. In a like
manner, today few European initiatives are taken without
prior consultation and agreement between Paris and Bonn.
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Bonn has increasingly promoted the idea that the
Federal Republic has world-wide security interests that
transcend the narrow bounds of NATO, even though the
Federal Republic may be limited in her military commit-
ments. Thus in the aftermath of the Afghanistan invasion,
West German officials were actively engaged in diplomacy
in Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, as well as the
Middle East and Gulf states. West Germany has also been
increasingly moving into such traditional U.S. diplomatic
preserves as Saudi Arabia and Central America, and
Chancellor Schmidt likes to take credit for restraining
the United States from imposing serious sanctions on Iran,
and thus indirectly for part of the progress that took
place toward the release of the U.S. hostages. [Ref. 82:
p. 70]
In the economic sphere, despite recent setbacks,
West Germany's ability to cope with the energy crisis,
unemployment, and inflation has been the envy of the
Western industrial powers. It is noteworthy that West
German economic strength was one reason why in 196 9
French President Georges Pompidou gave the go-ahead for
Britain and other countries to join the EEC in an effort
to counterbalance West German economic strength. Never-
theless the political and economic dominance of the
Federal Republic is much greater within the EEC today
than it was thirteen years ago. In business West Germany
156

is becoming the biggest exporter of all industrial
nations—exporting not only goods but money, management,
and technology. Perhaps the most striking example of
Bonn's new-found independence was Chancellor Schmidt's
ability to pour cold water on Washington's plea four
years ago for the Federal Republic to massively stimulate
her economy to act as a "locomotive" for other Western
economies. [Ref. 82: p. 69]
Finally, Bonn's new assertiveness has been
evident within the Atlantic Alliance, where the Federal
Republic has recently been seeking more command authority.
In the summer of 1977, Bonn officially requested that
more senior appointments in NATO be reserved for West
German officers. Bonn pointed out that Great Britain,
despite its sharply curtailed contribution to the
Alliance, receives some 40 percent of the top command and
staff positions (a percentage equal to the United States)
,
while little more than 10 percent of the total was
reserved for West Germans. NATO officials agreed, and as
a result, more senior posts are being allotted to the
Bundeswehr. The post of Deputy to the Supreme Allied
Commander, previously reserved for a 3ritish officer, is
now shared with a West German General. [Ref. 92: p. 106]
It is possible to identify several factors which
constitute the roots of this more assertive West German
foreign policy. Among the most important are the quest
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for reunification and the policy of Qstopolitik , the
growing lack of confidence in the United States with the
resultant increase of bilateral U.S.-FRG tensions, and the
growing sense of West German economic vulnerability.
These factors are interrelated to some degree and tend to
form a vicious circle, with increasing divergence between
American and West German policies. For example, it is
difficult to establish whether Bonn's policy of
Qstopolitik has driven a wedge between U.S. and FRG
policies or whether differing U.S. and FRG policies have
created more manoeverability for West German Qstopolitik .
The same can be said of the latter two factors mentioned
above. The more assertive West German foreign policy has
altered the strict leader-follower relationship that has
characterized Washington-Bonn relations in the past.
The 1979 Federal Republic Defense White Paper
states that "The Federal Republic of Germany continues to
pursue her declared intention of working for a state of
peace in Europe in which the German people will regain
their unity in free self-determination." [Ref. 64: p. 47]
As this statement emphasizes, the Federal Republic views
peace, or detente, as the precondition for a convergence
of the Germans. In spite of the immobility of the past
three decades, the Germans have never lost sight of the
goal of reunification. Chancellor Schmidt is fond of
remarking that it once took the Poles 200 years to
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reunite—but reunite they eventually did, and so, he says,
will the Germans. Schmidt has otherwise remarked that,
I do not foresee under what auspices and conditions
the Germans will get together again, but they will.
Maybe only in the twenty-first century, I don't know.
It would obviously be wrong for any European nation
to believe that the nation-state is normal for any
nation, but not for the Germans. [Ref. 93: p. 54]
The goal of reunification, the driving force
behind Ostopolitik , has resulted in continuous efforts by
Bonn to befriend East Germany and keep open relations with
the East Germany government and its Soviet political
masters. This desire at times seems to dominate West
German geopolitical thinking. The policy of detente for
the Federal Republic has created many advantages during the
last decade, but it has not been without its pitfalls.
Bonn's Ostopolitik first emerged during the
Chancellorship of Willy Brandt and was aided, and even
encouraged, by the United States, which was taking
tentative steps toward better Soviet-American relations.
The renunciation of force agreements with Moscow and
Warsaw in 1970, the Basic treaty between the two German
states in 1972, and the 1971 four-power agreement on
Berlin paved the way for increased contacts between the
West Germans and the East.
Unlike the United States situation, detente for
West Germans has provided many visible advantages and thus
makes its presence felt in domestic politics. The
domestic consideration that Ostopolitik formed the single
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most significant achievement of the SDP/FDP coalition
since 1969 led to the government's natural desire to
prevent any negative repercussions of extra-European
conflicts on the domestic West German partisan debate.
Ostopolitik has succeeded in political, human, and
material terms. During the last few years this policy has
produced more human contact between the two Germanys, an
improvement in the Berlin situation, and a yearly increas-
ing influence of Bonn in West and East Europe. Millions
of West Germans have been allowed to visit the GDR, and a
larger number of East Germans have travelled West than
ever before. In purely humanitarian terms there has been
a marked amelioration of contact between the Germanys.
On the more materialistic plane, the initiatives of
Ostopolitik ushered in a period of increased trade
between the Federal Republic, the Soviet Union, and the
East Bloc.
However, these gains from Ostopolitik have not
come without sacrifices on the part of the Federal
Republic. The Soviets have tried to woo and bully the
Federal Republic and especially during times of tension
have made a finely calibrated use of the carrot and stick
approach through the East German government. Thus, in
1980, during the Polish crisis, the East Berlin government
initiated a policy which drastically limited contacts with
West Germans by increasing the mandatory exchange minimum
160

(which is in effect an entrance fee for visitors from the
West) to DM 25 per day and person. Thus, a family of four
has to pay DM 100 (roughly $45) to the East Berlin
government if it wishes to spend a day with relatives in
East Germany. [Ref. 94: p. 180] This policy has halved
the number of West German visitors to the East; and as
always, East Berlin does not allow East Germans to visit
the West, except the elderly and in exceptional cases.
In addition, Bonn quietly continues to buy the
liberty of East Germans who are permitted to leave.
These payments to the GDR totaled 56 million dollars in
1977 and continue at that annual rate. A Berlin human
rights group estimates that the going price is 12,000-
15,000 dollars per person. Yet East Germans are netting
much more than the proceeds of this "body trade" in their
dealings with Bonn. The East owes West Germany 2.25
billion dollars in the so-called inner-deutscherhandel
,
the open-ended barter trade between East and West Germany.
"In the summer of 1980, Bonn extended an additional 293
million dollars in aid to build roads and canals between
the two countries. [Ref. 95: p. 42]
Despite these efforts by Bonn, the Soviets, after
the invasion of Afghanistan, cancelled a number of
detente-oriented meetings , hinted at cutbacks in trade
between West Germany and the COMECON countries (the value
of which is now approaching that between West Germany and
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the United States), and issued veiled hints that access
to Berlin might again be impeded. The events in Poland in
19 80 forced Chancellor Schmidt to cancel a long-awaited
summit between East and West Germany when the East German
communist leader, Erich Honecker, refused to let him visit
the Baltic port of Rostock.
The gains from detente and the sacrifices that
Bonn is willing to endure underline the commitment of the
Federal Republic to its Qstopolitik . The Eastern policy
which Brandt launched in 19 69 set the stage for a more
active Wespolitik, and the successes of Ostopolitik must
have diluted somewhat the political importance of NATO
from a West German perspective. As long as reunification
remains as a German aspiration, the ingredients for
potential deals between Bonn and Moscow remain, but this
does not entirely release West Germany from military
dependence on the United States and the Atlantic Alliance.
This latter fact serves as a check on West German inter-
national assertiveness , but does not eliminate it. For by
whatever standards of past or present, the division of
Germany is almost unalterable. The peace of Europe was
built on it, and no one, including the United States, is
likely to jeopardize this condition. As the process of
detente in Europe evolves—as it has evolved in spite of
periodic setbacks—West German foreign policy may be
increasingly less inhibited by her military vulnerability.
162

Bonn's Qstopolitik will maintain a growing freedom of
action between the East and the West.
The second major facet of Bonn's new assertive-
ness is the growing lack of confidence in the ability of
the United States to guarantee the security of West
Germany, and the increasing number of bilateral disagree-
ments between the United States and the Federal Republic.
Since the signing of the London and Paris agreements in
1954 f and later the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty in
1969, West Germany has relied on the U.S. nuclear um-
brella for security. Understandably, even minor con-
troversies concerning American nuclear weapons policy
have profound effects in Bonn. Bonn watched with appre-
hension the developments during the SALT negotiations,
fearing that the results would fail to safeguard the
interests of NATO. The problems associated with Long
Range Theater Nuclear Force (LRTFN) modernization and the
periodic controversies over the enhanced radiation
weapon (ERW) have also contributed to Bonn's loss of
confidence in U.S. political wisdom. The role of theater
nuclear weapons on West German soil also leaves questions
in West German minds. For the Federal Republic these
weapons represent an additional in-theater deterrent, a
link to the U.S. strategic deterrent, and a symbol of the
U.S. defense commitment to West Germany. They are clearly
not thought of as war-fighting weapons.
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As a result of many events, West German confidence
in the United States as a fundamental pillar of Western
defense was weakened over the past decade and visibility
shaken by 1979. The overthrow of the Shah of Iran coming
as it did on the heels of increased Soviet-Cuban adventurism
in Africa and a general concern over what appeared to be
America's post-Vietnam refusal to take risks in defense of
vital interests contributed to this feeling. After
Afghanistan, West Germans wondered about U.S. leadership
and military capability at a time when the U.S. began
pursuing a tougher policy toward the Soviet Union. Some
even attributed President Carter's get-tough policy to
domestic political pressures during an election year.
West German-American disagreements have broken out
over economic policy, nuclear proliferation issues (the
Federal Republic's proposed sale of a nuclear reprocessing
plant to Brazil) , and weapon standardization—which the
West Germans see as a facade to establish a one-way flow
of American arms sales to Western Europe. Finally, Bonn
has in the past chaffed over the perceived lack of alliance
consultation on the part of the United States. For
example, during the October 19 7 3 Middle East war President
Nixon ordered a global alert of American military forces
without notifying the NATO allies until seven hours after
the alert was initiated. Nor was Bonn provided any informa-
tion about the weakening of NATO's combat readiness as a
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result of American redeployment of armored units and F-4
aircraft or the shipment of U.S. weapons to Israel from
the American pier at Bremerhaven. [Ref. 96: p. 474]
These examples of West German disappointment in
U.S. policy and German-American disagreements are not
presented to imply that bitter denunciations are about to
break out on either side, nor to imply that U.S. policy was
necessarily at fault in each case. The point to be made is
that differences over a number of complex political,
economic, and military issues have caused U.S.-FRG relations
to seem more competitive than in the past. As a result West
Germany has begun to seek greater freedom of action in the
Atalntic Alliance and a larger leadership role in a more
assertive European Community.
West German measures to preserve her economic
achievements are the final major components of Bonn's, more
assertive foreign policy. Under Chancellor Schmidt, the
Federal Republic has displayed an increased self-confidence
in making its own decisions on how to best deploy her
economic strength. West Germany's economic power can be
compared to France's nuclear deterrent in that they both
represent each nation's claim to status at the head of a
group of medium powers below the two superpowers.
Chancellor Schmidt has told his countrymen that, "at least
in the field of international monetary affairs, West Germany
can count itself a world power equivalent to the United
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States." [Ref. 97: p. 118] In short, West Germany's
economy is perhaps her major source of national power, one
which Bonn will go to great lengths to protect.
In summary, it is apparent that the Federal
Republic has increasingly put to rest the mocking descrip-
tion of West Germany in the 1960s as an "economic giant"
but a "political dwarf." As a result the United States
faces the risk that in the 1930s, West Germany will come to
believe that realizing its identity requires a broad
rejection of U.S. leadership. The Federal Republic
remains dependent on U.S. military guarantees, but this
does not translate to agreement on all aspects of American
foreign policy. Perhaps not enough attention has been paid
in the West to a recent statement by Mr. Schmidt in which
he said,
One must admonish all who bear responsibility in
German politics not to bind themselves one-sidedly to
the decisions of another government but to the interests
of their own people and their own state. That is the
principle to be guided by. [Ref. 99: p. 23]
The U.S. should be concerned over how this new assertive-
ness will affect West German acceptance of the United
States' views on how to best guard Western interests in
Europe and in the Persian Gulf area.
2 . Potential for Increased West German Contribution
In response to the Iranian revolution and the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan the United States moved
quickly to increase the size of the American military
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presence in the Persian Gulf area by the traditional method
of increased naval power. The force levels that U.S. naval
involvement reached in the ensuing months made it apparent
that a continuous presence of this magnitude could not be
maintained in the Indian Ocean without adversely affecting
U.S. capabilities elsewhere. The military problem was
further complicated for the West by its inability to
quickly introduce substantial ground forces into the Gulf
area. These problems immediately generated a debate
within NATO concerning the geographical area of responsi-
bility of the Alliance and the role of individual states in
protecting Western oil supplies.
In West Germany, a few non-governmental observers
aired the idea of West German warship participation in an
international force to patrol the oil routes, and members
of the opposition such as Manfred Woerner and Franz Joseph
Strauss initially advocated an extension of NATO's defense
area to include the Middle East. However the overwhelming
consensus of opinion reflected that of European NATO as a
whole—that the established boundaries of NATO must remain
unchanged and that any military action or contemplated
action should be conducted on a bilateral or mutilateral
basis between nations that have the specific interest and
ability to act in extra-NATO contingencies.
After a Bundestag debate on January 17, 1980, both
Chancellor Schmidt and Foreign Minister Genschcer made it
167

clear that West Germany rejected demands for a wider NATO
military role and that the Bundeswehr would continue to
perform its traditional function in NATO's central region.
On November 12, 1980, Admiral Harry D. Train, Supreme
Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT)
,
gave an address to
the Belgian Royal Institute of International Relations in
Brussels on the theme of NATO's increasing maritime
responsibilities. In this speech he emphasized that:
Article 4 of the NATO treaty which makes provision
for inter-allied consultation is intended to stipulate
the need for consultation in the event of threats in
any part of the world, according to an informal agreed
interpretation. This includes threats to the signa-
tories overseas territories. Thus, though the defense
zone of the treaty was limited to the North Atlantic
area, the worldwide scope of the Atlantic powers'
interests was recognized. Simply stated, there is no
NATO border. There never was the slightest thought in
the mind of the drafters that it should prevent col-
lective planning, manoevers or operation South of the
Tropic of Cancer in the Atlantic Ocean or in any other
area important to the security of the parties. There-
fore, when I speak in terms of NATO's increased mari-
time responsibilities, I mean worldwide. [Ref. 99:
p. 4]
In spite of this interpretation of NATO's area of
responsibility, the role of the Bundeswehr and Bundesmarine
is likely to remain confined to the European theater for
the foreseeable future. Any multilateral military action
in the extra-NATO areas will be left to the British, French,
and Americans. Indeed, West German participation in
militarily countering Soviet or other threats in the Persian





The final communique of the Defense Planning
Committee of NATO, meeting in Ministerial Session on 12-13
May 1980, spells out the concept of NATO's division of
labor as follows:
The United States and other nations have already-
responded to challenges arising from situations outside
the NATO area. Future deployment of the United States
Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) to deter aggression and
respond to requests by nations for help could involve
possible changes in the availability of combat and
support forces currently committed to NATO in a re-
inforcement role. At the same time as the United
States carries out its efforts to strengthen defense
capabilities elsewhere, allied capabilities to deter
aggression and to defend NATO Europe should also be
maintained and strengthened. This situation only
heightens the need for all allies to maintain levels
and standards of forces necessary for defense and
deterrence in the NATO area. [Ref. 100: p. ]]
This statement followed a February 1980 statement
by General Rogers, who in addition to being SACEUR is also
Commander of U.S. forces in Europe,
The most visible function of U.S. troops lies with
our integration into NATO's military command structure.
However, the common and vital interests of the U.S. and
Europe are secured only to the extent that the nations
of the alliance join in an unreserved commitment to
share not only the benefits but also the risks and
burdens associated with our collective NATO effort.
[Ref. 101: p. 1]
These words might be construed to imply that, if Europe was
not forthcoming in her efforts to share the increased
burden of Western defense, the United States might be
forced to act unilaterally. The extent of European fear
that U.S. ground forces currently stationed in Europe might
be withdrawn to meet extra-European crises was illustrated
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by the furor created over what was perhaps a loosely-
worded statement by NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns in
May 1980. Luns declared that "Europeans must come to terms
with the idea of troop withdrawals by the U.S. from Europe
in tne event of an acute crisis outside NATO's theater of
action." Upon his return to Europe, he quickly amended the
term troop withdrawals to force withdrawals and stipulated
that this meant that U.S. Naval units might be withdrawn
from the North Atlantic and the Mediterranean. [Ref. 102:
p. 2[ Bonn's Defense Minister Kans Apel addressed this same
issue in a May 1980 Eurogroup meeting, declaring that:
The U.S.A. has no intention of withdrawing troops
in Europe for deployment elsewhere, but reserve troops
in the U.S.A. for use in NATO may possibly have to be
used in another region of the world. This is where
the sharing of the burden comes in, i.e., on the basis
of the NATO LTDP passed in May 1978, efforts will be
concentrated initially on achieving the objective of
developing European reserve units. [Ref. 100: p. 1]
As has been previously discussed, the Federal Republic at
that time was already well on the way to establishing more
and quicker reserve potential under the reorganization of
the Bundeswehr. The overwhelming concern in West Germany
was the potential withdrawal of U.S. troops and equipment
from West Germany in the event of an overseas crisis.
Under the division of labor concept several official
NATO sources have proposed that West Germany, among others,
assume a greater share of the maritime responsibility in the
Atlantic and Mediterranean in order to free American or
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British units for duty elsewhere. In May 1980, during a
joint meeting of NATO defense and foreign ministers the
defense minister of the Netherlands proposed that a second
allied naval squadron made up of units from Norway, Denmark,
West Germany, Belgium, the United Kingdom, Portugal, and
the United States, be formed in order to compensate for the
increased responsibility of the U.S. in the Gulf region.
[Ref. 103: p. 1]
West German officials, as previously noted, have
indicated that the Bundesmarine will operate only in the
NATO area; however, military officials have discussed the
possibility of assigning extra tasks to the West German
navy. American officials are particularly desirous of
seeing a larger role for the Federal Republic in helping to
extend NATO naval presence south of the Tropic of Cancer,
and these plans have already been publicly endorsed by
some West German military spokesmen. [Ref. 96: p. 4 77]
Nevertheless, the assets for a larger West German role may
be lacking. Although the Bundesmarine has ships with blue
water capabilities, and undertakes occasional deployments
beyond the NATO area, there are no current plans to
increase the size of the Bundesmarine—new construction is
entirely for replacement. Moreover, German naval officials,
stress that the 3undesmarine does not need larger warships
than those under construction (the F122 frigate) , which are
commensurate with its sphere of mission—the Baltic and the
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northern flank of Europe. [Ref. 104: p. 58] For this
reason, additional West German naval contributions are
likely to take the form of largely symbolic rotations of
Bundesmarine units outside their traditional Baltic theater
of operations.
The most substantial area of West Germany's contri-
bution is likely to be improvement of Europe's defense
under the guidelines of the LTDP. The Federal Republic is
under pressure to effect prompt or accelerated implementa-
tion of such measures as increased readiness, reserve
mobilization, war reserve munitions and material, support
for reinforcing forces, and NATO's infrastructrue program.
German officials have indicated a willingness to assume
these tasks, but insist that it must involve alliance-wide
participation. Defense Minister Apel has commented,
If we are supposed to do something about ammunition
stockpiling for example, then others must do that
jointly with us. They must not rely on well-stocked
German depots believing they need not make any financial
sacrifices. [Ref. 105: p. 3]
The Federal Republic knows that it will have to shoulder
still heavier defense commitments than in the past,
notably in the so-called host-nation support program of
logistic backing for American reinforcements. Thus, Bonn's
military contribution largely becomes a question of




Although West Germany's contribution to NATO must
be measured in much broader terms than that which enters
into the equation NATO uses under the three percent guide-
line established as part of the LTDP , this figure has been
the center of much controversy between the United States
and West Germany. After the invasion of Afghanistan,
Washington began to press Bonn more forcefully to increase
the Federal Republic's share of financial support for
rapid reinforcement and readiness programs, including
underwriting additional costs for U.S. troops in West
Germany. While the request for additional funds has been
part of NATO long range planning for several years, the U.S
proposals have come at a time when West Germany has been
sliding into a recession with the government of Chancellor
Schmidt looking at major cutbacks or freezing of a number
of national spending programs, including defense.
Bonn quickly became upset by the close scrutiny of
the Federal Republic's contribution to NATO and was quick
to point out that its armed forces are the best in Western
Europe and that, unlike the Anglo-American countries, its
forces consist of highly motivated conscripts. West
German spokesmen have criticized the three percent goal
as "mechanistic" and have suggested that West' Germany can




The controversy gained momentum in late October
1980, when spokesmen for the leading coalition parties, the
SPD and the FDP , reported that as a result of preliminary
budget talks the real growth of West German military
spending would slow to about 1.8 percent in 19 81. At the
same time the defense ministry financial situation was
deteriorating because of two factors: (a) the rise in fuel
prices, which heavily affected West Germany's highly
mechanized, gas consuming military structure, and (b) the
cost explosion of the Tornado (MRCA) weapons system. The
increased cost of the MRCA forced the West German air-
force and navy to trim back and stretch other military
system acquisition programs, and announcements were made
that all spending programs would be frozen until 1984.
[Ref. 106: p. 18] The cost increase for the Tornado came
in the midst of a major West German defense expenditure
program as part of the LTDP of NATO.
Following urging from the United States, as well as
other NATO members and German military leaders, West
Germany agreed in the beginning of 19 81 to increase defense
spending to a rate of about 6.2 percent over the 1980
defense budget. With adjustment for inflation this increase
still fell below the NATO goal of three percent real
increase. Preliminary plans for the 1982 defense budget
proposed a nominal increase of 4.2 percent over 1981, which
(with inflation in West Germany expected to be 4.5 percent)
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equated to a zero growth, in defense spending for 1982.
Chancellor Schmidt commented that this figure was as a
result of record high U.S. interest rates, which have
contributed to a downturn in the West German economy.
[Ref. 107: p. 26] This reduced military spending has
resulted in a curtailment of several programs for 1982. In
addition to a decreased number of training flights for air-
force and navy pilots, the Bundeswehr has had to dip into
peacetime strategic oil reserves to meet fuel needs and the
rate of delivery of weapon systems such as Tornado and
Leopard II, has decreased. The poor financial position of
the defense ministry has led to the potential shortage of
certain military equipment, including insufficient ammo
stocks to cover the 30-day NATO requirement and a lack of
electronic countermeasures equipment.
In October 1981, the West German cabinet voted to
cut 19 82 outlays even further, thus decreasing the nominal
defense increase over 1931 from 4.2 percent to 3.6 percent.
Defense ministry officials pointed out that this figure
still represents a greater increase than the overall
federal budget increase of 2.8 percent; but nevertheless
Bonn was heavily criticized by the Reagan administration.
[Ref. 108: p. 29]
The controversy over the "three percent solution"
for NATO defense expenditures is a complicated one, and it
is probably true that this rigid standard should be
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de-emphasized. However, at a time when the division of
labor concept is translating into European money and U.S.
money and personnel, and when President Reagan is embarked
on a massive build-up of America's strategic and convention-
al strength with resulting high defense expenditures, some
difficult questions will be asked in Congress about allied
defense spending, especially that of the Federal Republic.
3 . West Germany and the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan
The invasion of Afghanistan met with a mixed
reaction in West Germany. Rather than serving as a "call
to arms" or a rallying point for increased attention to
such topical NATO imperatives as LRTFN modernization,
reaction to the Soviet invasion included concern over
American "over-reaction" as well as Soviet aggression.
Fear of the destruction of detente and economic relations
which had been tediously built up during the past decade,
matched the fear of potential future Soviet aggression in
areas such as Yugoslavia and Norway.
These opposing opinions were expressed by former
West German Chancellor Willy Brandt and CDU defense spokes-
man Manfred Woerner, respectively. Brandt expressed the
opinion that,
The Soviet intervention is a serious matter, But
it shows that the world is still suffering from too
little rather than too much detente and that we must
do everything in our power to promote detente beyond
Europe. In any event reason speaks against playing
these events against the efforts to effectively limit
armaments. [Ref. 109: p. 4]
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Woerner, on the other hand, outlined a program of action
that would clearly dovetail with the more hard-line
American initiatives, including complete financial, mili-
tary, moral, and political solidarity with the United
States. More specifically, he called for protection
guarantees for countries in particular danger (Pakistan,
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, or Israel), intensification of rela-
tions with China, and an elimination of the geographic
limits of NATO. [Ref. 110: p. 3]
The official policy pursued by Chancellor Helmut
Schmidt represented a view between these two positions, but
was nevertheless representative of the tough situation West
Germany found herself in. Throughout the aftermath of
Afghanistan, the Federal Republic sought to appear as a
reliable partner with the United States while creating the
impression that Bonn was using her influence on the United
States to urge restraint over the invasion. Thus, Bonn
joined the rest of Western Europe in publicly denouncing
the Soviet action, but was much less forthcoming with
respect to more tangible actions. The Federal Republic
avoided taking an isolated stance against the Soviet Union
by voicing her policies in conjunction with the French
(after the Schmidt-Giscard summit of 5 February 1980) and
within the EEC (British Foreign Secretary Carrington '
s
proposal that Afghanistan be granted neutral status)
.
Meanwhile, Chancellor Schmidt insisted on keeping open the
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lines of communication with Moscow; and shortly after the
invasion of Afghanistan met with Soviet leader Leonid
Brezhnev, despite the misgivings of American leaders.
Americans were particularly disappointed with the
reaction to President Carter's plan for economic reprisals
against the Soviet Union. In the spring of 1980, there was
a joke making the rounds in Eastern bloc politics to the
effect that the Russians may have lost their last friends
by invading Afghanistan, but the Capitalists have remained
faithful to them. [Ref. Ill: p. 6] This only half-
facetious statement describes the lack of Atlantic soli-
darity which characterized President Carter's sanction
program. Economic reprisals against the Soviet Union
entailed a much greater risk for West Germany than the
United States; therefore, it is not surprising that there
was a great deal of disagreement between the two countries
over these measures.
As a minimum, the United States desired from her
NATO allies agreements to grant no exceptions for the Soviet
Union to the coordinating committees (COCOM) list of
exports banned to Communist countries. In addition
Washington sought allied support to expand the COCOM list to
cover, among other things, a much wider range of computers
and software, oil and gas field equipment, steel mill
equipment, communications equipment, and various other high
technology wares. [Ref. 112: p. 59] The United States also
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asked for a total cutoff of official credit to the Soviet
Union and a continued joint embargo of grain exports and
re-exports to the U.S.S.R. The Soviets for their part
hinted at cutbacks in trade between West Germany and the
COMECON countries (the value of which is now approaching
that between West Germany and the U.S.) , and issued veiled
hints that access to Berlin might again be impeded, while
canceling a number of detente-oriented meetings with Bonn.
Against this backgound, Chancellor Schmidt after a
fireside White House chat on world affairs in April 1980,
stated that,
While observing all treaty commitments, we shall
arrange our economic ties with the Soviet Union in such
a way that our economy does not derive advantage from
measures taken by fellow allies. But we shall never-
theless continue to regard trade and economic coopera-
tion with all of the countries of Eastern Europe as
important elements in our policy of fostering
European stability. [Ref. Ill: p. 6]
The Chancellor had earlier specified that West Germany
would not break agreements already signed with the Soviets
and would only go along with an addition tightening of the
rules providing all Western bloc nations did the same.
Economic Minister Otto Graf Lambsdorff later added
that,
While Germany may display a good measure of soli-
darity with the U.S. against Russia on Afghanistan, it
has no plans to drop its commercial dealings with other
members of the Warsaw Pact. They have no troops in
Afghanistan so we can go ahead with business as usual.
[Ref. 113: p. 66]
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Three months later, following a meeting between Count
Lambsdorff and Soviet Deputy Premier Nikoli Tikhonov, it
was announced that Bonn and Moscow were to intensify and
extend economic cooperation, especially in the energy
sector, between that time and the end of the century.
Count Lambsdorff remarked that "Our economic ties are
satisfactory, but they cannot be viewed separately from the
background of international affairs." [Ref. 114: p. 1]
—
a rather ironic statement in view of the circumstances and
the timing
.
In short, trade between the Federal Republic, the
Soviet Union and East European countries—the linchpin of
the detente process
—
proved to be a double-edged sword.
Although economic interaction does provide many benefits
for West Germany and allows for some penetration of the
Soviet bloc, these same economic ties effectively negated
West German support for the primary non-military weapon
that the West possessed to influence Soviet behavior after
Afghanistan.
The question of the Olympic boycott highlighted
again West Germany's cautious attitude about making any
move that would openly antagonize Moscow. Although many on
either side of the Atlantic felt that politics should not
interfere with the Olympics, Europeans also felt that
President Carter's boycott ultimatum to Moscow virtually
overrode his allies. For this reason, as late as February
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1980, Bonn still gave the impression that the question of
West German participation was still open. Significantly,
even after Bonn's declaration that West Germany would not
participate, Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher felt
it necessary to remind his countrymen that there was a
quid pro quo: "We shall not deny the U.S. our solidarity
in the question of the Olympic Games," announced Genscher,
"but we expect solidarity from the U.S. on the Berlin
question." [Ref. 113: p. 59] The Olympic boycott pales in
comparison to other measures directed against Moscow, but
it has the potential to greatly diffuse the propaganda
advantages Moscow would have gained with a full-participa-
tion event. In any case it was a low risk method for
demonstration of Western solidarity that did not achieve
the optimum results.
The controversies over economic sanctions and the
Olympic boycott highlight the general disagreement
between Bonn and Washington that transpired after
Afghanistan. While West Germans tended to view American
policies as short-sighted and provocative, there was a
growing conviction in the United States that the Federal
Republic was attempting to remain outside of the super-
power rivalry, and that Chancellor Schmidt too often
resembled the mediator rather than the ally.
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C. SUMMARY AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
West Germany's new strength and new willingness to
flex her muscles will bear significantly on every issue
from the immediate and medium term balance of power to
the long-term avoidance of a declining Western ability to
influence events in Europe or such vital regions as the
Persian Gulf ares. While most Americans see the Federal
Republic allying herself with the United States not only
by force of circumstance and geography, but by preference,
for West Germans the choice is in fact hard, subtle, and
complex. This becomes apparent when one analyzes the
manner and degree to which the Federal Republic expects
to contribute to the security of Western oil supplies
flowing from the Persian Gulf region.
As a strong Western industrialized country, West
Germany has the potential to make a large contribution to
Western security, especially in Europe. In addition, it
is possible that the Bundesmarine may in the future
accept a larger role within the confines of the Atlantic
or Mediterranean, thus releasing maritime assets of the
United States, France and/or Great Britain for use else-
where. However, the prime contribution expected by the
Federal Republic's allies, especially the United States,
lies within the economic sphere. It is within this realm
that the Federal Republic is expected to contribute
support for key NATO allies such as Turkey and
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accelerate the fulfillment of key measures under the
LTDP in order to improve the conventional defense and
deterrent capabilities of NATO Europe. The former
contribution, the support of Turkey, implies close
political and economic relations between 3onn and Ankara,
while the latter, acceleration of the LTDP, implies
increased defense spending. On both of these counts,
American confidence in West German intentions is
decreasing.
The trend in West German defense spending to a point
where growth after adjustment for inflation will reach
zero or negative growth has already been discussed and
there are clouds on the horizon concerning West German
aid to Turkey. European governments, including the
Federal Republic, continue to impose political and eco-
nomic sanctions on Turkey citing anti-democratic actions
on the part of the Turkish government. The OECD led by
West Germany and Scandinavian countries recently cut off
600 million dollars in economic aid to Turkey in 1981,
and the Common Market has suspended talks on full Turkish
membership in that organization until democracy is
restored in Turkey. [Ref. 115: p. 19] While it is true
that the United States in the past has used the boycott
weapon on Turkey when it was perhaps not in the best
interest of NATO, it is difficult to reconcile Bonn's
policy on Turkey with Bonn's policy on Poland recently.
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In the case of Turkey, a key strategic NATO ally plunged
into military government by a systematic campaign of
terrorism, West Germany has deferred a decision on 1982
aid because of tardiness in returning to democratic rule.
In the case of Poland, a Warsaw Pact member, upset by an
outbreak of freedom, West Germany argues for the continua-
tion of aid in the face of the reimposition of
totalitarianism.
Naturally this is a highly simplified view of the
situation and doesn't reflect the West German economic
stakes or political investments in the Polish situation;
but in conjunction with American concern over West German
defense spending, this anomaly calls into question West
German intentions concerning their role within the NATO
"division of labor." These concerns were outlined in a
recent article in Aviation Week and Space Tehcnology
[Ref. 116: p. 65], which claimed that a cautious move is
underway by the Reagan administration to deemphasize the
central region of NATO, and in particular, U.S. reliance
on West Germany as the centerpiece of Western strategy in
Europe:
According to high level State and Defense
department officials there has been a shift by the
administration in the direction of France and the
United Kingdom as strong alliance partners at a time
when the resolve of West Germany to meet the Soviet
threat is weakening.
This report may exaggerate the situation somehwat, but it
cannot be denied that the intrusion of extra-regional
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crises such as the increasing vulnerability of Western
oil supplies has strongly contributed to change in
Washington-Bonn bilateral relations. This, plus the
increasingly independent policy of the Federal Republic
within the Western alliance necessitates a redefinition of
West Germany's role in American foreign policy, particularly
in relation to the protection of Western oil supplies from
the Persian Gulf Region.
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V. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF FRENCH AND
WEST GERMAN POLICIES
France and the Republic of Germany exhibit differ-
ences and similarities in relation to their interests in
the security of the Persian Gulf as well as their capa-
bilities and intentions to contribute to its defense. As
the United States continues to lead in formulating a
response to threats in this region, it is necessary to
understand the individual strengths and weaknesses of
allies in order that each country can perform the tasks
for which it is best suited.
France and West Germany share several significant
interests in the security of the Persian Gulf region.
Foremost among these is their direct reliance on energy
supplies from the region. Second, both countries are
involved in interlocking economic and security arrange-
ments with other industrial countries such as the United
States which heavily depend upon Persian Gulf sources of
energy. While some of these Western industrial partners,
such as Great Britain and Norway, have to a large degree
escaped from reliance on Persian Gulf sources since 1973,
the United States has increased the share of its oil
imports from this region. In addition, France and West
Germany share the West's concern that the Soviet Union and
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its East European allies could become serious competitors
for energy from this region in the future.
Concerning direct reliance on OPEC and the Arab
members of OPEC, the Federal Republic of Germany is in a
somewhat better position than France. Table 3 shows that
by 1979 West Germany had cut oil imports from OPEC to
almost 60 percent of total oil imports while France still
depended on OPEC for 85.5 percent of her oil imports. The
imports from Arab members of OPEC were 40.6 percent and
70.8 percent for West Germany and France, respectively.
Additionally, the Federal Republic possesses the advantage
of significant domestic reserves of coal, which constitute
a more expensive source of energy than oil but nevertheless
a secure source in an emergency. France, on the other
hand, has negligible domestic coal reserves.
Whereas the Federal Republic possesses an advantage
over France concerning coal reserves, France has a more
advanced and ambitious nuclear energy program than West
Germany. While nuclear plant construction has been
frozen in West Germany due to environemental pressure,
the French government continues to develop this energy
source though at a reduced construction rate under
Mitterrand's leadership.
3oth countries are striving to develop alternative
sources of energy to diversify supply sources, and to
improve conservation techniques. In these areas an
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important development has been the natural gas deal that
both countries have entered into with the Soviet Union.
The Yamal natural gas pipeline deal will increase the
share of Soviet gas in West Germany's gas imports to
almost 30 percent and the share of Soviet gas in West
Germany's overall energy needs to about 5 percent. For
France, this project will more than double current French
gas imports from the Soviets to 25 percent of France's
natural gas supplies and raise French dependence on Soviet
gas to 4 percent of her total energy needs.
In short, the energy situation of West Germany in the
short term looks better than that of France when one
considers the percentage of their respective oil imports
from the OPEC suppliers and West Germany's coal reserves.
France in the future may overcome this West German
advantage with her more aggressive nuclear program.
However, the present slight advantage of West Germany must
be tempered by the realization that her economy is more
heavily dependent on exports and her primary trade partners,
including France, are vulnerable to energy disruptions in
the Persian Gulf region. For these reasons, neither
France nor West Germany can ignore the necessity for
developing political, economic, and military capabilities
to protect their interests in this region.
The capabilities of France and West Germany to
contribute to the security of the Persian Gulf region vary
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widely, especially in the military sphere. Whereas both
countries can provide a degree of political and economic
influence in the Gulf region, only France can project
military power into the area. West Germany, on the other
hand, makes an indirect contribution to Persian Gulf
security through German conventional military power in
central Europe. West German strength in central Europe
may permit France and the U.S. to dedicate more resources
to the Persian Gulf.
Politically, both France and the Federal Republic are
involved with the Middle East and Persian Gulf states due
to historical linkages and economic relationships. Owing
in part to energy dependence on the Arab states, each
maintains a more pro-Arab line than the United States
concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict. Thus both have the
potential to act as a political bridge between the Arab
world and the West that is essentially denied to the
United States because of American support for Israel. In
this respect, West Germany is more constrained than France
because of the general feeling of obligation to Israel
which resulted from the genocide during World War II.
France and the Federal Republic maintain economic and
arms transfer relationships with Middle East and Persian
Gulf states. However, the so-called arms-for-oil
relationship seems to be aimed more at gaining political
influence than maintaining regional stability, and in this
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respect France is mere directly involved than West
Germany. For the French there is little incentive to
forego arms sales simply because they might destabilize
the military balance in the Middle East. [Ref. 117: p. 26]
Conversely, West Germany has declined to offer armored
equipment to both Saudi Arabia and Iran during the past.
However, in comparison to France, West Germany can offer
developing oil-producing Arab states a somewhat wider
variety of industrial products. In short, in the area of
potential influence stemming from arms relations or
industrial trade, France has the advantage in the former
while West Germany maintains the upper hand in the latter.
Militarily, West Germany has much less potential than
France to influence events in the Gulf region, although
West German efforts in Turkey must be considered in this
respect. Conversely, West Germany is more influential as
an American partner in the maintenance of deterrence and
the defense of Europe, although this must be tempered by
the existence of French nuclear and conventional forces
in Europe. France, unlike the Federal Republic, possesses
a diversified military force responsible for global
commitments.
West Germany possesses no counterpart to the French
intervention forces or global naval capacilities. Nor
does the Federal Republic maintain overseas military
bases comparable to the French bases in Djibouti, Reunion,
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or Mayotte. Moreover, West German military power has
never been used abroad since 1945 (with the exception of
the Mogadishu operation by Bonn's anti-terrorist (GSG-9
team) . West Germany could reap the belated fruits of the
Versailles settlement which, in 1919, relieved the
Weimar Republic of all of the Reich's colonial possessions.
Without colonies, there were no colonial wars to be fought.
The Federal Republic could enjoy the blessings of military
inaction while England, France, and the United States
squandered their blood and treasure in military inter-
ventions aroung the globe. [Ref. 118: p. 68]
In contrast, France was involved in protracted wars in
Indochina and Algeria, and has conducted numerous military
interventions from Suez in 19 56 to Zaire in the recent
past. France still maintains a global network of overseas
possessions and is one of a few countries in the world to
permanently deploy naval forces abroad. In short, France
has the capacity and the potential motivation to militarily
assist American forces if it becomes necessary in the
Persian Gulf region, whereas West Germany does not.
In Europe a comparison of military capabilities
becomes more complex. On one hand, the Federal Republic
fields the largest and best-equipped conventional forces
on the central front, which are fully committed to the
Alliance and determined to defend their territory within
the forward defense strategy. These assets are
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complemented by naval forces primarily designed and
oriented toward a strictly regional function in the Baltic
Sea and North Atlantic. France, on the other hand, fields
a smaller, but capable conventional army whose role in a
conflict in Europe is still ambiguous. Equally ambiguous
is the role of the French independent nuclear force. The
French navy is much larger and more diversified than that
of West Germany and possesses limited sea control and
amphibious capabilties , as well as aircraft carriers.
These naval elements could operate either in the Atlantic
of on NATO's southern flank in the Mediterranean. Both
France and West Germany contribute to deterrence in
Europe—France with her independent nuclear force (and
to a lesser degree, with her conventional forces) and
West Germany with her large conventional forces on the
central front.
France and the Federal Republic each face constraints
on their ability to contribute to deterrence and defense
in Europe and to the security of the Persian Gulf region.
Foremost among these constraints is the effect of the
general Western economic slowdown, which has resulted in
closer scrutiny to the relationship between "guns and
butter" in national budgets. The debate over defense
spending has resulted in greater cutbacks in West German
defense allocations than those of France in spite of the
fact that the Federal Republic's inflation rate has
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remained below that of France and her economic growth
has exceeded that of France. Despite this fact, key
sectors of France's conventional force have suffered due
to traditional heavy spending on nuclear development at
the expense of conventional assets, particularly the
navy. The Federal Republic does not spend billions of
dollars on an independent nuclear force, and it has a
larger gross national product (GNP) to draw from; there-
fore, the effects of a lower percentage of GNP allocated
to defense are ameliorated somewhat. Nevertheless,
limits on defense spending as a result of the global
economic situation will continue to constrain the
contributions of both countries to the security of the
Persian Gulf region.
A comparison of French and West German intentions
relating to the security of the Persian Gulf area
necessitates consideration of several factors. First,
by virtue of different geographic and historical situa-
tions, each country has different potential roles and
interests. Whereas the Federal Republic is more suited
to (and insists upon) a regional role in the maintenance
of deterrence and defense in Europe, France is better
disposed and motivated to assume an overseas role in the
Persian Gulf region. Thus, an assessment of West German
intentions largely consists of examining her willingness
to assume greater responsibilities for the defense of
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Europe and Turkey, while French intentions must be
evaluated against her willingness to cooperate with other
Western nations in the Persian Gulf region. Second, both
countries ' intentions largely depend on how they view
their relationship vis a vis the United States and Soviet
Union.
Considering the second factor first, both France and
West Germany share a considerable interest in the gradual
transformation of the international order but tradition-
ally have chosen different vehicles to achieve this end.
The Federal Republic aspires to eventual national
reunification and a prosperous Germany. France also
dreams of leading Europe from disunity and dependence to
a new position of global strength. Whereas the West
German approach assumes close cooperation with the
United States within the Atlantic Alliance, the French
chose an independent route. While West Germany depended
on her strong economy and the perception of American
power to pursue her goals, France depended on her
independent nuclear strength.
The impact of the 1973 oil crisis and events since
that time have had different effects on French and West
German policies. West Germans have become increasingly
fearful of the erosion of their sources of strength
—
their economy and the perception of American power—with
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the consequent determination of the Federal Republic to
protect her economy and rely less on American perceptions
of how to best protect Western security interests.
France, on the other hand, must realize that her nuclear
deterrent force cannot protect her extensive overseas
interests and that her independent foreign policy must be
modified to include closer overseas cooperation with her
Western allies, particularly the United States. In
effect, France and West Germany are moving toward a
reversal of the traditional relationships which they have
shared with the United States—France's policies are
becoming less independent while West Germany's are
becoming more independent.
This evolution has as its catalyst the increasing
need for Western political and military efforts to
ensure the security of the Persian Gulf region. Since
the invasion of Afghanistan, France has made clear her
direct interest in the Gulf region and her appreciation
of American efforts to ensure its stability. The French
government has been very accommodating by allowing the
use of Djibouti as an airfield for American maritime
patrol aircraft, and French officials have acknowledged
the similarity of American and French military goals in
the area. Moreover, the French have emphasized their
interest in the region by a show of naval force,
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including the deployment of minesweeping forces for
potential use in the Straits of Hormuz . In a more
general demonstration of a strategic concern, France
continues to increase her defense spending above the
three percent goal which NATO had set for itself.
In contrast, the Federal Republic has been less
forthcoming. Unable (and unwilling) to contribute
militarily to the security of the Persian Gulf area,
West Germany has assumed responsibility for improving
NATO's defense in Europe and for strengthening Turkey.
This largely translates to increased defense spending
and closer political and economic ties with Turkey.
Nevertheless, West German defense spending as a percent-
age of GNP has been decreasing and relations with
Turkey have deteriorated since the September 19 80
imposition of martial law in Turkey. This diverse
trend in French and West German policies would support
recent French statements that France is Washington's






In the past decade, a sense of energy vulnerability
has been added to the more enduring sense of Western
vulnerability in Europe. Ever since 1969 the United
States has defined conventional force adequacy as the
capability to deal simultaneously with one major and one
minor contingency in conjunction with our allies. [Ref.
119: p. 7] However, since the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan and the Iranian Revolution, it has become
apparent that the stakes in a "minor contingency" in the
Persian Gulf region could be very large—a serious
disruption of energy flow due to a local conflict or a
Soviet attack in the Gulf would amount to an indirect
attack on Europe with serious consequences for the United
States as well.
Moreover, the rapid build-up of American forces in
the Gulf region (requiring the transfer of naval assets
from the Mediterranean and Pacific theaters) demonstrated
that the additional threat can only be met (at least in
the short-term) by the redeployment of part of the total
of the West's existing military assets in accordance
with a reassessment of strategic priorities. In
addition to a transfer of American maritime power to the
Indian Ocean, this has resulted in a reorganization of
the United States strategic reserve into the Rapid
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Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) , a search for base
access rights, upgrading of existing facilities in the
areas, and the positioning of prestocked cargo ships at
Diego Garcia. However, much more needs to be done; the
demand for a capability in the Gulf is in addition to, not
simply part of, the traditional capability needed in the
European theater.
American policy-makers have said in the past that in
conjunction with our allies we want to be able to protect
critical alliance interests that are endangered by a non-
nuclear attack on the periphery by meeting such an attack
on its own level. In addition, the goal has been to
respond rapidly and decisively in order to frustrate a
quick takeover which would present us with a fait accompli
while at the same time maintaining the capability to fight
or to deter a large war happening at the same time or
shortly thereafter. [Ref. 75: p. 4] Presently, the
ability of the Western allies to accomplish these goals in
the Persian Gulf area with a high degree of confidence is
questionable.
The increased efforts required to provide such a
capability can not be supplied by the United States alone.
This fact has been the basis for renewed American pressure
on all of the allies to improve their defense potential
and cooperation with the United States. Although
indigenous Persian Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia and
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other allies such as Japan are an important part of this
strategy, NATO Alliance members are the key to this
endeavor. In this respect France and the Federal Republic
of Germany are of paramount importance—France, because of
her experience and capabilities in the Persian Gulf area,
and West Germany by virtue of her position as the center-
piece of Western conventional deterrence and defense in
Europe
.
This analysis of French and West German policy
concerning the dual problem of protecting Western interests
in the Persian Gulf region while maintaining a credible
posture in Europe has demonstrated that France's present
perception of the threat and of remedial actions to be
taken are closer to American views than are those of West
Germany. This presents a dilemma for American alliance
strategy when dealing with the Persian Gulf situation.
When the United States takes and implements decisions for
the entire alliance, it is reproached for arrogance (a
situation the French are particularly sensitive to)
.
When, on the other hand, the United States attempts to
comprehensively incorporate European governments into the
decision-making process, Europeans are prone to complain
of inadequate American leadership (a condition West
Germans are particularly sensitive to)
.
Within this framework , the United States must continue
to nurture the seeds of cooperation that have developed
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between French and American policy-makers, being careful
not to pressure French cooperation beyond the point which
evokes protests regarding "NATO-ization" from Gaullists
or Leftists in France. The direction in which French and
American cooperative measures are moving in relation to
the Persian Gulf problem provides advantages for both
countries. The United States gains confidence in the
capability and intention of France to contribute to
joint Western efforts in the region and the low profile
nature of these bilateral relations enables French leaders
to maintain the Gaullist legacy of an independent foreign
policy. The fact that France still remains outside the
integrated military structure of NATO creates some
advantages concerning cooperation in the Gulf region. The
consensus of opinion within NATO dictates that military
planning and/or intervention in this region must be
conducted on a strictly mutilateral or bilateral basis
outside the organizational framework of the Alliance;
thus French absence from the integrated military structure
of NATO is irrelevant in this case. Moreover the French
seem immune to the widespread NATO tendency whereby
member countries base their defense budgeting on a care-
ful comparison with their allies' efforts and often feel




The growing lack of agreement with West Germany
presents a more formidable problem for American policy-
makers. West German efforts to "fill the gap" in Europe
and in Turkey under the so-called division of labor
concept have fallen short of American expectations.
Lately, as in the initial stages of the Polish crisis, the
Federal Republic has even declined to offer verbal support
for the American position. As a sovereign power the
Federal Republic is certainly entitled to pursue her
perceived national interests; however, the American public
and its leadership are becoming increasingly critical of
the West German position at a time when the United States
is embarking on a massive military build-up with huge
economic costs. This improvement of American capabilities
itself will perhaps restore West German confidence in
American power and provide the impetus for renewed West
German defense efforts. If not, the consequences for
NATO alliance cohesion could be ominous.
The potential roles of France and West Germany in the
strategy to ensure the future security of the Persian
Gulf region are substantial. The image that the Western
allies are being dragged along somewhat unwillingly on
American coattails must be dispelled if the American
public and leadership are to continue to support American
political, economic, and military efforts to improve the
Western posture in the region. For France and West
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Germany the agreement to pay a subscription to join the
Persian Gulf "out of area" club would confer a right to
have some say in how the West should respond to events in
distant regions rather than surrendering the initiative
in this respect entirely to the United States.
The present situation that the West faces in the
Persian Gulf region brings to mind Lenin's statement in
1920 concerning how the Soviet Union survived the after-
math of the Russian Revolution:
Weak, torn apart, downtrodden Russia. .. turned out
victorious. . .against the rich mighty countries which
rule the world. . .Why? ... .Because among those powers
was not a shadow of unity, because all of them worked
at cross purposes. [Ref. 120: p. 70]
This statement has even more relevance today, for the





PRIMARY ENERGY CONSUMPTION IN GERMANY





1973 estimate 1974 es tim<
Energy Sources Mtoe 1 % Mtoe o.•3 Mtoe Q.O
Oil 139 55 220 54 163 44
Bitumous Coal
(domestic)





62 15 68 18
Lignite
(domestic)
22 9 25 6 25 7
Nuclear Energy 3 1 60 15 54 15
Other 7 3 7 2 7 2
Total 253 100 407 100 370 100
Mtoe, million tons of oil equivalent
2Adapted from Mendershausen , Horst, Coping with the
Oil Crisis: French and German Experiences , (Johns Hopkins




PRIMARY ENERGY CONSUMPTION IN FRANCE




























Total 176 100 263 100 240 100
Mtoe, million tons of oil equivalent
2Adapted from Meniershausen , Horst, Coping with the
Oil Crisis; French and German Experiences (Baltimore:




COMPARISON OF FRENCH AND WEST GERMAN OIL IMPORTS 1973/79
France Germany
1973 % 1979 o.o 1973 1979 "5
Algeria 222 8.2 102 3.7 268 12.2 196 6.6
Bahrain
Egypt 8
Qatar 426 15.8 76 2.8 173 8.2 10
UAE 173 6.3 151 5.1
Syria 43 1.6 17
Iraq 374 13.8 489 17.7 30 1.4 45
Kuwait 310 11.5 97 3.5 88 4.1 63 2.1
S. Arabia 606 22.4 893 32.3 498 22.8 359 12.0
Libya 130 4.8 33 3.0 516 23.6 358 12.0
OAPSC 2068 76.3 19 56 70.8 1578 71.9 1207 40.6
Ecuador negl. negl.




Iran 216 8 140 5.0 280 12.8 233 7.8
Nigeria 252 9.3 19 3 7.0 204 9.3 294 9.9
Venezuela 36 1.3 84 3.0 42 1.9 32 1.0
OPEC 2620 96.7 2361 35.5 2130 97.1 1768 59.5
Canada negl. negl. 4
Mexico negl. negl.
Other 89 3.3 358 13.0 62 2.3 1175 39.5
Total 2709 100 2762 100 2192 100 2972 100
Oil
Consumotion 2485 2422 2985 2901
(Figures are in thousands of barrels of oil per day)
Figures are derived from The Handbook of Economic Statistics , 1930,
National Foreign Assessment Center and Mendershausen , Horst, Coping
with the Oil Crisis: French and German Experiences (Baltimore:
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